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Abstract 
The rapid growth of information and communication systems in recent years has 
brought with it an increased need for security. Meanwhile, encryption, which 
constitutes the basis of the majority of security schemes, may imply a significant 
amount of energy consumption. Encryption algorithms, depending on their 
complexity, may consume a significant amount of computing resources, such as 
memory, battery power and processing time. Therefore, low energy encryption is 
crucial, especially for battery powered and passively powered devices. Thus, it is of 
great importance to achieve the desired security possible at the lowest cost of energy.  
The approach advocated in this thesis is based on the lack of energy implication in 
security schemes. It investigates the optimum security mode selection in terms of the 
energy consumption taking into consideration the security requirements and suggests 
a model for energy-conscious adaptive security in communications. Stochastic and 
statistical methods are implemented – namely reliability, concentration inequalities, 
regression analysis and betweenness centrality – to evaluate the performance of the 
security modes and a novel adaptive system is proposed as a flexible decision 
making tool for selecting the most efficient security mode at the lowest cost of 
energy. Several symmetric algorithms are simulated and the variation of four 
encryption parameters is examined to conclude the selection of the most efficient 
algorithm in terms of energy consumption. The proposed security approach is 
twofold, as it has the ability to adjust dynamically the encryption parameters or the 
energy consumption, either according to the energy limitations or the severity of the 
requested service. 
 1 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
The rapid evolution of communication and the subsequent rise of security threats in 
recent years, have led to the development and application of a plethora of security 
schemes. To facilitate secret communication, modern security systems rely mainly on 
encryption, the process of encoding information in a way that only the legitimate 
receiver can decode.  
Communication over networks often requires propagation of sensitive information 
between parties. Online transactions, shopping, internet banking, Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSN) for healthcare monitoring, are only few cases that require 
propagation of sensitive information, such as contact details, medical records, 
passwords and Personal Identification Numbers (PINs). Furthermore, with the 
evolution of Cloud Computing, that provides shared computing resources and data 
storage in a network, encryption is a vital concern regarding the security of the data. 
Therefore, the incredible growth of data communications and complexity of modern 
communication systems, as well as the resulting growth of security threats, has led to 
the development of complex and time consuming encryption algorithms. The latter, 
however, depending on the complexity of the algorithm, may consume a significant 
amount of computing resources, such as memory, processing time and battery power 
[1]. The key challenge in providing low energy encryption solutions is subject to the 
offset between minimum energy consumption and maximum encryption strength [2]. 
Hence, investigating and designing energy efficient encryption systems is necessary in 
order to minimize the energy consumption.  
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1.1. Motivation 
 
Knowledge about the optimum selection of the most efficient encryption algorithm 
under specific security restrictions would help in designing systems that can adjust the 
security level, according to the desired level of strength while taking into 
consideration the energy implications. Consequently, the relationship between energy 
consumption and encryption parameters have to be investigated and modelled. In this 
work this issue is addressed and the performance of the encryption schemes for all 
available security options is investigated. 
Traditional approaches mainly cope with maintaining a high level of confidentiality 
and along this line a great deal of effort is put in achieving high secrecy. However, the 
significant implication of energy consumption is not taken into consideration [2]. 
Therefore, modern approaches should bring together encryption strength and energy 
saving. Existing approaches that take into consideration the encryption energy cost are 
mainly based on experimental comparisons of encryption parameters in terms of 
effectiveness and provide results on their behaviour with respect to their impact on 
energy consumption. Although such efforts are very interesting, as demonstrated in 
[3], there is an inherent need to develop global metrics to be used in specifying the 
strength of encryption algorithms.  
In spite of the fact that most authors use the individual performance of the encryption 
parameters as factors to compare and rank algorithms, it does not seem reasonable to 
consider the overall energy performance of the encryption system in complete 
isolation from security [1] and [2]. This further stresses the need for a global quality 
factor [3] and explains the importance of the development of a decision making 
framework that evaluates the overall impact of each security mode on energy 
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consumption. The latter statement is based on the fact that system energy consumption 
depends on the combination of parameters not just on their individual impact [4].  
The purpose of this thesis is to address all these issues and solve the problem 
associated with the lack of the energy implication in modern security techniques.  
 
1.2. Research questions 
 
The aim of this research is to answer the following research questions: 
1. Can the adaptability of encryption systems be based on the energy 
consumption? 
2. Does the combination of modelling techniques, improvement strategies and 
verification methods facilitate the development of energy conscious adaptive 
security? 
3. Can energy conscious adaptive security be integrated into a formal decision 
making process? 
 
1.3. Aims and objectives 
 
The aims of this thesis concern the maximization of encryption performance in terms 
of energy consumption management, taking into consideration several inter-related 
factors. It is intended to develop a generic security framework for the decision making 
regarding the most efficient security mode selection. To this end, the following 
objectives have been set out: 
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1. To identify the limitations of existing security approaches 
2. To deploy stochastic and statistical analysis using several mathematical 
methods 
3. To build a model that represents the encryption components and can be utilised 
to estimate the energy consumption 
4. To examine the impact of the encryption parameters on energy consumption 
5. To investigate how a security framework can utilise this information to 
maximize encryption performance 
6. To develop a decision making tool for energy consumption management in 
encryption systems 
 
1.4. Scope 
 
The approach advocated in this thesis is based on the lack of energy implication in 
security schemes. In order to deal with this energy implication with a consistent 
manner, this thesis adopts several stochastic and statistical methods. In this way, a 
novel adaptive system is proposed as a flexible decision making tool for selecting the 
most efficient security mode at the lowest cost of energy. This adaptive scheme 
permits the interaction of the desired security with the energy constraints, allowing the 
system to switch to the optimum security mode. The proposed security approach is 
twofold, as the security mode can be adjusted either according to the severity of the 
requested service, or according to a desired energy threshold [4]. 
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The proposed framework is generic, as it is not tied to any specific encryption scheme 
or technology and could be therefore applied to any security system or device. 
Although it would be particularly applicable to battery powered devices and passively 
powered devices, where low energy encryption is crucial, it could also benefit 
traditional computing devices. The suggested scheme is intended to assist in the 
design, implementation, or management of encryption systems that need to adjust their 
operation based on computational resources and security constraints. In addition, the 
proposed energy conscious adaptive security scheme can be used in the evaluation 
phase of an encryption system’s development life cycle, in order to assess the 
effectiveness and performance of the encryption algorithms and/or parameters. This 
could also prevent possible retrofitting after the final implementation of the system 
and therefore avoid any costly modifications. Finally, although in this research five 
symmetric algorithms are presented, the proposed scheme can be applied to other 
symmetric or asymmetric algorithms as well. Furthermore, the variation of the 
encryption parameters may include other or even more factors, depending on the 
application and the parameters of interest for the specific experiment and/or analysis. 
The key contribution of this work is a novel approach that stochastically and 
statistically studies the overall influence of the configuration parameters on the total 
energy consumption. The distinguishing feature of the work presented in this thesis is 
the maximization of encryption system performance by energy consumption 
management, taking into consideration several inter-related factors. 
 
1.5. Organization of this thesis 
 
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2 background information of 
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security, energy and mathematical methods is presented, while previous work in low 
energy encryption is reviewed. Chapter 3 describes the concept of how a global metric 
for performance evaluation allows for optimal security mode selection. In Chapter 4, 
the reliability model is presented, the limiting distribution of n encryption is analysed, 
and the results of the experiments are discussed. Chapter 5 presents an extension of the 
Reliability model, based on Chernoff bounds. Chebychev, Hoeffding, Bennett and 
Bernstein bounds are used to investigate further the impact of n encryptions on the 
energy consumption. Examples and results of this stochastic approach are included. In 
Chapter 6, a statistical solution is proposed, based on regression. The model and 
results obtained from the statistical analysis are also discussed. Chapter 7 deals with 
the centrality approach, where the encryption system is treated as a graph and the 
betweenness centrality that measures the significance of the encryption parameters is 
examined. Finally, Chapter 8 presents the conclusions of this work and discusses 
possible future work that could extend further the study of the proposed framework. 
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Chapter 2 - Background and literature review 
The accelerated evolution of communication over networks as well as the consecutive 
rising sophistication of security threats in recent years, have led to the development of 
a wide variety of security approaches. With a view to achieving secret communication, 
modern security frameworks rely heavily on encryption, the process of transforming 
information into code, using mathematical formulas, in a way that only the authorised 
person is able to decode. Failure to encrypt propagated data, may allow an attacker 
who is sniffing the network's traffic, to eavesdrop the private communication between 
the legitimate parties. The importance of encryption becomes even more crucial for the 
propagation of sensitive data. Examples of sensitive information include, inter alia, 
contact details, passwords and Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) for various 
online transactions such as online shopping and internet banking, and medical records 
for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) in healthcare monitoring. Web traffic analysis 
could also reveal sensitive information about political opinions, religious beliefs, 
sexual preferences or criminal records. Sensitive information, if compromised may 
cause serious harm to the owner and therefore, sensitive data encryption is currently a 
privacy and financial regulation for many organizations [5]. 
In addition to the above online transactions, security and privacy must also be 
preserved for data that is stored, propagated and managed in modern cloud computing 
technologies and services that provide shared computing resources and data storage in 
a network. Encryption, which is the cornerstone of the security architecture, is 
particularly important when dealing with large and complex data sets. Managing big 
data from a security point of view may be a challenging task, due to the complexity in 
the structure of the data that are stored and also due to the difficulty in their processing 
when stored in shared repositories. Furthermore, when dealing with big data and cloud 
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computing services, modern data retrieval is also a vital aspect that has to be taken into 
consideration when designing the security scheme of a system. This is especially true 
for shared resources that host large amounts of data where a lack of adequate security 
measures may result in security breaches.  
Therefore, to ensure that an adequate level of security is provided for all the above 
processes and services, the development of complex and time consuming encryption 
algorithms is inevitable. However, depending on its complexity, an algorithm may 
consume a significant amount of computing resources, such as memory, processing 
time and battery power [1]. 
This chapter first provides an overview of communication security and protocols that 
have been employed in recent years in order to defend against security threats. Also, 
the notions of cryptography and cryptographic primitives are discussed. The chapter 
also introduces the adaptive security concept addressed in this thesis and presents the 
related work in the area of low energy encryption. Finally, the theory of the methods 
used in the development of the energy conscious adaptive security scheme namely, 
reliability theory, regression analysis, betweenness centrality, as well as the most 
popular concentration inequalities are introduced [6]. 
 
2.1. Secure communications 
 
In recent years, communication system numbers have grown exponentially in terms of 
both devices and networks. Security, which is critical for ensuring protected 
communication among systems, is therefore an important aspect to be considered. 
Security concerns in communication systems range from user authentication to secure 
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information storage and networking [6]. Therefore, with the growth of networks and 
communications, security has attracted considerable attention.  
Security is the field of communications that consists of the provision and policies 
utilized to provide the communication system the protection required to deter any kind 
of threat [7]. It is widely recognised as a priority in the design and development of 
today’s Information Technology systems, because threats such as malicious code and 
computer hacking are a concern that has been increasing dramatically over the last 
decade. There are various types of security attacks that a system may be exposed to, 
such as the denial of service, unauthorized access and confidentiality breach. 
Therefore, it is essential for a communication system to deploy several measures to 
defend against such threats. The most commonly accepted security approach involves 
three processes. These are Authentication, Authorization and Encryption. 
 
2.1.1. Authentication 
 
This is the first part of the security process, where users have to identify themselves 
and provide verification of their identity. The most common means of user 
authentication involves the use of a username and password. This is not the safest 
means of demonstrating identity, as there are various forms of attacks that a hacker 
may adopt to crack a password. For this reason, authentication technology is usually 
integrated using hardware mechanisms, such as smart cards, or even biometric 
solutions, e.g. fingerprint scans, and is also accompanied by other security processes 
[8]. 
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2.1.2. Authorization 
 
Authorization is the process which after Authentication examines whether the user is 
permitted to have access to the requested resource or not. Access to the specific 
resource may be granted or denied, based on a wide variety of criteria. Other than the 
use of a password, access control may depend on whether that user is a part of a 
particular group or not [8]. 
 
2.1.3. Cryptography 
 
Cryptography concerns communication in the presence of an adversary [9]. Secure 
communications are commonly accomplished by utilizing security protocols which in 
turn invariably employ cryptographic algorithms. The latter may include encryption 
algorithms, which are used to provide authentication and privacy, as well as hash or 
message digest algorithms that are used to provide message integrity [6]. 
 
2.1.4. Encryption 
 
Encryption is the process that is used to algorithmically transform the data into an 
unrecognizable format and can be achieved with the employment of encryption 
algorithms. It involves obscuring information through the use of ciphers and rendering 
it unreadable to the adversary without special knowledge [10]. The authorized 
communicating party has to decode the encrypted data using a decryption key in order 
to translate the encrypted data into recognizable information. Encryption complements 
the authorization and authentication processes and is very important because it can 
work independently to protect resources when authentication, authorization or both 
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have failed or even in case that they are not at all considered in a security policy [11]. 
An encryption algorithm is a mathematical function that incorporates a keystream - a 
sequence of random bits generated from the algorithm’s keyspace, which is the set of 
all the possible keys. Although the level of secrecy of the encrypted data depends on 
both the algorithm and the key, the encryption algorithm is known publicly. Therefore, 
the key plays an important role in determining the security of the encrypted data. The 
more possible keys that can be generated from the keyspace, the harder it becomes for 
an attacker to guess which key has been used for encryption. For example, an 
algorithm with a 128 bit key length offers 2
128
 possible keys. Encryption algorithms 
can be divided into symmetric (private) key algorithms and asymmetric (public) key 
algorithms. In the former, the sender and receiver must agree upon a key prior to 
encryption. This private key which is usually a string of characters is then used by the 
sender to encrypt a message and by the receiver to decrypt the result, known as the 
ciphertext. In the latter, each party has two keys; one that is displayed publicly and one 
that is kept private. The sender encrypts the message using the receiver’s public key 
and only the intended recipient is able to decrypt the message [12].  
 
2.1.5. Security primitives 
 
Symmetric encryption or private key encryption is applied to achieve message 
confidentiality. A secret key is used to encrypt the data and change the content in a 
particular way. The key must be shared by both communicating parties. The sender 
applies the encryption function to the data using the key to produce the cipher text. 
The latter is sent instead of the original message to the receiver, which then applies the 
decryption function using the same shared key. Message integrity is implicitly 
provided, as altering the cipher text would result in an illegible decrypted message 
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[13]. Typical symmetric encryption algorithms include AES, DES, Triple DES, RC2 
and Blowfish, which are introduced later in this chapter.  
There are two fundamental types of symmetric algorithms: stream ciphers and block 
ciphers.  
 
2.1.6. Stream ciphers 
 
Stream ciphers operate on streams of plaintext and ciphertext one bit at a time. Bits are 
encrypted individually, by combining a bit from the key with a bit form the plaintext, 
using the exclusive or operation (XOR). In stream cipher encryption, the same bit will 
encrypt to a different bit every time it is encrypted, provided that a different 
initialization vector is used. Stream ciphers operate via keystream generators, where, a 
keystream is generated from a small initial key (seed) and is combined with the 
plaintext to produce the ciphertext, using simple encryption transformations. A typical 
encryption transformation is the XOR operation, which is applied to the keystream to 
transform it into a pseudorandom bit stream which is then XORed with a stream of 
plaintext bits to produce the stream of ciphertext bits. This encrypted stream can be 
decrypted using the same random bit stream [14]. 
 
2.1.7. Block ciphers 
 
In the case of block ciphers, the message is partitioned into data blocks of fixed length 
and one block is encrypted at a time. If required, the blocks may be padded as well. 
The blocks are then joined together, using a fixed encryption transformation, to make 
the ciphertext. Block ciphers encrypt one block at a time with the same key and 
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therefore, the encryption of a plaintext bit depends on every other plaintext bit within 
the same block. For older block ciphers the block size is 64 bits, while the block size 
for relatively new designs is usually 128 bits [14].  
As a block cipher encrypts plaintext in fixed-size n-bit blocks, for arbitrary length 
messages that exceed the n-bit size that the cipher operates on, the simplest approach 
is to partition the message into n-bit blocks and encrypt each of these separately. This 
can be achieved by using different modes of operation that offer different properties. 
The modes of operation describe how blocks interconnect with each other. Four of the 
most common modes of operation namely ECB, CBC, CFB, and OFB, are discussed 
below [13]. 
 
2.1.8. Modes of operation 
 
The Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) is the simplest mode of operation. In ECB 
encryption, the plaintext is divided into blocks and each plaintext block is encrypted 
separately. The forward cipher function is applied directly and independently to each 
block of the plaintext. Therefore, any ciphertext block does not depend on any 
previous plaintext block. The resulting sequence of output is the ciphertext. Regarding 
the decryption, the inverse function is applied directly and independently to each block 
of the ciphertext and the resulting sequence of output blocks is the plaintext. The 
advantages of ECB are the simplicity of the operation, as well as the fact that multiple 
blocks can be operated simultaneously. The disadvantage of this mode of operation is 
that identical plaintext blocks are encrypted into identical ciphertext blocks and thus, 
data patterns can be identified. As a consequence, if a block of plaintext is repeated 
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several times, the result of the encryption will contain several copies of the same 
ciphertext and therefore the encryption might be insecure [15]. 
The Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode of operation features the combining of the 
current plaintext blocks with the previous ciphertext blocks. Particularly, before being 
encrypted to generate the ciphertext block, each plaintext block is XORed (chained) 
with the previous ciphertext block. For the first block, an Initialization Vector (IV) is 
required as a starting point. When a plaintext block is encrypted, the resulting 
ciphertext is stored in a feedback register of the same size as the block size. Before the 
next plaintext block is encrypted, it is XORed with the feedback register to become the 
next input to the encrypting routine. This is repeated until the end of the message [14] 
meaning that the encryption of each block depends on all the previous blocks. In this 
mode, since the ciphertext is constantly changing, if a block of plaintext is repeated 
twice, the result of the encryption of the two identical blocks will produce two 
different ciphertext blocks. In decryption, the inverse cipher function is applied to the 
corresponding ciphertext block and the resulting block is XORed with the previous 
ciphertext block. In this mode, each ciphertext block depends on all the proceeding 
plaintext blocks. [15]. The advantage of this CBC is that the attacker cannot deduce 
the plaintext by looking at the encrypted blocks separately.  
In the Cipher Feedback (CFB) mode of operation, the encryption of messages with 
fewer bits than the block size is allowed. It features the feedback of successive 
ciphertext blocks into the input blocks of the forward cipher to generate output blocks 
that are XORed with consecutive bits of plaintext in order to produce the ciphertext. 
Once the ciphertext is produced, it becomes the input block of the forward cipher to 
produce the output block and so on. The method also needs an IV for the first block to 
produce the first output block [15]. CFB mode links the plaintext segments together so 
 15 
 
that the ciphertext depends on all the preceding plaintext [14]. The advantages of CFB 
mode are that its operation is simple and that the input to the block cipher is 
randomized. The disadvantage of CFB mode is that encryption cannot operate in 
parallel.  
The Output Feedback (OFB) mode of operation is a method of running a block cipher 
as a synchronous stream cipher [14]. OFB mode operates in a similar fashion to CFB, 
as it features the iteration of the forward cipher on the IV to generate an output block 
that is XORed with the plaintext to produce the ciphertext. The size of the plaintext is 
not necessarily an integer multiple of the block size, as in CFB mode. The difference 
between CFB and OFB is that in CFB, it is the ciphertext that is fed back to the 
register, whereas in OFB, it is the output block that is fed back to the register. In 
encryption, the successive output blocks are produced from applying the forward 
cipher function to the previous output blocks, and the output blocks are combined with 
the corresponding plaintext blocks by the means of the XOR method to produce the 
ciphertext blocks. Similarly, in decryption, the successive output blocks are produced 
from applying the forward cipher function to the previous output blocks, and the 
output blocks are XORed with the corresponding ciphertext blocks to recover the 
plaintext blocks [15]. OFB does not allow for parallelism, but it prevents error 
propagation, as an error in a ciphertext bit will only affect the corresponding plaintext 
bit. 
 
2.1.9. Encryption algorithms 
 
The Data Encryption Standard (DES) is one of the most well-known symmetric key 
block ciphers. It was developed in 1970 and was based on IBM’s 128-bit algorithm, 
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called Lucifer. The US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
accepted it as a standard encryption algorithm and it officially became a federal 
standard in 1976, with a 56-bit key [16].  DES processes plaintext blocks of 64 bits, 
producing 64-bit ciphertext blocks. The secret key consists of 64 bits but only 56 bits 
are effectively used. The remaining 8 bits are used for checking parity [11]. The 
algorithm involves carrying out combinations, substitutions and permutations between 
the plaintext secret key, while making sure the operations can be performed in both 
directions for encryption and decryption accordingly. Since it became a standard, 
many attacks and methods have been recorded that exploit weaknesses of DES, 
making it an insecure block cipher. In 1998, a computer system was designed that was 
able to break the DES encryption key in 3 days [17]. 
As an enhancement of DES, the Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES) encryption 
standard applies the DES cipher algorithm three times to each data block. 3DES 
performs the DES encryption three times with different keys, making it more difficult 
for an attacker to crack the encryption code. It has a 64 bit block size and a key length 
of 56, 112 or 168 bits. In 3DES the encryption method is similar to the one in original 
DES but three 64-bit keys are used instead of one, for an overall length of 192 bits. 
Although 3DES is a more powerful version of DES and can be much more secure if 
used properly, due to its complex computation it is three times slower than DES and 
also slower than other block cipher methods [14]. 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES), which is one of the most popular 
symmetric key algorithms, was proposed in 1997 by Daemen and Rijmen and 
published in 2000 by the NIST [18]. It is a fast and flexible block cipher, as it can be 
implemented on various platforms. It is based on the Rijndael cipher and supersedes 
the DES. It is based on the substitution-permutation network design principle. A 
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permutation (P-box) is a mathematical operation for rearranging the data, whilst the 
substitution (S-box) is the operation for the replacement of a data unit with another. 
There are several techniques for permutations and substitutions. AES operates on a 4 
by 4 array of bytes, known as the state and has a fixed block size of 128 bits and a 
variable key length of 128, 192, or 256 bits with 10, 12 and 14 rounds accordingly 
[19].  
Blowfish is a symmetric key block cipher designed by Schneier, in 1993, as a fast and 
free alternative to the existing encryption algorithms. It operates on a 64-bit block size 
of plaintext with a variable key length from 32 to 448 bits [14]. Blowfish is 
unpatented, license-free, and is available free for all uses [12]. It is one of the most 
common public domain encryption algorithms. As such, it has been subject to a 
significant amount of cryptanalysis. Regarding its security, it is susceptible to attacks 
on reflectively weak keys and therefore key selection is crucial. However, full 
encryption has not been broken.  
Rivest Cipher (RC2) is a variable key-size block cipher, designed in 1989 by Ron 
Rivest for RSA Data Security, Inc. The cipher was initially intended as a drop-in 
replacement for DES [20]. According to the designer company, software 
implementations of RC2 are three times faster than DES. It is a 64- bit block cipher 
with a variable key length ranging from 8 to 128 in steps of 8 bits. In addition, the 
speed of the encryption is independent of the key size [14]. RC2 is based on the Feistel 
network design, which involves 16 mixing and 2 mashing rounds. A mixing round 
consists of interleaving an expanded key with the plaintext. A mashing round 
combines different pieces of the expanded key and the result of the mixing rounds 
[21]. 
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2.1.10. Padding schemes 
 
Block ciphers work on fixed sized encryption blocks. However, messages come in a 
variety of lengths, sometimes leading to a shorter final block, as the message cannot be 
divided into the required fixed size blocks [14]. Padding is the way to deal with this 
problem. When the plaintext to be encrypted is not an exact multiple of the block size, 
a padding string is added to the plaintext. For the decryption, the padding has to be 
removed and so the padding scheme has to be known to both communicating parties. 
Several padding schemes exist for the padding of the final block before encryption but 
the commonest are ISO10126 and PKCS5.  
In ISO10126, the padding is done at the end of the last block with random bytes. The 
number of added bytes that are required in order to fill the block size is specified by 
the last byte which is assigned the value of this number so that the receiver knows how 
many bytes have been padded [14]. 
In the PKCS5 padding scheme, the number of bytes to be padded is equal to 8 -
(number of bytes of plaintext) mod 8. This results in 1 to 8 bytes and depends on the 
plaintext length. The number of bytes remaining to fill the required block size is added 
at the end of the last block before encryption, all are assigned the value of the number 
of the remaining bytes so that the receiver knows the number of padded bytes [11].  
2.2. Energy 
Encryption algorithms are computationally intensive, consuming a significant amount 
of energy and computational resources that are crucial especially for battery powered 
devices. Algorithms may result in a different level of energy efficiency under different 
circumstances, as some algorithms may provide the same level of security while 
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consuming less energy [22]. This can be shown if one considers the following. 
Encryption strength is related to the difficulty of discovering the key, which in turn 
depends on both the cipher used and the key size [23]. In general, longer keys provide 
stronger security. Different ciphers may require different key lengths to achieve the 
same security strength. Although a large key length could provide stronger security, it 
could increase computation and thus energy consumption. Therefore, variations of the 
algorithmic parameters, i.e. key size, mode of operation, data size and padding scheme 
and so forth, may result in different levels of energy consumption.  
 
2.2.1. Energy efficiency 
 
Energy efficiency 𝑒 is defined as the energy dissipation that is essentially needed to 
perform a certain function, divided by the actual total energy dissipation [24].  
 
 𝑒 =
essential energy dissipation for a cerain function
total energy dissipation
                  (2.1) 
 
The energy efficiency of a certain function is independent of the actual 
implementation and thus is independent of the issue whether an implementation is low 
power. Low power is generally closely related to the hardware, whereas energy-
efficiency relates to the algorithm using the hardware [24].  
Research in the area of energy efficiency was initially focussed on the physical layer, 
as particularly for wireless devices, power consumption depends on the system 
hardware [25]. The primary problem regarding energy in mobile devices is that battery 
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capacity is limited. Thus, the main objective of battery technology research is to 
increase power capacity. However, this area has not experienced significant advances 
in order to conform to the increasing energy demands [25]. Therefore, the solution lies 
in the design of energy efficient schemes. 
 
2.2.2. Energy consumption computation 
 
To compute the energy consumption, the technique described by Naik and Wei [26] is 
employed. Energy consumption can be represented by the product of the total number 
of clock cycles taken by the encryption and the average current drawn by each CPU 
clock cycle to deliver the basic encryption cost in units of ampere-cycles. To calculate 
the total energy cost, this basic ampere-cycle encryption cost is divided by the 
processor clock frequency in cycles per second to obtain the energy cost of encryption 
in ampere-seconds. Multiplying this by the processor’s operating voltage produces the 
energy cost () in Joules. 
𝜀 =
clock cycles×∗average current by CPU clock cycle×processor′s operating voltage
clock frequency
  (2.2) 
 
2.3. Adaptive security 
The rapid development and extensive application of computer networks have brought 
new challenges in the area of information security [27]. In addition, the number and 
complexity of security attacks in recent years has increased considerably. This raises 
particular concerns on the ability of software development methods to deal with this 
challenge. The traditional static security model and a single security policy cannot 
solve this problem [28]. Most traditional security techniques were developed without 
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taking into account the significance of dynamic elements implication. Initial efforts to 
develop security systems employed static methods with fixed security measures. 
Although this has led to the reduction of system vulnerabilities, with the advance of 
the attacks in terms of complexity, the security measures had to be strengthened. 
However, this advance in the security system brought with it an increased rate of 
processing overhead and resource consumption of the system infrastructure, leading to 
higher development and maintenance costs [27]. The solution to this obstacle is 
therefore adaptive security. Adaptive systems dynamically change their behaviour in 
order to respond to specific changes. There are several advantages in a system that is 
able to adapt its security mechanisms compared to a static security system. For 
example a system could respond to intrusions by strengthening its security policies. In 
addition, different users need different level of security strength, for example the 
department of defence network would require higher security than a personal webpage 
[29]. Finally, different users have different access rights and therefore the adaptive 
system could apply the appropriate restrictions by dynamically adapting users’ access.  
What is more, mobile devices have experienced a period of rapid evolution in recent 
years, bringing unprecedented changes in mobile applications. At the same time, 
security risks have risen with the sophistication of mobile devices leading to the 
development of several security schemes for mobile devices [30]. However, 
encryption, which is the cornerstone of security, comes at a significant energy cost 
[31]. Coupled with the aforementioned lack of progress in battery technology this has 
led to a considerable decrease in battery life. According to [32] there is a widening 
battery gap between trends in processor power consumption and improvements in 
battery capacity. Thus, referring to low energy encryption for mobile devices, there is 
an intrinsic need to provide a sufficient level of security at the lowest energy cost [2]. 
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The key challenge when designing adaptive security schemes is to find a common 
point between the static behaviour of traditional security systems and the dynamic 
security provision of adaptive systems.  
The following section provides a background in adaptive security through discussion 
of related literature. 
 
2.4. Relevant work 
This section provides an overview of previous work in the area of adaptive security 
with regards to low energy consumption. This work has been influenced by several 
research areas. The main and most relevant one is the comparison based approaches, 
where researchers compare and rank encryption algorithms and encryption parameters 
based on their impact on the energy consumption. The comparison is made either 
between algorithms, or based on the variation of the encryption parameters of the same 
algorithm. Furthermore, the concept of reusing existing ideas and principles that is 
described in Green and lightweight cryptography, as well as in minimalism in 
cryptography, has been adopted and is considered the main intention of this work. 
First three resource conservation oriented areas of cryptography are introduced and 
then general approaches in the area of low energy encryption, including the 
comparison based approaches, are discussed. 
 
2.4.1. Green Cryptography 
 
Green cryptography suggests using ideas that have proven their merits. Encryption 
algorithm and protocol design should recycle existing components and primitives, 
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while developing encryption should be based on the selection of existing algorithms, 
according to the needs of the individual service. Green cryptography is aimed at 
sustainable security within scalable implementations. It is about maximizing 
confidence in cryptographic primitives while minimizing complexity in their 
implementation [33].  
In Troutman and Vincent’s work [33], a green approach to the design process is 
suggested. They illustrate the concept of green cryptography using the pedigree of 
AES and how essential elements of AES have been recycled in the design of its 
successors. The aim of their work is to optimize the efforts of designers that have 
already been spent on designing primitives and algorithms. To further support their 
concept, they used Rijndael’s round transformation and compared to Twofish’s and 
Serpent’s round transformation. They concluded that for different number of rounds, 
the resulting numbers of full diffusion steps is varied, and therefore the ranking of the 
compared ciphers is changed. This way, they showed that it is not always easy to 
compare algorithms based on only one metric; instead, sometimes combinations of 
metrics should be taken into consideration.  
Several authors proposed security methods based on the concept of green 
cryptography. A method for the construction of a compression function that could be 
extended to a hash function, based on a fixed key block cipher was proposed in [34]. 
The authors analysed several schemes in terms of their security strength, by 
performing attacks and they provided bounds on the security of each scheme.  
In [35] the authors introduced the idea of using block ciphers to construct hash 
functions and they proposed a method for constructing hash functions based on block 
ciphers, where the hash code size is equal to the block size of the cipher and 
approximately equal to the key size. Their model can be used to identify and compare 
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secure schemes. The aim of their work was to minimize the design and 
implementation effort. However, the first attempt to construct hash functions from 
block ciphers was intended for the use with the DES [35].  
Although these approaches mainly deal with specific ciphers and they present ways to 
minimize the design and implementation effort, the concept of reusing existing 
schemes is similar to the concept of this thesis. Specifically, although the proposed 
scheme is not tight to any specific algorithms, the analysis in terms of their efficiency 
can be used to identify the most energy efficient algorithm, for the requested security 
service. In this way, it is not necessary to implement a new low energy encryption 
algorithm; instead, based on its performance, the most efficient scheme can be 
identified.  
 
2.4.2. Lightweight Cryptography 
 
In this area of cryptography the aim is to provide cryptographic algorithms and 
primitives intended for use in devices with limited resources [36]. The main concern 
of lightweight cryptography is extremely low resource requirements. Therefore, the 
main idea is to find a compromise between low resource requirements, performance 
and strength of cryptographic algorithms and primitives [36].  
DESL, a new lightweight DES variant was proposed in [37], which is based on the 
classical DES design, but uses a single S-box repeated eight times, instead of eight S-
boxes of the original DES. The reduction of the memory requirements for the S-box 
storage made the light version of the original DES suitable for devices with 
constrained resources. Although the proposed algorithm was proved to be resistant 
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against certain types of attacks, this is not true for all types of attacks. DESL does not 
provide high level of security, compared to its predecessor, the classical DES cipher. 
In [38] the authors propose PRESENT, which is a Substitution-Permutation Network 
based block cipher, suitable for small cyber-physical systems and is notable for its 
compact size – 2.5 times smaller than AES. The cipher has been designed considering 
security and power constraints as well. Although the main goal when designing 
PRESENT was simplicity and hardware optimization, it provides adequate security for 
applications with low security requirements. However, PRESENT is targeted to 
specific applications in constrained environments, such as Radio Frequency 
Identification (RFID) tags and sensor networks and therefore can only be applied to 
applications that require moderate security levels. 
The KLEIN family of lightweight block ciphers proposed by Gong et al. [39] is an 
SPN cipher and was also designed for resource constrained devices. KLEIN offers can 
have various key sizes and therefore can provide a moderate security level for several 
applications, specifically in environments such as RFID tags and sensor networks. 
Although it is resistant against specific cryptanalytic attacks, it has been proved that it 
has a conservative security margin against various cryptanalysis. 
The authors in [40] proposed KATAN and KTANTAN a new family of efficient 
hardware oriented block ciphers that offer a solution for low-end devices where 
encryption is necessary. In [41] the authors suggest the use of the KATAN lightweight 
block cipher as a base for various cryptographic functions, including block ciphers, 
stream ciphers and hash functions, therefore incorporating ideas form Green 
cryptography. In [42] the same authors propose the use of a lightweight block cipher 
as a cryptographic kernel to mount various types of cryptographic algorithms that do 
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not require significant resources. The authors also suggest a way to extend the set of 
cryptographic algorithms of the IPSec protocol and include lightweight algorithms. 
Efforts in the area of lightweight cryptography are mainly aiming to environments 
with limited resources. This however is usually at the cost of security strength, as these 
schemes can only provide moderate security. Although the design of lightweight 
ciphers is very important for applications with low or moderate security requirements, 
the mechanisms that are adopted in order to achieve higher efficiency in the 
implementation may result in great expense in the security level that can be achieved. 
Therefore, it is very important to investigate how this issue can be balanced. In this 
work, the aim is to provide the most efficient security mode, considering possible 
resource limitations. 
 
2.4.3. Minimalism in Cryptography 
 
Over the past decades, the analysis of minimal constructions has played an important 
role in the area of cryptography. A great deal of effort was put in achieving the 
minimal cryptographic assumptions that are sufficient for the construction of 
cryptographic primitives and algorithms. Research has been carried out for example on 
the analysis of the smallest number of rounds that is needed to make Feistel structures 
with truly random functions secure, as well as on the simplest way to transform one 
primitive into another by using the appropriate mode of operation [43].  
In 1984 Ron Rivest proposed DES-X, an extension of DES, intending to  increase the 
DES key size without altering the cipher’s internal structure, in order to increase the 
strength of DES against exhaustive key search attack [44]. The idea was to augment 
the original 56-bit key DES by XORing an extra 64-bit key to the input before 
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applying DES and then XORing another 64-bit key to the output of DES-after the 
encryption. Although this version of DES was proved to improve the cipher’s 
resistance against differential and linear cryptanalysis compared to the original DES, 
for brute force attacks there is no significant improvement regarding the security 
strength compared to DES.  
Influenced by the DES-X design, in 1991 the Even-Mansour block cipher was 
proposed [45]. This scheme used similar keys but eliminated the keyed block cipher 
between the two XOR operations, replacing it with a fixed random permutation. 
Therefore, in order to encrypt a plaintext, the latter has to be XORed with one key 
before applying the random permutation, and the outcome is then XORed with a 
second key. Furthermore, as only one permutation is required, there is no need to 
generate and store many permutations. The designers showed that when the 
permutation is random, the cipher is secure. However, it was later proved that the 
scheme can be compromised. 
As described in this subsection, the idea of adjusting specific parameters of an 
algorithm or a primitive can improve the security level. This concept has been adopted 
in this thesis, as the security modes can be alternated by adjusting the encryption 
parameters of the algorithms. In this way, although the required security level is 
achieved, the selected security mode does not provide stronger security than is actually 
needed and therefore no unnecessary energy is consumed. 
 
2.4.4. Other efforts 
 
In the absence of generally accepted metrics that could be used to analyse and quantify 
cryptographic strength, Jorstad and Smith [3] tried to explore the possibility of 
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developing an approach to cryptographic metrics that could be used to describe the 
attributes of encryption algorithms and develop a framework for specifying the 
strength of cryptographic technologies. Although an objective metric was not 
identified, a subjective scale was suggested for rating the overall strength of an 
algorithm. The concept of generalising the way that the available security modes can 
be compared is very interesting. Although this is a rather challenging task, the concept 
has been adopted in this thesis. Specifically, a metric has been proposed, that can be 
used to compare algorithms based on their probability of finishing the encryption 
process prior to a threshold – based either on time or energy. 
Existing efforts to investigate the energy consumption characteristics of encryption 
algorithms mainly deal with comparison based approaches. These studies are based on 
experiments performed either for different encryption algorithms where the impact of 
the encryption parameters on the energy consumption is observed, or for one 
algorithm where the impact of its encryption parameters’ variation on energy 
consumption is observed. The latter is usually based on a specific encryption 
parameter i.e key size variation, and the impact of this variation is then analysed. 
Although this information can be useful for further analysis of the algorithms and their 
behaviour with respect to the energy consumption, the desired security level is not 
taken into consideration. In this work, the suggested scheme examines and compares 
the energy consumption of different algorithms based on the encryption parameters’ 
variation, while the security restrictions for the requested service are also taken into 
account. Furthermore, in the proposed scheme, several algorithms can be compared, as 
the scheme is not tight to any specific ciphers. The comparison is based on the 
encryption parameters’ variation and therefore the impact of each one of them can also 
be investigated.  
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Lamprecht et al. [46] conduct a comparative performance evaluation based on the 
implementation of different encryption algorithms. The authors examined and 
compared the average encryption time of a fixed size file using AES, DES, Blowfish 
and DESede (DES variant). Following, they measured the encryption time for the 
same algorithms using two modes of operation, CBC and ECB. Finally, they analysed 
the performance of DES for different data sizes. Their study provides interesting 
knowledge concerning the cryptographic methods, but does not generalise a 
methodology for performance evaluation. Furthermore, it does not provide any 
information about the relationship between security and performance and they do not 
take energy consumption into consideration.  
In [1], [47]-[48], the authors describe the effects of individual adjustments in 
encryption parameters on security with respect to energy consumption. In their work, a 
performance comparison between common encryption algorithms is presented. In [1], 
the authors compared six algorithms based on their performance for different types of 
files – text, audio and video. They used the throughput as the metric for the 
performance comparison of the algorithm. Guo et al [47] compared AES, DES, 3DES 
and Blowfish in terms of the energy they consume. In addition, they performed 
comparisons of the algorithms for different key sizes and modes of operations. 
However, the encryption parameters were varied one at a time. Therefore, only one 
parameter can be examined following their approach. In [48] the authors examined 
AES, DES, 3DES and Blowfish and compared them for a specific data size. In their 
approach, they varied the key size and they performed the experiment for two different 
modes of operation – ECB and CBC. They used the throughput as a performance 
indicator.  
Although such efforts are very interesting, there is a demonstrated inherent need [3] to 
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develop global metrics for use in specifying the strength of encryption algorithms. 
Potlapally et al. [6] studied the energy consumption requirements of security 
protocols, using a parametric approach and focusing on battery-powered devices and 
the application of the SSL. In their work, the authors compare several algorithms, by 
measuring their encryption time and the corresponding energy consumption. In their 
approach, they also consider the levels of cryptanalytic difficulty. However, the 
encryption parameters remain fixed in their comparative approach. The same authors 
also presented a framework for analysing the energy consumption of encryption 
algorithms and compared the performance of common ciphers.  
In [49]-[50] the authors highlight general problems and methods of their solutions 
concerning the adaptive security concept in complex information systems. Their 
theoretical approach concerning adaptive security implies the use of control theory and 
dynamical systems theory. According to the authors, information gathering required 
for the adaptation of a complex secure system can be achieved by registering external 
influences and/or internal states. The optimal solution would be achieved by the 
combination of these, but at the cost of the resources. The proposed method is based 
on the optimal control of the system whose internal states depend on the external 
influences.  
In [51] a security framework for distributed system control is presented with a focus 
on device level system control. The security problems of collaborative distributed 
systems are addressed and a security framework is proposed based on three logical 
domains, namely the client (stores user credentials), task repository (stores task 
components, including functions and policies) and low level control device (security 
control gateways incorporate requests and control actions and guarantee the secure 
task and control action execution).  
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An adaptive security scheme for denial of service threat has been proposed in [52] 
based on a fuzzy feedback controller that behaves similarly to human immune system 
when a virus is detected. The system monitors specific parameters and how fast they 
change to identify threats. In addition, it allows the user to select the security level 
according to need.  
In [53] the authors describe a resource aware adaptive security framework for mobile 
ad hoc networks (MANETs), at the protocol level. Their scheme selects the optimal 
set of protocols, one from each layer, with the maximum security and network 
performance services. They introduce two indices; a security index and a performance 
index that are computed and then used for the optimal protocol set selection. Security 
is evaluated using high, medium and low security levels, while analysis of variance is 
used for the performance evaluation. The concept of categorizing algorithms based on 
their security strength has been adopted by several authors. Son et al. [54] propose a 
security manager that dynamically adapts to real-time performance conditions. Their 
method provides four degrees of protection that depend on a four-level security 
classification. Zou et al. [55] present the architecture of an intelligent firewall. In their 
method, packet characteristics (IP address and port number) are “fuzzified” to produce 
fuzzy inputs. Using an adaptive fuzzy security algorithm, the fuzzy inputs, as well as 
the security policy rules, the appropriate security level is figured out and adjusted 
accordingly. It could be characterised as an attempt to combine packet filtering and 
application level firewalls. 
Although some of the approaches described in this section are not directly linked to 
this work, several concepts and methods based on these approaches have been 
incorporated for the implementation of the security scheme presented in this thesis. 
Since there is no established scheme that investigates the energy consumption of 
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encryption algorithms based on the probability of finishing the encryption prior to a 
threshold, whilst the security restrictions are also taken into consideration, here a 
generic model is developed that can be used to explore how energy consumption and 
encryption requirements can compromise. 
 
2.5. Methods used 
The rest of this chapter focuses on the theory of the techniques that were used for the 
development of this energy conscious adaptive security scheme.  
 
2.5.1. Reliability function 
 
Reliability theory considers the performance of a system over time. Let T be the 
lifetime of a system or component with Probability Density Function (PDF) f(t) and 
Cumulative Density Function (CDF) F(t) as shown in (2.3).  
 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑠)𝑑𝑠
𝑡
0
 (2.3) 
In reliability engineering the concern is with the probability that the system will 
survive for a stated interval of time i.e. there is no failure in the interval (0, t). This is 
known as the survival function and is given by R(t). 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) (2.4) 
A reliability function represents the probability that for a given time t, the system will 
survive [56]. A system S that consists of four subsystems connected in series is 
considered. The reliability for system S will be [57]:  
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 R(t) = P(T > 𝑡) = ∏ P(𝑇𝑖 > 𝑡)
𝑛=4
i=1  (2.5) 
where T represents the total lifetime of the system, while Ti stands for the lifetime of 
subsystem Si [4].  
The reliability function is the complement of the CDF.  If modelling the time to fail, 
the CDF represents the probability of failure and the reliability function represents the 
probability of survival. Thus, the CDF increases from zero to one as the value of t 
increases, and the reliability function decreases from one to zero as the value of t 
increases [57]. The CDF is thus:  
 F(t) = 1 − R(t) = ∏ P(𝑇𝑖 ≤ t)
𝑛=4
i=1   (2.6) 
The Empirical Cumulative Density Function (ECDF) F(t) is a step function with jumps 
i/n at observation values, where 𝑖 is the number of tied observations at that value and n 
is the number of observations. For observations 𝑥 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛), F is the fraction 
of observations less than or equal to t:  
 𝐸𝐶𝐷𝐹(𝑡) = 𝐹(𝑡) =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐼(𝑥𝑖 ≤ 𝑡)
𝑛
𝑖=1   (2.7) 
where 𝐼 is the indicator function [56]. 
 
2.5.2. Concentration inequalities 
 
Concentration inequalities provide probability bounds on the deviations of functions of 
random variables from their expectation. A random variable with good concentration 
is a variable which is close to its mean with high probability. A concentration 
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inequality, also known as tail bound, is a theorem providing that a random variable has 
good concentration [58].  
For any nonnegative random variable 𝑋, 
 𝐸[𝑋] = ∫ 𝑃(𝑋 ≥ 𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 (2.8)  
 
2.5.2.1. Markov’s inequality 
 
For any nonnegative random variable 𝑋 and for any 𝑡 > 0, 
 𝑃(𝑋 ≥ 𝑡) ≤
𝐸[𝑋]
𝑡
 (2.9)  
Although this is the simplest concentration inequality, the drawback is that it gives 
weak bounds [58]. 
 
2.5.2.2. Chebyshev’s inequality 
 
From (2.9), if 𝑓 is a monotonically increasing nonnegative-valued function, then for 
any random variable 𝑋 and real number t [58], 
 𝑃(𝑋 ≥ 𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑓(𝑋) ≥ 𝑓(𝑡)) ≤
𝐸[𝑓(𝑋)]
𝑓(𝑡)
 (2.10) 
For 𝑓(𝑋) = 𝑋2, 
 𝑃(|𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋)| ≥ 𝑡) = 𝑃 ((𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋))
2
≥ 𝑡2) ≤
𝐸((𝑋−𝐸(𝑋))
2
)
𝑡2
(2.11) 
In addition, 
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 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋) = 𝐸 [(𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋))
2
] (2.12) 
Therefore, from (2.11), (2.12) 
 (|𝑋 − 𝐸(𝑋)| ≥ 𝑡) ≤
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋)
𝑡2
 (2.13) 
 
2.5.2.3. Chernoff bounds 
 
The tail estimates given by Markov and Chebyshev inequalities, work for random 
variables in general. When the random variable (r.v.) 𝑋 can be expressed as a sum of n 
independent random variables, one can obtain tighter bounds on the tail estimates. 
Chernoff bounds are used to bound the tail of the distribution for a sum of independent 
r.v. [59]. 
Let 𝑋 be a r.v defined as  𝑋 = 𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝑋𝑛 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
Also let 𝑋𝑖  be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) such that 𝑋𝑖 ∈ {0,1},
∀ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛.   
Let  𝜇 = 𝐸[𝑋] = 𝐸[∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ]  and  𝑃[𝑋𝑖 = 1] = 𝑝𝑖, 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛 
Then for any 𝛿 > 0, 
 𝑃[𝑋 ≥ 𝜇(1 + 𝛿)] ≤ (
𝑒𝛿
(1+𝛿)1+𝛿
)
𝜇
 (2.14) 
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2.5.2.4. Hoeffding’s inequality 
 
Chernoff studied the problem of finding a tight bound for binary random variables. 
Later Hoeffding derived a more general result for arbitrary bounded random variables. 
Hoeffding’s Lemma: Let 𝑋  be a random variable with  𝐸[𝑋] = 0, 𝑎 ≤ 𝑋 ≤ 𝑏 ,  
then for 𝑠 > 0, 
 𝐸[𝑒𝑠𝑋] ≤ 𝑒𝑠
2(𝑏−𝑎)2/8 (2.15)    
For bounded random variables 𝑋𝑖 ∈  [𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖]  where 𝑋𝑖, … 𝑋𝑛   are independent [60], 
then for 𝑆𝑛 = 𝑋1 + 𝑋2 + ⋯ + 𝑋𝑛 
 𝑃(𝑆𝑛 − 𝐸𝑆𝑛 ≥ 𝑡) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−2𝑡2
∑ (𝑏𝑖−𝑎𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
) (2.16) 
and  
 𝑃(𝐸𝑆𝑛 − 𝑆𝑛 ≥ 𝑡) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (
−2𝑡2
∑ (𝑏𝑖−𝑎𝑖)2
𝑛
𝑖=1
) (2.17) 
This inequality is similar to the concept of Markov’s inequality but it is a sharper one.  
Probabilities can be estimated from a set of examples using the sample average. The 
latter approaches the expected average as the number of samples approaches infinity 
according to the strong law of large numbers. Hoeffding’s inequality provides an 
estimate of the error of an unconditional probability given 𝑛 samples. 
Hoeffding’s Theorem: Let 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛 be i.i.d. observations such that 𝐸[𝑋𝑖] = 𝜇 and 
𝑎 ≤ 𝑋𝑖 ≤ 𝑏. Then for any 𝜖 > 0, [58] 
 𝑃(|𝑋𝑛̅̅̅̅ − 𝜇| ≥ 𝜖) ≤ 2𝑒
−2𝑛𝜖2
(𝑏−𝑎)2 (2.18)  
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where n is the sample size. This can be used to determine how many samples are 
required to guarantee a probably approximately correct estimate of the probability. 
 
2.5.2.5. Bennett’s inequality 
 
Hoeffding’s inequality does not use any knowledge about the distribution or variance 
of the variables. Bennett’s inequality is a stronger concentration inequality [61], since 
it uses the variance of the distribution to provide a tighter bound. 
Bennett’s Theorem: Let 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛  be independent observations with 𝐸[𝑋𝑖] = 0 
and |𝑋𝑖| < 𝑐  with probability 1.  
Let  𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑖)   and   𝜎
2 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝜎𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1   
Then, 
  𝑃 (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑛𝜎2
𝑐2
𝐻 (
𝑐𝑡
𝑛𝜎2
)} (2.19) 
Where 𝐻(𝑢) = (1 + 𝑢)𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑢) − 𝑢  for  𝑢 ≥ 0  
 
2.5.2.6. Bernstein’s inequality 
 
Bernstein’s inequality is also a stronger concentration inequality [62] compared to 
Hoeffding’s, since it uses the variance of the distribution to provide a tighter bound. 
Bernstein’s Theorem: Let 𝑋1, 𝑋2, … 𝑋𝑛 be independent observations with 𝐸[𝑋𝑖] = 0 
and |𝑋𝑖| < 𝑐  with probability 1.  
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Let  𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑖)   and   𝜎
2 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝜎𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1   
Then, 
  𝑃 (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑋𝑖 ≥ 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 (−
𝑛𝜀2
2𝜎2+2𝑐𝜀/3
) (2.20) 
 
2.5.3. Statistical analysis 
 
In this section statistical analysis techniques that identify relationships among 
variables as well as their impact on the response variable are presented.  
 
2.5.3.1. Correlation 
 
In order to state with certainty if and how predictor variables affect the response 
variable, the null hypothesis testing H0 is used. Its practice is related to the decision 
making about the statistical significance. In null hypothesis testing, the idea is to state 
a null hypothesis by assuming that there is no effect on the output variable and then 
assess whether the evidence obtained from the test does or does not support this 
hypothesis and rejects or accepts the test accordingly [63]. The null hypothesis is 
tested by gathering data and then measuring how probable is the occurrence of data, 
under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true. If data do not contradict the null 
hypothesis, then H0 is true and the predictor variables do not affect the response 
variable. In this case the null hypothesis test is accepted. If data is very improbable – 
usually defined as observed less than 5% of the time – it is expected that some 
predictor variables with influence on the response variable will be found and the null 
hypothesis is rejected. 
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A P-value is a measure of how much evidence there is against the null hypothesis. The 
smaller the P-value, the more evidence one has against H0. It is also a measure of how 
likely it is to get a certain sample result or a more extreme result, assuming H0 is true. 
The P-value is used to obtain the most statistically significant variables influencing the 
output variable. If the P-value between one predictor variable and the response 
variable is less than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is rejected and the predictor and 
output variables are highly correlated [64].    
 
2.5.3.2. Regression analysis 
 
Regression analysis is a statistical method for investigating functional relationships 
among variables. The relationship is expressed in the form of an equation or a model 
connecting a response variable with one or more predictor variables. Let 𝑦 denote a 
response variable and 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛  denote predictor variables, a multiple regression 
equation between 𝑦 and 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 can be written as 
𝑦 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑥1 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑛 
The correlation coefficient R describes the degree to which two or more predictors – 
independent or X variables – are related to the dependent variable Y. The R-square 
value is an indicator of how well the model fits the data [65].  
 
2.5.4. Betweenness Centrality 
 
In graph theory and network analysis, centrality of a vertex measures its relative 
importance within a graph [66].  
 40 
 
Betweenness Centrality has been established as an important quantity to characterize 
how influential a node is in communications between each pair of nodes. It is a 
measure that computes the relative importance of a vertex in a graph and it is widely 
used in network analysis [67]. The betweenness centrality of a vertex in a graph is a 
measure for the participation of the vertex in the shortest paths in the graph. It is in 
some sense a measure of the influence that a node has over the flow of information 
through the network. Conceptually, high betweenness nodes lie on a large number of 
non-redundant shortest paths between other nodes [68].  
Let 𝐺 = (𝑉, 𝐸) with 𝑉 vertices and 𝐸 edges be a graph and let 𝑠, 𝑡 be a fixed pair of 
graph nodes. Let 𝜎𝑠𝑡 be the number of shortest paths between 𝑠 and 𝑡, and let 𝜎𝑠𝑡(𝑣) 
be the number of those shortest paths that pass through 𝑣 . According to [69] the 
betweenness centrality of the vertex 𝑣 is then expressed as: 
 𝐶(𝑣) = ∑
𝜎𝑠𝑡(𝑣)
𝜎𝑠𝑡
𝑠≠𝑣≠𝑡∈𝑉   (2.21) 
 
2.6. Closing remarks 
 
In this chapter, an overview of cryptography and adaptive security as well as related 
work in the area has been presented. The concept of the energy conscious adaptive 
security has been introduced and the methods used in the development of the scheme 
have been briefly discussed.  
Chapter 3 is intended to demonstrate the conceptual energy conscious adaptive 
security scheme. Throughout the following chapters of this thesis, results and 
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experimental procedures performed on the methods introduced in this chapter are 
presented. 
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Chapter 3 - Concept and implementation 
This chapter introduces the concept of how a global metric for performance evaluation 
allows for optimal security mode selection, with respect to energy consumption. The 
first section is intended to demonstrate the conceptual energy conscious adaptive 
security scheme that involves the minimum energy needed to achieve a desired 
security. In the second section, an implementation overview is presented, related to the 
algorithm selection, as well as the simulation and data analysis software used for the 
implementation, including methods, packages and classes. Finally, the contribution of 
this work in the area of low energy encryption is addressed. 
This chapter is based on the “Energy Conscious Adaptive security Scheme for Optical 
Wireless”, published in the proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on 
Transparent Optical Networks (ICTON), 2012. 
 
3.1. Concept 
 
Mobile devices have experienced a period of rapid evolution in recent years, bringing 
unprecedented changes in mobile applications. At the same time, security risks have 
risen with the sophistication of mobile devices leading to the development of several 
security schemes for mobile devices [30]. However, encryption, which is the 
cornerstone of security, comes at a significant energy cost [31] and also battery 
technology has not been able to conform to the increasing energy demands, leading to a 
considerable decrease in battery life. There is thus an intrinsic need to provide a 
sufficient level of security at the lowest energy cost [2]. In this work this issue is 
addressed and the performance of the encryption schemes for all available security 
options is investigated. One possible way to achieve this is by adjusting all encryption 
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parameters, i.e. key size, data size, mode of operation, padding and so forth. 
Traditional approaches generally deal with ensuring the security and accuracy of the 
propagated data [2]. Although modern approaches take into account the encryption 
energy cost, existing efforts to examine the energy cost characteristics of encryption 
mainly comprise experimentally based comparative approaches which assess the 
behavioural and energy impacts of the encryption parameters [1, 47, 48]. 
An important further aspect is that energy consumption does not depend only on 
isolated factors – i.e. key size, padding scheme, mode of operation – but rather there is 
a correlation between factors and their global effect on energy. To achieve low energy 
encryption, the offset between minimum energy consumption and maximum encryption 
strength has to be investigated, meaning that it is essential to explore the relationship 
between energy consumption and functional encryption parameters. This will facilitate 
an adaptive security scheme with efficient adjustment of encryption parameters to 
deliver energy efficient encryption algorithms and protocols.  
In order to minimize the energy consumption in an encryption system, many inter-
related factors must be considered. The latter are often internally related in a complex 
system, resulting in high complexity for encryption optimization. An encryption system 
can be seen as a parametric system with several configuration parameters. Clearly, 
assigning proper values for these parameters can increase the performance and reduce 
the overall energy consumption.  
In symmetric algorithms, the security level can be altered by adjusting functional 
parameters [6], such as key size, mode of operation and number of rounds. Although 
examining the performance of an algorithm, based on the individual performance of 
each encryption parameter, provides interesting results with regards to their impact on 
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energy consumption, it does not seem reasonable to consider encryption performance 
in complete isolation from security. One evident example is the key size parameter: a 
large key length makes the algorithm slower but should provide greater security. 
Although an obvious way to investigate each parameter’s impact on the overall 
security and energy consumption would be to split the overall security into individual 
security units, this would only make sense when comparing parameters within the 
same algorithm. When examining several algorithms, encryption parameters cannot be 
used as global performance evaluation indicators. Although some authors use those 
encryption parameters as factors to compare and rank algorithms, this is not generally 
accepted, as the criteria used are not universal –  i.e. there is no reasonable way to 
judge if a 256-bit algorithm is better or worse than a 128-bit algorithm.  
The importance of the dependencies exploration is based on the fact that the system’s 
energy consumption will depend on the combination of the parameters, and not just on 
individual parameters. In the case of the AES algorithm, for example, the selection of 
a 128-bit key will operate in 10 rounds [70], which makes the dependence between the 
key size and the number of rounds evident. Since each parameter combination will 
result in an energy cost, the aim is to identify the security mode that consumes the 
minimum energy needed to achieve the desired overall security level. Therefore, it is 
of great importance to take into consideration the dependencies between those 
parameters, so that they can be viewed as a function rather than as isolated impact 
factors. This would allow for a global performance metric that could be further used 
for the investigation of the balancing between encryption strength and energy 
consumption.  
Adaptive security is based on the observation that the security requirements of a 
system or service heavily depend on the severity of the operation requested, and 
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should therefore be dynamically adjusted to operate in the most effective way. This 
scheme is concerned with adapting the choice of encryption algorithms and primitives 
with respect to energy consumption. In a security system, where several security levels 
are provided, each associated with its individual energy consumption characteristics, 
the security scheme offers the option to adapt the level of security depending on the 
security requirements or on any possible energy consumption restrictions. In the first 
case, less critical information would be encrypted with lower security, thus resulting in 
lower energy consumption, whilst more critical information would be encrypted with 
higher security, consuming more energy. The second case is best exemplified in the 
case of battery powered devices, where security could be adapted with regards to the 
state of the battery in order to extend its life.  
Therefore, the subsequent security approach is twofold. Firstly, encryption strength is 
adjusted according to the severity of the requested service. This helps save energy, 
while preserving the encryption strength. Secondly, for battery-powered devices, data 
can be encrypted according to a specified threshold, or even based on the battery level 
itself. The individual method of each security approach, namely reliability theory, 
Chernoff bounds, multiple regression and betweenness centrality, serves as a quality 
factor that describes all encryption parameters and their impact on energy 
consumption, and therefore as a global indicator of the energy consumption. 
The proposed adaptive security scheme for low energy encryption is based on the 
principles of green cryptography, and suggests reusing ideas that have proven their 
merits, in the specific scheme with respect to security and energy.  
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3.2. Implementation overview 
 
Simulation tests were carried out on an Intel Core i3 3GHz CPU computer with 3GB 
of RAM and the 32-bit Windows 7 Home Premium OS. For testing purposes, several 
performance data streams were collected, including the encryption time and the CPU 
process time. 
 
3.2.1. Simulation 
 
Simulation represents an efficient way to generate test data rapidly using the 
appropriate tools. In this work, the Sun Netbeans IDE Platform for Java Application 
Development was used as the platform of the implementation [71]. Java Cryptography 
Architecture (JCA) and Java Cryptography Extension (JCE) set of classes were used 
for the implementation of the desired cryptographic functions [72]. Being a universal, 
powerful and object-oriented language, Java was considered as the appropriate tool for 
data gathering. Java class javax.crypto.Cipher is the engine class for encryption and 
decryption services. It provides the functionality of a cryptographic cipher used for 
encryption and decryption [73].  
Cipher objects are obtained by invoking the static method getInstance() and requires a 
transformation string that describes the operation to be performed on the given input. 
The transformation makes use of the algorithm parameters that include the name of the 
encryption algorithm, followed by the mode of operation and padding scheme. The 
transform is of the form algorithm/mode/padding. For example, the following is a 
valid transformation: “DES/ECB/PKCS5Padding”. Following, method update() is 
called to pass byte arrays for encryption or decryption [74]. Encrypt and Decrypt are 
used for the encryption and the decryption process to produce the Ciphertext and the 
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Plaintext respectively. Finally, the doFinal() method must be invoked to complete the 
cipher operation and reset the Cipher object so that it will be ready for the next 
encryption process. The implementation process of the class for symmetric encryption 
and decryption is illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1: Cipher class, retrieved from [73]. 
The encryption procedure was simulated 100 times for all 576 combinations of four 
encryption parameters for the five algorithms. The encryption time ranged between 74 
µs and 2.7 ms, whereas the energy consumption ranged between 26 nJB
-1
 and 17.6 
µJB
-1
. The energy consumption has been calculated based on the encryption times that 
resulted from the simulation, using Equation (2.2). 
For simulation purposes, five encryption algorithms, namely: AES, DES, 3DES, RC2 
and Blowfish, were considered but the method investigated is generic and so would 
work with any encryption algorithms and functional parameters.  
Here, some parameter choices were the same for all algorithms, namely: ECB, CBC, 
OFB and CFB modes; data block sizes of 16, 1024, 2048 and 4096; padding scheme 
with NoPadding, ISO101126 and PKCS5. The key sizes used were different for each 
algorithm, and are shown in Table 3.1. 
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Table 3.1: Key size variation 
Algorithm Key size 
AES 128,192, 256 
DES 56 
3DES 112, 168 
Blowfish 56, 112, 256 
RC2 40, 64, 128 
 
3.2.2. Data analysis 
 
The R language [75] has been used for data manipulation, calculation and graphical 
display of the probabilistic approaches. The code is designed to read the encryption 
times as resulting from the simulation. The graphical displays of the results of the data 
analysis that are used in the following chapters have been delivered using the R 
plotting commands and attributes. 
In the first approach, based on reliability, stochastic data analysis using the R language 
was applied to the simulation outputs to provide the reliability metric, facilitating the 
evaluation of the overall impact of the interrelated encryption parameters on energy 
consumption and delivering a global performance metric for energy consumption. 
Specifically, 
 In this implementation, the CDF and reliability are calculated for a given time 
threshold that is set by the user.  
 The code is also designed to return the cases that meet the criteria specified by 
the user, i.e. return the security scenarios that will finish the encryption prior to 
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the set threshold and by a desired probability. An example criterion could be 
the following: for a time threshold t = 300 µs, identify the cases that will finish 
the encryption prior to the threshold with probability P ≥ 0.99.  
 For the case where the user requests specific security parameters with a 
specific reliability level, then a threshold has to be set. This optimum threshold 
selection algorithm is also coded in R. 
Regarding the bound approach, stochastic data analysis using the R language was 
performed on the simulation outputs in order to provide an upper bound on the 
probability that the mean time of n encryptions will exceed the expected time by a 
desired threshold.  
 First the expected and theoretical means are calculated. A Bootstrap method has 
been used for the generation of the sample. 
 The bound is then calculated for the probability that the true and expected 
means will not deviate more than a desired threshold. 
 Based on a point-to-point comparison, the difference between the true and 
expected mean is calculated. 
 The relationship among several attributes, as well as the impact of their 
variations, is also coded in R.  
In the centrality-based approach, data analysis using the R language was also applied 
to the simulation outputs to measure the significance of the encryption parameters in 
the algorithms as well as their impact on energy consumption. 
 The betweenness function is used in order to measure the centrality of the 
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encryption parameters based on the number of shortest paths - in terms of 
energy consumption - going through each parameter. The shorter the path, the 
lower energy will be consumed.  
 The igraph package is used to produce the graphs as an illustration of the 
betweenness of each encryption parameter. 
Finally, in the statistical approach, data analysis was performed using the SPSS 
(Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) Statistics package [76].  
 Multiple linear regression is conducted in order to determine whether energy 
consumption can be predicted by the encryption parameters.  
 Correlations among the variables are taken into account in the estimation of the 
coefficients. 
 The dependencies between encryption parameters are examined.   
 Residual plots are used to evaluate the goodness of fit. 
 
3.3. Contribution 
 
Although most approaches compare algorithms based on individual encryption 
parameters, the performance of the encryption system should be evaluated with respect 
to the security restrictions. Therefore, the development of a decision-making 
framework that evaluates the overall impact of each security mode on energy 
consumption based on a global quality factor is suggested. The distinguishing feature 
of the work presented in this thesis is the maximization of encryption system 
performance by energy consumption management, taking into consideration several 
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inter-related factors.  
The contribution made here is to study the overall influence of the configuration 
parameters on the energy consumption regarding either the security requirements or 
the available resources in terms of energy. Stochastic and statistical considerations in 
terms of evaluation have been developed in order to conclude the overall effect of the 
encryption parameters on energy.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there has been no attempt to study the overall 
influence of these configuration parameters on the energy consumption of encryption 
systems. This work is an attempt to analyse and study the overall energy consumption 
and encryption parameters’ variation and obtain the most effective configuration of the 
encryption system, for specified security requirements. 
Hereafter, it is intended to demonstrate the four novel approaches concerning the 
energy conscious adaptive security implementation and to quantify the effectiveness of 
the scheme over the traditional methods. 
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Chapter 4 - Reliability approach 
In this chapter a security framework is presented, based on the reliability function, 
with the ability to adjust dynamically the security mode with respect to energy 
consumption. The proposed security approach is twofold, as the security mode can be 
adjusted either according to the severity of the requested service, or according to a 
specified energy threshold. The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. In the first 
section reliability and its implication in the security scheme will be covered. The 
chapter then goes on to providing a brief description of the methodology that is 
adopted in the development of the proposed security scheme. This is followed by the 
implementation of the framework and the results obtained from the analysis of the 
security mode performance based on reliability. Finally, for the case of the security 
adjustment based on the user reliability level requirements, the second option of the 
twofold approach, the optimum threshold concept and the related algorithm, are 
illustrated.   
This chapter is based on the two following papers: 
 “Energy Conscious Adaptive Security Scheme for Optical Wireless”, published 
in the proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on Transparent 
Optical Networks (ICTON), 2012  
 “Energy Conscious Adaptive Security Scheme: A Reliability-based Stochastic 
Approach”, submitted to the Journal of Performance Evaluation. 
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4.1. Reliability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A reliability function represents the probability that for a given time, the system will 
survive [56]. For illustration purposes, system S is considered that consists of 
individual subsystems S1, S2, S3 and S4 connected in series, as shown in Figure 4.1. 
Those subsystems have independent individual lifetimes, not necessarily coming from 
the same probability distribution. Each subsystem consists of several components, Ca, 
Cb, Cc, connected in parallel with each other.  
For the above system, the reliability function as shown in Equation (4.1) is: 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇1 > 𝑡 , 𝑇2 > 𝑡 , 𝑇3 > 𝑡 ) (4.1) 
where T represents the total lifetime of the system, while T1, T2 and T3 stand for the 
lifetime of subsystems S1, S2 and S3 respectively.  
The above reliability function (4.1) can also be expressed as a function of energy, as 
shown in Equation (4.2): 
 𝑅(𝑒) = 𝑃(𝐸 > 𝑒) = 𝑃(𝐸1 > 𝑒 , 𝐸2 > 𝑒 , 𝐸3 > 𝑒 ) (4.2)  
C1a 
C1b 
C1c 
C2a 
C2b 
C2c 
C3a 
C3b 
C3c 
C4a 
C4b 
C4c 
S1 S2 S3 S4 
Figure 4.1: Encryption system S. 
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where E represents the total energy consumption of the system, whereas E1, E2 and E3 
stand for the energy consumed by subsystems S1, S2 and S3 respectively, for a given 
energy e.  
An equivalent formulation in terms of encryption can be made by replacing every 
occurrence of death with the completion of the encryption procedure. Empirical 
distribution of lifetimes of each encryption mode can be easily measured with several 
simulations running for all possible combinations. A subsystem’s lifetime refers to its 
execution time when used in the encryption procedure. 
By considering e as a given energy threshold, the above function could also be applied 
in an adaptive encryption scheme, as it could be used to derive upper bounds on the 
minimum operation of the encryption parameters, in order to achieve the required 
security. Those upper bounds are expected to be monotonically increasing in 
reliability, suggesting that it is better from an energy efficiency perspective to use 
relatively less secure primitives. Another way to express the reliability of a system is 
to use the lifetime distribution function (4.3), which is the complementary probability 
that derives from the reliability function (4.2). Specifically:  
 𝐿(𝑒) = 1 − 𝑅(𝑒) = 1 − 𝑃(𝐸 > 𝑒) = 𝑃(𝐸1 ≤ 𝑒 , 𝐸2 ≤ 𝑒 , 𝐸3 ≤ 𝑒 )(4.3) 
Equation (4.3) demonstrates the usefulness of the energy threshold. The use of the 
lifetime distribution function could be easily adopted and serve as a global indicator of 
performance. 
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4.2. Methodology 
 
As mentioned in the previous sections, Reliability, and therefore the CDF function can 
be used to calculate the probability of survival or failure for a given system 
respectively. The CDF, can be used to describe the probability that the system will 
finish its operation prior to a given threshold and therefore indicate the impact of its 
subsystems’ variation on the total system lifetime. In security analysis, the CDF 
function can easily be adopted and treated as a quality factor that describes all 
encryption parameters and their impact on energy consumption. It serves as an 
indicator of the performance of the encryption parameters with respect to the energy 
consumption of the overall security system. This forms the basis for the proposed 
adaptive security scheme that extends the fitting of the model for each security mode 
accordingly, by properly adjusting functional parameters and always taking into 
consideration the energy cost. In this way, a metric that indicates the impact of all 
encryption parameters is developed, and thus a global indicator is derived. The 
proposed model can be thus considered global, as it is not based on distinct 
parameters, but, instead, arises from the impact of all the individual encryption 
parameters on energy consumption [4]. According to Equation (2.5), to calculate 
system reliability one should isolate all encryption parameters and calculate their 
individual probabilities P(T1 > t), P(T2 > t), P(T3 > t), P(T4 > t) accordingly. However, 
it is not easy to derive their individual encryption parameter distributions since these 
cannot be isolated. Therefore, in this work, several simulation runs have been 
performed, as described in section 3.2.1, and the results provided the means to 
determine the empirical CDF (ECDF) of 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡). The encryption times of the 576 
cases considered in this work have been measured and the ECDF for each security 
mode has been concluded. Based on the ECDF, the security modes can be compared 
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and evaluated. Depending on the requirements, the selection of the most efficient 
mode can be made either based on the security restrictions or the energy/time 
threshold.  
 Variables:  list Cases # 576 cases data set 
  boolean S  # security requirements  
  boolean E # energy requirements 
  list Sr # security restrictions 
  float Er # energy restriction 
  float R # reliability 
  float Rmin = 1 # lowest reliability 
  int efficient = 0 # most efficient case 
 
 1: if S = TRUE then 
 2:  for case in Cases 
 3:   if case not in Sr then 
 4:    delete case 
 5:   else 
 6:    calculate R 
 7:    if R < Rmin 
 8:     R = Rmin 
 9:     efficient = case 
 10:    end if 
 11:   end if 
 12:  end for 
 13:  return efficient 
 14: else 
 15:  for case in Cases 
 16:   if case not in Er then 
 17:    delete case 
 18:   else  
 19:    calculate R 
 20:    if R ≠ 0 
 21:     delete case 
 22:    end if 
 23:   end if 
 24:  end for 
 25:  return Cases  
 26: end if 
 
 
 
In the first case, the security modes that do not meet the security requirements are 
Figure 4.2: Adaptive security scheme algorithm. 
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excluded. For the rest of the security modes, first the ECDF is determined and then the 
selection follows based on the ECDF metric. In the second case, the security modes 
that do not meet the energy/time requirements are excluded. For the rest of the security 
modes, first the ECDF is determined and then the selection follows based on the 
ECDF metric. The proposed adaptive security scheme and its operation are described in 
the adaptive security algorithm, shown in Figure 4.2. 
As mentioned earlier, the suggested adaptive security scheme provides two options for 
achieving the desired encryption strength at the lowest energy cost: 
 For given security requirements for the requested service, the reliability 
function is used to return the most efficient option with respect to energy, for 
the specific security mode. This can be done by excluding the modes that do 
not meet the security requirements, and by ranking the modes after the 
elimination based on the reliability or the ECDF. The higher the ECDF, the 
highest the probability of finishing the encryption on time.   
 In the case of battery powered devices, for a given energy threshold that 
derives from the battery state, the reliability function is used to return the most 
efficient option with respect to security, for the specific energy threshold. The 
modes that do not meet the time/energy requirements are excluded and the rest 
of the cases are ranked based on the ECDF/reliability and the selection is made 
based on this ranking. 
Overall, the proposed adaptive security scheme consists of several security modes, 
each providing a different level of security, depending on the severity of the service 
requested. Each security mode operates using the appropriate security algorithms 
 58 
 
and/or primitives. As the energy cost depends on the encryption parameters, each 
policy will induce a different level of energy consumption.    
Using the empirical CDF, a probability metric is calculated for a specified energy 
threshold. In this way, one can either accept or reject the combinations according to 
the desired level of the probability, and, depending on whether they satisfy the 
requirements or not, a decision will be made, which implies that the combinations that 
do not meet the given constraints will be eliminated. 
A general rule applied to most of the cases is that the highest probability of completing 
the encryption procedure prior to the time threshold will be selected, meaning that, for 
the specified threshold, the system will accomplish complete encryption in the most 
secure mode possible as well as at the lowest energy cost. Depending on the desired 
reliability, the most secure option will be selected.  
In the case of a battery-level threshold, the security modes that do not meet the energy 
constraints are excluded and the rest of them are ranked according to their 
reliability/ECDF. As mentioned earlier, reliability is the probability that the system 
will continue the encryption process even after the given energy threshold. Therefore, 
the lower the reliability is, the higher the probability that the system will have finished 
the encryption procedure before the battery dies. Thus, the probability will be used to 
return the most efficient option with respect to security, for the specific energy 
threshold. In the case of specific security requirements, the probability will be used to 
return the most efficient option with respect to energy, for the specific security. Thus, 
the system will select the lowest reliability metric from the available options that meet 
the requirements of the desired security.  
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4.3. Implementation and results 
 
In what follows, examples of how the reliability function can be used in an adaptive 
security scheme are presented. By setting a time threshold t for the encryption 
procedure, one can exclude the cases that do not meet the time or energy constraints 
and, therefore, the energy limitations that derive either from the available resources or 
the energy saving requirements. Since the probability that the system will have 
finished the encryption procedure on time is given by the ECDF: the higher the ECDF, 
the greater the probability of success and hence of energy consumption less than or 
equal to the level desired. Given that T represents the total lifetime - or the total 
encryption time of the encryption system, the highest probability that the encryption 
time T is less than or equal to t is desired: 
 𝐸𝐶𝐷𝐹(𝑡) = 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 ≤ 𝑡) → 1 (4.4) 
As a consequence, the higher the reliability, the higher is the probability that the 
system will continue the encryption after the specified time threshold t. Thus, a 
reliability equal to 0 would be the optimal probability, since it is desired that the 
system will operate for as little time as possible, and therefore consume the lowest 
energy possible: 
 𝑅(𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) → 0 (4.5) 
 
4.3.1. Example 1: Upper quartile time threshold 
 
To illustrate the implementation concept, a time threshold t will firstly be assigned. In 
the specific example the threshold is set to be in the upper quartile of the data. This 
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means that the ordered data is divided into four equal-sized subsets, and the quartile is 
the point taken at four intervals from the CDF of the variable, marking the boundaries 
between the consecutive subsets. In other words, the threshold is set equal to the value 
that represents the boundary of the quartile that lasts the longest time during encryption. 
It has to be noted, however, that one could also set a specific threshold, based on either 
the desired time or energy. For illustration purposes, Table 4.1 shows a sample of 6 of 
the 576-case (security modes) data set that resulted from the simulation, along with the 
variations of the parameters and the mean encryption time and energy consumption for 
the 100 iterations executed for each algorithm.  
The ECDF and reliability probabilities are shown, for the specified threshold that 
resulted in a time threshold of t = 864 µs, or an energy threshold of e = 233 µJ from 
Equation (2.2), corresponding to 56 nJB
-1
 for the encryption of a 4096 byte data set. 
As shown in the table, Reliability is very low for all of the cases of the random 
sample. This was expected, as the time threshold is well above the overall mean 
encryption time. 
Table 4.1: Simulated data sample 
Security 
mode 
Algorithm Mode Key Data Padding ECDF Reliability Mean 
time  
(µs) 
Mean 
energy 
(nJB
-1
) 9 AES CBC 256 4096 No 0.99 0.01 534 35 
16 AES CFB 128 4096 No 1 0 493 32 
135 DES CBC 56 4096 ISO 0.96 0.04 772 50 
215 3DES OFB 112 4096 ISO 0 1 1596 105 
279 BF ECB 256 4096 PKCS5 0.98 0.02 608 40 
342 RC2 CFB 128 4096 No 0.98 0.02 652 42 
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By examining the results in Table 4.1, it may be seen that case 215 will be eliminated, 
as it exceeds the specified threshold, which also appears as an ECDF equal to zero, 
meaning that almost surely the encryption will not be finished before the requested 
threshold. The other cases offer some of the available options that satisfy the threshold 
requirements. Depending either on the energy consumption or the desired level of 
probability, the security option that best satisfies the requirements can be selected.  
 
4.3.2. Example 2: 500 µs time threshold 
 
When a set time threshold is desired, this can be set by the user and then the 
calculation of the reliability metric for all the available security modes can proceed. 
For the specified time threshold t = 500 µs, some of the cases that will complete the 
encryption procedure prior to t with a desired lifetime ≥0.97, are shown in Table 4.2.  
The ECDF of the five cases that satisfy the requirements for the specified time 
threshold are presented. 
Table 4.2: Simulated data sample for a set threshold of 500 µs 
Case Algorithm Mode Key Data Padding ECDF Reliability Mean time 
(µs) 
Mean Energy 
(nJB
-1
) 
4 AES CBC 128 2048 NoPadding 1 0 293 38 
6 AES CBC 256 2048 NoPadding 0.99 0.01 324 42 
119 DES OFB 56 2048 NoPadding 0.97 0.03 444 58 
312 BF ECB 256 2048 ISO 0.97 0.03 427 56 
374 RC2 CFB 64 2048 PKCS5 0.97 0.03 379 50 
  
Figure 4.3 depicts the behaviour of the estimated ECDF function which depends on 
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the encryption time as taken from the simulation for the five cases mentioned above. 
The area on the left side of the vertical line - which is the specified time threshold t - 
represents the probability that for the given time threshold the encryption procedure 
will be completed. Specifically, analysing the ECDF probability as illustrated in 
Figure 4.3, the following results may be extracted: Case 4, P(T ≤ 500) = 1; Case 6,  
P(T ≤ 500) = 0.99; cases 119, 312 and 374, P(T ≤ 500) = 0.97. 
 
Figure 4.3: ECDF for sample cases 4, 6, 119, 321, 374. 
Figure 4.4 shows the performance of Case 4 in terms of encryption time. The resulting 
ECDF and reliability are presented, illustrating their reciprocal relationship. For the 
specified time threshold t = 500 µs, the ECDF tends to 1, while the reliability function 
tends to 0. This can be easily explained by comparing Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4, 
where one can observe that regarding the ECDF, which describes the probability of the 
encryption time, the maximum observed time is 450 µs. For this reason, the ECDF 
probability tends to 1, while reliability tends to 0. 
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Figure 4.4: ECDF and Reliability – Case 4. 
Following, an ideal encryption performance scenario, where the ECDF is 1 (and 
reliability is 0) for a time threshold t, is considered. A time threshold may be set, such 
that P(T ≤ t) = 1, which will here be 550 µs. For example, considering case 6 from the 
previous scenario, the probability of finishing before 500 µs is 0.99; increasing the 
time threshold by 50 µs makes the probability that Case 6 will finish before 550 µs, 
equal to 1. Translating the 500 µs encryption time to energy, this is equal to 135 µJ. 
Similarly, translating the 550 µs encryption time to energy, results in 150 µJ. 
Therefore, the 10% increase in the time threshold will incur an energy cost of  
100-135*100/150=10% increase, which is 150-135=15 µJ. This, once again, reinforces 
the idea of the energy consumption investigation under certain security requirements, 
which offers the user the option for the optimal security mode selection at the lowest 
energy cost. 
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The proposed adaptive security scheme evaluates the performance of several 
encryption algorithms and functional variation of their parameters with respect to 
energy consumption. Its methodology includes all possible combinations of the 
encryption functional parameters ranked with regard to the quality of the security, 
whilst also allowing for sorting security modes with respect to the level of energy 
consumption. At its most fundamental, this scheme determines a probability for each 
combination of functional parameters based on their impact on energy consumption. In 
Table 4.2 for example, one can not only see the ranking of a sample of the 576 cases, 
but also a quantitative comparison of the latter, i.e. Case 4 is 3% more likely to finish 
the encryption prior to the time threshold t, than case 119, and so on. 
 
4.4. Optimum threshold 
 
As described in the previous sections, one can adjust the level of security in the 
proposed scheme, based either on the desired threshold for energy restricted cases, or 
on the security requirements. In the second case, the reliability metric calculation 
reduces the adjustment of the security mode to the setting of an appropriate threshold 
for efficient probability estimation to meet user reliability level requirements. Hence, 
it is of great importance to develop a model that returns the optimum threshold, and 
the following subsection addresses this issue. 
When the security mode has to be adjusted according to the severity of the requested 
service, the system needs to deliver a specific likelihood that the encryption procedure 
will have finished before a time threshold. Although threshold selection could be 
random or set at the beginning of the operation, here the optimum threshold is 
computed for each security mode independently. This offers optimized performance, 
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since the respective reliability metric is concluded for each security mode, based on 
the individual optimum threshold, allowing for a more realistic, precise and rational 
evaluation of the reliability metric.  
 
4.4.1. Proposed algorithm 
 
The proposed algorithm calculates the optimum threshold for each security mode as 
follows. Using binary search, the time that results in the desired reliability level is 
found. Therefore, the list that the encryption times are stored has to be sorted in 
ascending order. Staring from the middle element of the list, the algorithm calculates 
the reliability and if it is equal to the requested one, the encryption time of this element 
is used as the optimum threshold for the next part of the algorithm. If reliability is 
greater than the requested one, the search is repeated for the first half of the list. If 
reliability is less than the requested one, the search is repeated for the second half of 
the list. This process is repeated until the level of reliability is equal to the requested 
one. There is also an option to adjust the decimal precision of the threshold. In this 
case, after the above procedure is completed, the algorithm subtracts one decimal point 
of the minimum time unit the reliability requirements are met. The overall optimum 
threshold selection procedure proposed in this section is summarized in the above 
algorithm as shown in Figure 4.5. It requires the choice of a reliability level together 
with the exact decimal precision and starts from the minimum observed encryption 
time. 
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 Variables:  list Times # observed encryption times 
  float R # reliability 
  float Rreq # requested reliability 
  int d # number of decimal precision 
  float j = 1 # initialized at 1 
 
 1: Search ( list, k, low, high ) 
 2:  mid = ( low + high ) / 2 
 3:  Calculate R  # for key(mid) 
 4:  if k = R then 
 5:  t = key ( mid + 1 ) 
6:  else if k < R then 
 7:   Search ( list, k, low, mid – 1 ) 
 8:  else 
 9:   Search ( list, k, mid + 1, high ) 
 10:  end if 
 11:  return t 
 12: end Search 
 13: 
 14: Search ( Times, Rreq, Times[1], Times[n] ) 
 15: 
 16: for i = 1 to i = d 
 17:  j = j / 10 
 18:  Calculate R # for t 
 19:  while R > Rreq  
 20:   t = t – j   
 21:   calculate R 
 22:  end while 
 23: end for 
 24: 
 25: return t  
 
Figure 4.5: Optimum threshold selection algorithm.  
 
4.4.1.1. Example 1: R ≤ 5% - Case 4 
 
Figure 4.6 gives an example where a user has requested the optimum threshold for 
security mode 4 that offers a probability of ≤5% that the encryption will not be 
completed prior to that threshold. This means that the ECDF lifetime metric has to be 
>0.95. Using the algorithm described in the previous section, the optimum threshold for 
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the specific example was found equal to 345.014 µs. As shown in Figure 4.6, the 
encryption procedure will be finished prior to the threshold by 0.95. 
 
Figure 4.6: ECDF and Optimum threshold for R ≤ 0.05 – Case 4. 
 
4.4.1.2. Example 2: R ≤ 5% - Case 6 
 
Another example is illustrated in Figure 4.7, where the user has requested the optimum 
threshold for security mode 6. The desired reliability is ≤5%. Using the algorithm for 
the optimum threshold selection, it was found that topt = 383.566 µs. As shown in 
Figure 4.7, the encryption procedure will be finished prior to the threshold with 
probability 0.95. 
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Figure 4.7: ECDF and Optimum threshold for R ≤ 0.05 – Case 6.  
 
4.4.1.3. Example 3: R ≤ 3% - Case 6 
 
Finally, for security mode 6 and for a desired reliability level ≤0.03 according to the 
proposed optimum threshold selection algorithm, topt was found to be equal to 401.166 
µs. Figure 4.8 illustrates the optimum threshold for this case. Compared to the previous 
example, where for a desired reliability level ≤0.05 topt = 383.566 µs, it can be observed 
that, by increasing the desired probability of not exceeding the time threshold by 2%, 
the optimum threshold is increased by 4.7%. 
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Figure 4.8: ECDF and Optimum threshold for R ≤ 0.03 – Case 6. 
 
4.5. Results 
 
When a system has not been configured to differentiate between the security hierarchy 
of the requested services, all the propagated data will be encrypted using the same 
encryption scheme. Thus, the mode that meets the requirements of the most crucial 
service is selected, so that an adequate level of security is guaranteed. However, it is 
not always necessary to encrypt data with a higher level of security strength than is 
actually needed, as this might result in unnecessary time and energy consumption.  
In the second example presented in the previous section, for the encryption of a 2 kB 
of data, the user aims to encrypt prior to the 500 µs threshold, with probability ≥ 0.97. 
Consider that apart from the time/energy requirements, the user also desires a high 
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level of security. Assuming that AES is adequate for the user security requirements, 
according to Table 4.2, the available options for this encryption process are Cases 4 
and 6, which differ only in the key size. However, given that both options provide an 
adequate level of security, Case 4 runs at a saving of 4nJB
-1
. Although this might be 
negligible for one encryption, using the appropriate parameters could save a 
significant amount of energy over a large number of encryptions, and this section now 
presents the concept and examines the results. 
Let 𝑛 be the number of encryptions and 𝑋 be a r.v with mean 𝜇 and variance 𝜎2 that 
represents the encryption time of a security mode. 
Let 𝑆 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  be the overall encryption time of the 𝑛 encryptions. Since 𝑋𝑖 , … , 𝑋𝑛 
are i.i.d., from Central Limit Theorem (CLT), 𝑆  approaches a normal distribution. 
Hence, the ECDF of ?̂? converges in distribution to 
 𝑆 ~ 𝑁(𝑛𝜇, 𝑛𝜎2) as 𝑛 → ∞ (4.6)  
From Equation (4.6), it can be derived that for Case 4 in Table 4.2, 𝑆4̂ converges to 
 𝑆4~𝑁(𝑛𝜇4, 𝑛𝜎4
2) as 𝑛 → ∞, where 𝑛 = 1000, 𝜇4 = 2.93 × 10
5ns, 𝜎4
2 = 6.61 × 108 
ns,  𝜇𝑆4 = 𝑛𝜇4 = 2.9 × 10
8 ns and   𝜎𝑆4
2 =  𝑛𝜎4
2 = 6.61 × 1011 ns.  
Figure 4.9 illustrates a point to point comparison of the theoretical distribution of  𝑆4 
and the approximate of  𝑆4̂  as generated from  𝑆4̂ = ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚 =
10000} and 𝑋𝑖~𝐸𝐶𝐷𝐹4 with mean 𝜇𝑖 and variance 𝜎𝑖
2, ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}. As shown in 
the histogram, 𝑆4̂ is distributed evenly around the mean, with most of the frequencies 
gathered in the centre, indicating that 𝑆4̂ follows the Normal distribution. Hence, the 
approximation of 𝑆4̂ is good, since the theoretical density maps the histogram. The  
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Q-Q plot indicates that 𝑆4̂ follows the normal curve as well since the data points lie 
close to the diagonal line. 
 
Figure 4.9: Theoretical 𝑆4 vs estimated 𝑆4̂ distribution. 
 
Figure 4.10: Theoretical 𝑆6 vs estimated 𝑆6̂ distribution. 
Similarly, for Case 6, 𝑆6̂ converges to 𝑆6~𝑁(𝑛𝜇6, 𝑛𝜎6
2) as 𝑛 → ∞, where 𝑛 = 1000, 
𝜇6 = 3.24 × 10
5 ns, 𝜎6
2 = 1.05 × 109  ns,  𝜇𝑆6 = 𝑛𝜇6 = 3.24 × 10
8  ns and   𝜎𝑆6
2 =
 𝑛𝜎6
2 = 1.05 × 1012 ns.  
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Figure 4.10 illustrates a comparison of the theoretical distribution of  𝑆6  and the 
approximate version 𝑆6̂  as generated from 𝑆6̂ = ∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑚 =
10000} and 𝑌𝑖~𝐸𝐶𝐷𝐹6 with mean 𝜇𝑖  and variance 𝜎𝑖
2, ∀𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}. 
 
Figure 4.11: 𝑆4 vs 𝑆6 density plot. 
Again, the figure indicates that the distribution of the sum approaches a normal 
distribution. The Q-Q plot indicates that 𝑆6̂ is a good fit as well, as the data points do 
not deviate from the diagonal line.  
Therefore, by fixing all encryption parameters that meet the user requirements and by 
distinguishing the key size, Cases 4 and 6 are compared. Figure 4.11 illustrates the 
contrast of the two encryption modes.  
As expected, 𝑆4  has a smaller mean compared to 𝑆6 , 𝜇𝑆4 = 2.93 × 10
8𝑠 <  𝜇𝑆6 =
3.24108𝑠, as well as smaller variance, 𝜎𝑆4
2 = 6.61 × 1011𝑠2 <  𝜎𝑆6
2 = 1.05 × 1012𝑠2. 
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In terms of 𝑛 encryptions, this difference could be translated to 10% more time for 
encryption with mode 6 than with mode 4. In addition, for an observation that follows 
the distribution of 𝑆4 , the probability that the overall encryption time of 𝑛 services 
will take values from the following ranges is: 
 𝑃 (𝑆4 ∈ (𝜇𝑆4 − 3𝜎𝑆4 , 𝜇𝑆4 + 3𝜎𝑆4  ))  ≈  0.99 (4.7) 
 𝑃 (𝑆4 ∈ (𝜇𝑆4 − 2𝜎𝑆4 , 𝜇𝑆4 + 2𝜎𝑆4  ))  ≈  0.95 (4.8) 
 𝑃 (𝑆4 ∈ (𝜇𝑆4 − 𝜎𝑆4 , 𝜇𝑆4 + 𝜎𝑆4  ))  ≈  0.68 (4.9) 
As it has been shown, by encrypting 𝑛  times under Case 6 parameterization, it is 
expected that the overall encryption time will be 10% higher than the Case 4 
parameterization. Knowledge of the distributions of  𝑆4  and 𝑆6  provides further 
understanding regarding the deviation of the encryption time from the mean by 
computing the confidence intervals (4.7-4.9). There follows an analysis that will 
enable the user not only to rank security cases, but also quantify and mathematically 
evaluate the selection among the available options. This will allow a user to predict the 
encryption time/energy saving he could achieve and make inference on how likely his 
predictions are to be true. Therefore, the distribution of the difference between the 
time of 𝑛 encryptions form Case 4 and 6 will be investigated. 
Let 𝑊1 = 𝑆6 − 𝑆4   be a random variable that represents the difference of two 
independent random variables, where 𝑆6~𝑁(𝑛𝜇6, 𝑛𝜎6
2) and 𝑆4~𝑁(𝑛𝜇4, 𝑛𝜎4
2). 
The characteristic function of a r.v. 𝑋 is defined by  
 𝜑𝑥(𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑒
𝑖𝑡𝑋) (4.10) 
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and has the property that uniquely characterizes the probability function of X [78]. 
Hence, from Equation (4.10) the characteristic function of a normal r.v. with expected 
value 𝜇 and variance 𝜎2 is given by [78]. 
 𝜑𝑥(𝑡) = exp (𝑖𝑡𝜇 −
𝜎2𝑡2
2
) (4.11) 
Thus, from Equation (4.11), 
  𝜑𝑊1(𝑡) = 𝜑𝑆6−𝑆4(𝑡) 
 = 𝜑𝑆6(𝑡) 𝜑𝑆4(𝑡) (independence)(4.12) 
Also, by symmetry −𝑆4~𝑁(−𝑛𝜇4, 𝑛𝜎4
2) [79] and Equation (4.12), results in 
𝜑𝑊1(𝑡) = exp {𝑖𝑡𝑛𝜇6 − 𝑛𝜎6
2
𝑡2
2
} ∙ exp {𝑖𝑡𝑛𝜇4 − 𝑛𝜎4
2
𝑡2
2
} 
= exp {𝑖𝑡𝑛𝜇6 − 𝑛𝜎6
2
𝑡2
2
+ 𝑖𝑡𝑛𝜇4 − 𝑛𝜎4
2
𝑡2
2
} 
 = exp{𝑖𝑡𝑛(𝜇6 − 𝜇4) − 𝑡
2𝑛(𝜎6
2 + 𝜎4
2)}   (4.13) 
Hence, from (4.13), 𝑊1 follows the normal distribution 
 𝑊1~𝑁(𝑛(𝜇6 − 𝜇4), 𝑛(𝜎6
2 + 𝜎4
2)) (4.14) 
The distribution of the difference between the time of 𝑛 encryptions from Cases 4 and 
6 is illustrated in Figure 4.12. It is shown that 95% of the shaded area is inside the 
range  𝜇𝑊1 ± 2𝜎𝑊1 = (2.8 × 10
7𝑠, 3.3 × 107𝑠)  as stated in Equation (4.9), whilst 
from Equation (4.8), 99% of the area under the curve lies within 
 𝜇𝑊1 ± 3𝜎𝑊1 = (2.7 × 10
7𝑠, 3.4 × 107𝑠) . This reveals that the likelihood of 𝑛 
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services that are encrypted using security mode 4 finish prior to 𝑛 services encrypted 
using security mode 6, is a rather rare event, since 𝑃(𝑊1 < 0) → 0. 
 
Figure 4.12: 𝑊1 density plot. 
As expected, the results show that between 𝑆4  and 𝑆6 , 𝑆4  should be selected for 
services whose security requirements are satisfied, since it proves greater efficiency 
than 𝑆6. There now follows an examination of an adaptive scenario to illustrate the 
adaptability of the proposed scheme. In the scenario, the user has requested 𝑘 services 
to be encrypted using mode 4 and (𝑛 − 𝑘) using mode 6. 
Let 𝑄1 = 𝑍6 + 𝑍4 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖 +
𝑘
𝑖=1 ∑ 𝑌𝑗
𝑛−𝑘
𝑗=1  
where 𝑍6 = ∑ 𝑋𝑖~𝑁(𝑘𝜇6, 𝑘𝜎6
2)𝑘𝑖=1 ,  𝑍4 = ∑ 𝑌𝑗~𝑁((𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜇4, (𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜎4
2)𝑛−𝑘𝑗=1 ,  
𝑋𝑖~𝐸𝐶𝐷𝐹6, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑘}, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝜇6 , 𝜎6
2 < ∞   
𝑌𝑗~𝐸𝐶𝐷𝐹4, 𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛 − 𝑘}, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝜇4, 𝜎4
2 < ∞ 
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In addition, 𝑋𝑖 are i.i.d. , 𝑌𝑗 are i.i.d. and 𝑋𝑖, 𝑌𝑗 independent ∀𝑖, 𝑗. Similar to Equation 
(4.12) and by independence and because  
𝜑𝑄1(𝑡) = 𝜑𝑍6(𝑡) ∙ 𝜑𝑍4(𝑡) 
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {𝑖𝑡𝑘𝜇6 − 𝑘𝜎6
2
𝑡2
2
} ∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {𝑖𝑡(𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜇4 − (𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜎4
2 𝑡
2
2
} 
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {𝑖𝑡𝑘𝜇6 − 𝑘𝜎6
2
𝑡2
2
+ 𝑖𝑡(𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜇4 − (𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜎4
2 𝑡
2
2
} 
= 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {𝑖𝑡(𝑘𝜇6 + (𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜇4) −
𝑡2
2
(𝑘𝜎6
2 + (𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜎4
2)} 
the overall encryption time 𝑄1of the compound scenario, is distributed according to 
 𝑄1~𝑁(𝑘𝜇6 + (𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜇4, 𝑘𝜎6
2 + (𝑛 − 𝑘)𝜎4
2) (4.15) 
The density of Q1 for 𝑘   = 200 encryptions under mode 4 and 𝑛 − 𝑘   = 800 
encryptions under mode 6 is illustrated in Figure 4.13. For the compound mode, it is 
expected that the overall encryption time will be 8% higher than mode 4 and 2% less 
than mode 6. Further, from Equation (4.8), the time interval that assures the user's 
overall encryption time will lie within (3.16 × 108𝑠,  3.2 × 108𝑠) with probability 
0.95. This provides statistical confidence that with high probability the right 2.5% tail 
of 𝑄1 will not overlap with the left 2.5% tail of 𝑆6, since 
 𝑃(𝑄1 > 𝜇𝑆6 − 2𝜎𝑆6) ≈ 0.6 × 10
−10 → 0   (4.16) 
and  𝑃(𝑆6 < 𝜇𝑄1 + 2𝜎𝑄1) ≈ 0.7 × 10
−20 → 0 (4.17) 
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Hence, with a 95% probabilistic level of confidence, time predictions belonging to the 
set of the 2.5% best case scenarios for 𝑆6 do not to overlap with those lying in the 
2.5% worst case scenarios for the compound mode. 
 
Figure 4.13: 𝑄1, 𝑆4,  𝑆6 density plot. 
Therefore, 𝑆4  and 𝑆6  can be considered as benchmarks for the user customization 
options and decisions regarding the mode selection, since the distributions of 𝑆4 and 
𝑆6 provide an upper and lower bound on the customization of security. The user can 
make inferences and predict the expected times for the different encryptions according 
to the severity of each service. Depending on the allocation of the 𝑘  and 𝑛 − 𝑘 
services to different encryption modes, the user can therefore customize security 
according to need.  
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4.6. Discussion 
 
In this chapter an adaptive security scheme that suggests a new approach in the area of 
low energy encryption has been proposed. The method relies on the use of the CDF as a 
global performance indicator. The performance of five encryption algorithms has been 
evaluated on the basis of the encryption time, energy consumption and the encryption 
parameter variation, taking into consideration the overall impact of the encryption 
parameters on energy consumption. CDF has been used as a global indicator for the 
optimal security mode selection among algorithms and encryption parameters. An 
adaptive security scheme has been suggested that results in the most efficient security 
mode, at the lowest energy cost. Furthermore, in this work an optimum threshold 
selection algorithm has been introduced and developed. This is based on the reliability 
metric and provides the solution to the problem associated with the selection of the 
threshold in the case where the security mode has to be adjusted according to the 
severity of the requested service, and, therefore, the system is required to operate for a 
specific reliability level.  
The asymptotic distribution of n encryptions of the two cases that were assumed to 
meet user’s security requirements has been investigated. The approximate distribution 
of the overall execution time of n encryptions as calculating by applying CLT, is a 
Normal distribution 𝑁(𝜇, 𝜎2) with parameters 𝜇 equal to n times the mean execution 
time of a single encryption and 𝜎2equal n times the variance of the execution time of a 
single encryption. It has to be noted that the general form of the Normal distribution as 
shown in Equation (4.6) is applicable for any case by properly adjusting the parameters 
𝜇 and 𝜎2. In addition, this can be applied to the compound scenario, as calculated in 
Equation (4.15). Furthermore, the distribution of the difference between the time of n 
encryptions from Case 4 and Case 6 has been calculated. From CLT, the calculated 
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distribution is Normal with parameters as shown in Equation (4.14). This allows a user 
not only to rank security modes, but also to quantify and mathematically evaluate the 
selection among the available options. Finally, by using the asymptotic distribution of 
Case 4 and Case 6 as benchmarks, the derived distribution of a compound policy has 
been analyzed, with respect to time/energy saving. 
This was the first part of the stochastic approach introduced earlier in this thesis 
concerning the energy conscious adaptive security implementation. Chapter 5 extends 
the reliability approach with the use of probability inequalities, so that predictions for a 
finite number of encryptions can be achieved.  
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Chapter 5 - Probabilistic bound approach 
The objective of this chapter is to extend the reliability framework proposed in 
Chapter 4, where reliability was adopted to deliver a global quality factor for optimal 
security mode selection, with respect to energy consumption. Here, the focus is on the 
aspects of bounding the probability that the mean time of n encryptions will exceed the 
expected time by a desired threshold. Similarly, the probability that the overall 
encryption time will exceed the expected time is also bounded. The advantage of such 
a model is that predictions outside the range of the most frequently observed values 
can be made. 
A probabilistic upper bound-based approach is introduced and evaluated on the same 
experiment as in Chapter 4 [4, 80] in order to develop a framework for energy 
conscious adaptive security. The bound approach relies on stochastic modelling and 
probabilistic decision making to bound the tail distribution of n encryptions. The key 
contribution of this work is a new bound-based approach that stochastically studies the 
overall influence of the configuration parameters on the total energy consumption. 
Chernoff-type bounds are applied to the probability that the encryption time will 
exceed a given threshold, so as to return the most effective combination regarding 
either the desired security or the available energy resources for n encryptions.  
 
5.1. Bounds on the tail distribution 
 
In addition to the reliability model described in the previous chapter, the ideal model 
should also have the ability to provide a bound on the tail distribution of n samples. In 
what follows, Chernoff-type bounds are applied in order to examine the impact of the 
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encryption parameters on the overall energy consumption for n encryptions.  
The advantage of such a model is that predictions outside the range of those most 
frequently observed can be made. Several models may fit well the most frequent values 
of the observed data, but vary considerably in the tails of the distributions of the 
variable of interest. Here, this is the longest encryption time, naturally leading to the 
consideration of the extreme values. Thus, to evaluate the effectiveness of the model 
proposed, the probability that the mean time for n encryptions will exceed the expected 
time by a desired threshold, as well as the probability that the overall time for n 
encryptions will exceed n times the expected time by a desired threshold, should be 
bounded.  
Chernoff’s bounds estimate the tail probability of random variables and give 
exponentially decreasing bounds on tail probabilities [82] that  
 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) ≤ 𝑒−ℎ(𝑡) (5.1) 
where ℎ(𝑡) is a function of t such that for 𝜃 ≥ 0, the supremum of function h is given 
by ℎ(𝑡) = 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝜃{𝑛𝜃𝑡 − 𝑛𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑀(𝜃)}, where 𝑀(𝜃) = 𝐸(𝑒
𝜃𝑇) is the moment generating 
function of T.  
Let  𝑇𝑖, … . , 𝑇𝑛 be i.i.d. r.v. so that 
 𝑇 = ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  (5.2) 
Then, from the Chernoff-Cramer inequality [81] 
 𝑃(𝑇 ≥ 𝑛𝑡) ≤ 𝑒𝑛ℎ(𝑡) (5.3) 
In this work, as there is no knowledge concerning the theoretical distribution, the 
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moment generating function cannot be computed and thus the original form of the 
Chernoff bound cannot be applied. Instead, Chebyshev’s and Hoeffding’s inequality 
[82] is going to be used as a starting point to provide a bound for the tail distribution. In 
contrast to other popular concentration inequality methods, Hoeffding’s inequality can 
be applied to arbitrary distributions. Furthermore, Bennett’s and Bernstein’s 
inequalities have been used to extend the initial bound. By utilizing knowledge about 
the variance of the distribution, tighter bounds can be derived. 
In this section, an upper bound on the probability that the encryption time of n trials 
exceeds the time threshold is presented, which is considered as the objective function to 
be minimized. The aim is to find an upper bound for the probability that the mean time 
of n encryption procedures will exceed the expected time by a given threshold. Due to 
symmetry, a two-sided version of those bounds has also been considered and 
investigated. 
To establish the bound and compute the probability that T deviates significantly from t, 
𝑓(𝑇) = 𝑒𝑠𝑇 is used, where 𝑓 is a function of T that, after applying Markov’s inequality, 
allows for expressing the bound as a function of the moment generating function. This 
methodology is due to Chernoff [82] and is based on finding the value of s that 
minimizes the upper bound for 𝑠 > 0, 
 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) = 𝑃(𝑒𝑠𝑇 > 𝑒𝑠𝑡)   (5.4) 
According to Markov’s inequality, for a nonnegative random variable T  and 0s  
 𝑃(𝑇 > 𝑡) ≤
𝐸[𝑒𝑠𝑇]
𝑒𝑠𝑡
 (5.5) 
In the following subsections, the bound calculation for n>1 is presented. The calculated 
bound is then applied to the data to obtain the bounded tail probability. 
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5.2. Bound calculation – Chebyshev’s inequality 
 
Let 𝑇1, … , 𝑇𝑛 be i.i.d. random variables so that: 
 ?̂? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  (5.6) 
and   𝜇 = 𝐸[?̂?] =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝐸[𝑇𝑖]
𝑛
𝑖=1  (5.7) 
𝑃 (|∑ 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
| ≥ 𝜀) = 𝑃 [(∑ 𝑇𝑖 −
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
)
2
≥ 𝜀2] 
 ≤
𝑬(∑ 𝑻𝒊−𝑬 ∑ 𝑻𝒊
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏 )
𝟐
𝜺𝟐
 by Markov 
 =
𝑉𝑎𝑟(∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
𝜀2
 by definition of variance 
 =
𝑛𝜎2
𝜀2
 (5.8) 
since 𝜎2 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1  
and by independence 𝑉𝑎𝑟(∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) = ∑ 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1  
The absolute difference between mean and sample mean can be bounded by 
𝑃(|?̂? − 𝜇| ≥ 𝜀) = 𝑃 (|
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑇𝑖 −
1
𝑛
𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
| ≥ 𝜀) 
 84 
 
=  𝑃 (|∑ 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
𝑖=1
| ≥ 𝑛𝜀) 
≤
𝑛𝜎2
𝑛2𝜀2
 
 =
𝜎2
𝑛𝜀2
 (5.9) 
Hence, from Equation (5.9), to achieve a desired level of probability, 𝛾, the required 
sample size is given by 
 𝑛 ≥
𝜎2
𝛾𝜀2
 (5.10) 
The accuracy 𝜀 derived from Equation (5.9) is given by 
 𝜀 ≥
𝜎
√𝑛𝛾
 (5.11) 
Then, with probability at least (1 − 𝛾), the sample mean lies within the interval 
 𝜇 −
𝜎
√𝑛𝛾
≤ ?̂? ≤ 𝜇 +
𝜎
√𝑛𝛾
 (5.12) 
In order to bound the right tail of ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , the application of the Cauchy-Schwarz 
inequality to the classical Chebyshev inequality will result in Equation (5.13) 
 𝑃(𝑋 − 𝐸𝑋 ≥ 𝜀) ≤
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋)+𝜀2
 (5.13) 
which is due to Cantelli [83]. 
By letting 𝑋 = ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , Equation (5.13) becomes 
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𝑃 (∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
− 𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≥ 𝜀) ≤
𝑉𝑎𝑟(∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 )
𝑉𝑎𝑟(∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) + 𝜀
2
 
 =
𝑛𝜎2
𝑛𝜎2+𝜀2
  (5.14) 
Where (5.14) follows by independence and the definition of 𝜎2. 
From Equation (5.14), the required sample size to achieve the desired level of 
probability is 
 𝑛 ≥
𝜀2𝛾
𝜎2(𝛾−1)
 (5.15) 
The accuracy 𝜀 derived from Equation (5.14) is 
 𝜀 ≥ 𝜎√
𝑛(1−𝛾)
𝛾
 (5.16) 
Equation (5.14) provides an upper bound for the sum of 𝑛 r.vs, while for 𝜀 = 𝑛𝑡, the 
sample mean can be bounded by 
𝑃(?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) = 𝑃 (∑ 𝑇𝑖 −
𝑛
𝑖=1
𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
≥ 𝑛𝜀) 
≤
𝑛𝜎2
𝑛𝜎2 + 𝑛2𝜀2
 
 =
𝜎2
𝜎2+𝑛𝜀2
 (5.17) 
From Equation (5.17), the required sample size to achieve the desired level of 
probability 𝛾 is 
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 𝑛 ≥
𝜎2(1−𝛾)
𝜀2𝛾
 (5.18) 
The accuracy 𝜀 derived from Equation (5.17) is 
 𝜀 ≥ 𝜎√
(1−𝛾)
𝛾𝑛
 (5.19) 
 
5.3. Bound calculation – Hoeffding’s inequality 
 
The goal is to find an upper bound for the probability that the difference between the 
true and estimated mean is equal to or greater than the desired threshold ε 
 𝑃(?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) (5.20) 
For 𝜀 > 0,  𝑃(?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) = 𝑃(𝑒𝑠(?̂?−𝜇) ≥ 𝑒𝑠𝜀),  𝑠 > 0 
≤
𝐸[𝑒𝑠(?̂?−𝜇)]
𝑒𝑠𝜀
 
=
𝐸 [𝑒𝑠
1
𝑛
∑ (𝑇𝑖−𝐸[𝑇𝑖])
𝑛
𝑖=1 ]
𝑒𝑠𝜀
 
 =
∏ 𝐸[𝑒
𝑠
1
𝑛(𝑇𝑖−𝐸[𝑇𝑖])]𝑛𝑖=1
𝑒𝑠𝜀
 (5.21) 
In order to provide a bound for the numerator, Hoeffding’s lemma (5.22) will be 
applied.  
Let T  be random variable so that  𝑇 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏 ] almost surely. Then ∀ 𝑠 > 0 [82] and 
from (2.15), 
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 𝐸[𝑒𝑠𝑇] ≤ 𝑒
𝑠2(𝑏−𝑎)2
8  (5.22) 
The proof lies upon the convexity of the exponential (Jensen’s inequality) and Taylor’s 
theorem. 
By letting  𝑍 = 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐸[𝑇𝑖]   
and considering that 𝑇𝑖 ∈ [𝑎𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖] 
then  𝑎 ≤ 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑏 
 
𝑎−𝐸[𝑇𝑖]
𝑛
≤
𝑇𝑖−𝐸[𝑇𝑖]
𝑛
≤
𝑏−𝐸[𝑇𝑖]
𝑛
  (5.23) 
Let 𝑅1 =
𝑎
𝑛
−
𝐸𝑇𝑖
𝑛
 
and 𝑅2 =
𝑏
𝑛
−
𝐸𝑇𝑖
𝑛
 
Substituting Equation (5.23) in Equation (5.21), and recognizing that the argument 
above applies ∀𝑖 
 𝑃(?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑒−𝑠𝜀 ∏ 𝑒𝑠
2(𝑅2−𝑅1)
2/8𝑛
𝑖=1  
 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
𝑠2(𝑏−𝑎)2
8𝑛
− 𝑠𝜀} (5.24) 
The bound is minimized for 
 𝑠 =
4𝑛𝜀
(𝑏−𝑎)2
 (5.25) 
and hence: 
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 𝑃(?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
−2𝑛𝜀2
(𝑏−𝑎)2
} (5.26) 
The target is to minimize the probability in Equation (5.26).  
Allowing the number of samples to approach infinity results in the probability 
approaching zero since  
 lim𝑛→∞ 𝑃(?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) = 0 
Moreover, to achieve a desired level of probability γ, the number of samples needed 
may be found form Equation (5.26) thus: 
 𝑛 ≥ −
(𝑏−𝑎)2 ln 𝛾
2𝜀2
 (5.27) 
While for 0  the accuracy ε for a desired level of confidence γ and sample size n is 
 𝜀 ≥ (𝑏 − 𝑎)√−
ln 𝛾
2𝑛
 (5.28) 
Similarly to the upper bound Equation (5.26), by applying the appropriate arguments, 
the lower bound can be derived: 
 𝑃(𝜇 − ?̂? ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
−2𝑛𝜀2
(𝑏−𝑎)2
} (5.29) 
From Equations (5.26) and (5.29), the 2-sided inequality can be obtained as shown in 
Equation (5.30). 
 𝑃(|?̂? − 𝜇| ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 2𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
−2𝑛𝜀2
(𝑏−𝑎)2
} (5.30) 
Hence, for the 2-sided inequality, to achieve a desired level of probability 𝛾 , the 
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required sample size can be found from Equation (5.29), thus: 
 𝑛 ≥ −
(𝑏−𝑎)2
2𝜀2
ln (
2
𝛾
) (5.31) 
The accuracy 𝜀 derived from Equation (5.30) is 
 𝜀 ≥ √
(𝑏−𝑎)2
2𝑛2
ln (
2
𝛾
) (5.32) 
From Equation (5.32) the confidence interval, which is the range [𝜇 − 𝜀, 𝜇 + 𝜀] is 
given by 
 𝜇 − √
(𝑏−𝑎)2
2𝑛
ln (
2
𝛾
) ≤ ?̂? ≤ 𝜇 + √
(𝑏−𝑎)2
2𝑛
ln (
2
𝛾
) (5.33) 
with probability at least (1 − 𝛾). 
In order to bound the right tail of ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ,  let 𝜀 =
𝑡
𝑛
. From Equation (5.26) the 
following can be derived: 
 𝑃(∑ 𝑇𝑖 −
𝑛
𝑖=1 𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝑡) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
2𝑡2
𝑛(𝑏−𝑎)2
} (5.34) 
From Equation (5.34) and by letting 𝑡 = 𝜀 for consistency in notation, to achieve a 
desired level of probability 𝛾, the required sample size is 
 𝑛 ≥
2𝜀2
2(𝑏−𝑎) ln(1/𝛾)
 (5.35) 
The accuracy 𝜀 derived from Equation (5.34) is 
 𝜀 ≥ √
𝑛(𝑏−𝑎)2 ln(
1
𝛾
)
2
 (5.36) 
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By symmetry, the lower bound follows from Equation (5.29), resulting in the following 
2-sided bound for the sum of  𝑛  r.vs. 
 𝑃(|∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − 𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 | ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 2𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
2𝜀2
𝑛(𝑏−𝑎)2
} (5.37) 
From Equation (5.37), the desired level of probability 𝛾 is achieved for sample size 
given by 
 𝑛 ≥
2𝜀2
(𝑏−𝑎)2 ln(2/𝛾)
 (5.38) 
The accuracy 𝜀 derived from Equation (5.37) is 
 𝜀 ≥ √
𝑛(𝑏−𝑎)2 ln(
2
𝛾
)
2
 (5.39) 
From Equation (5.39), the confidence interval for   ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 − 𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1   is given by 
𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
−
√𝑛
(𝑏 − 𝑎)2 ln (
2
𝛾)
2
≤ ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 ≤ 𝐸 ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
+
√𝑛
(𝑏 − 𝑎)2 ln (
2
𝛾)
2
 
or 
 𝑛𝜇 − √
𝑛(𝑏−𝑎)2 ln(
2
𝛾
)
2
≤ ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≤ 𝑛𝜇 +
√
𝑛(𝑏−𝑎)2 ln(
2
𝛾
)
2
 (5.40) 
 
5.4. Bound calculation – Bennett’s inequality 
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Let T1, … , Tn  be i.i.d. r.v., such that 𝑇𝑖 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏], ∀ 𝑖 ∈  {1, … , 𝑛}  and 
0 < 𝑎 < 𝑏 < ∞.  
Also let 𝜎2 =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝜎𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1 , where 𝜎𝑖
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑇𝑖). 
Without loss of generality, r.v. 𝑇𝑖 will be centered by  𝑎 ≤ 𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑏. Then, 
 𝑎 − 𝐸𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐸𝑇𝑖 ≤ 𝑏 − 𝐸𝑇𝑖  (5.41) 
Note, that since 0 < 𝑎 < 𝑏 implies that 𝑏 − 𝐸𝑇𝑖 > 𝑎 − 𝐸𝑇𝑖, the centred r.v.  
𝑍𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖 − 𝐸𝑇𝑖 can be symmetrized by letting 𝐶 = 𝑏 − 𝐸𝑇𝑖, resulting in |𝑍𝑖| < 𝐶 and 
𝐸(𝑍𝑖) = 0 as required. 
Similarly to Hoeffding’s inequality, the moment generating function needs to be 
bounded, but in this case using knowledge of the variance. Therefore, a tighter bound 
than Hoeffding’s will be derived. 
For 𝐸 > 0, 𝑠 > 0 
𝑃 (∑ 𝑍𝑖 ≥ 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=1
) = 𝑃(𝑒𝑠 ∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝑒𝑠𝜀) 
 ≤
𝐸[𝑒𝑠 ∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ]
𝑒𝑠𝜀
 (from Markov) 
 =
∏ 𝐸(𝑒𝑠𝑍𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1
𝑒𝑠𝜀
 (by independence) (5.42) 
From Taylor series for 𝑒𝑠𝑍𝑖  and taking the expectation 
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𝐸𝑒𝑠𝑍𝑖 = 1 + 𝑠𝐸𝑍𝑖 + ∑
𝑠𝑟𝐸(𝑍𝑖
𝑟)
𝑟!
∞
𝑟=2
 
and since 𝐸𝑍𝑖 = 0 
𝐸𝑒𝑠𝑍𝑖 = 1 + ∑
𝑠𝑟𝐸(𝑍𝑖
𝑟)
𝑟!
∞
𝑟=2
 
= 1 + 𝑠2𝜎𝑖
2 ∑
𝑠𝑟−2𝐸(𝑍𝑖
𝑟)
𝑟! 𝜎𝑖2
∞
𝑟=2
 
≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝{𝐹𝑖𝑠
2𝜎𝑖
2} 
where 𝐹𝑖 = ∑
𝑠𝑟−2𝐸(𝑍𝑖
𝑟)
𝑟!𝜎𝑖2
∞
𝑟=2   
Using Schwarz’s inequality and since the expectation of a function is the Lebesgue 
integral [84] with respect to the probability measure P, 
𝐸𝑍𝑖
𝑟 = ∫ 𝑍𝑖
𝑟−1𝑍𝑖   𝑑𝑃
𝑃
 
≤ (∫|𝑍𝑖
𝑟−1|
2
  𝑑𝑃
𝑃
)
1
2⁄
(∫ |𝑍𝑖|
2  𝑑𝑃
𝑃
)
1
2⁄
 
= 𝜎𝑖 (∫ |𝑍𝑖
𝑟−1|
2
𝑃
)
1
2⁄
 
Applying Schwarz’s inequality recursively 𝑛  times, 
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𝐸𝑍𝑖
𝑟 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
1+
1
2+⋯+
1
2𝑛−1 (∫ |𝑍𝑖
2𝑛𝑟−2𝑛+1−1|  𝑑𝑃
𝑃
)
1
2𝑛
 
 = 𝜎𝑖
2(1−
1
2𝑛
) (∫ |𝑍𝑖
(2𝑛𝑟−2𝑛+1−1)|  𝑑𝑃
𝑃
)
1
2𝑛
  (5.43) 
Since |𝑍𝑖| ≤ 𝐶, 
 (∫ |𝑍𝑖
2𝑛𝑟−2𝑛+1−1|  𝑑𝑃
𝑃
)
1
2𝑛
≤ (𝐶2
𝑛𝑟−2𝑛+1−1)
1
2𝑛
 (5.44) 
From equations (5.43) and (5.44) the 𝑟𝑡ℎ moment is bounded by 
 𝐸𝑍𝑖
𝑟 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
2(1−
1
2𝑛
)𝐶(𝑟−2−
1
2𝑛
)
 (5.45) 
And since  lim𝑛→∞ 𝜎𝑖
2(1−
1
2𝑛
)𝐶(𝑟−2−
1
2𝑛
) = 𝜎𝑖
2𝐶𝑟−2 , 
 𝐸𝑍𝑖
𝑟 ≤ 𝜎𝑖
2𝐶𝑟−2 (5.46) 
Applying Equation (5.46) to 𝐹𝑖, 
𝐹𝑖 = ∑
𝑠𝑟−2𝐸(𝑍𝑖
𝑟)
𝑟! 𝜎𝑖2
∞
𝑟=2
 
≤ ∑
𝑠𝑟−2𝜎𝑖
2𝐶𝑟−2
𝑟! 𝜎𝑖2
∞
𝑟=2
 
=
1
𝑠2𝐶2
∑
𝑠𝑟𝐶𝑟
𝑟!
∞
𝑟=2
 
 =
1
𝑠2𝐶2
(𝑒𝑠𝐶 − 1 − 𝑠𝐶) (by Taylor’s theorem) (5.47) 
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From Equation (5.47), 
  𝐸𝑒𝑠𝑍𝑖 ≤ 𝑒𝐹𝑖𝑠
2𝜎𝑖
2
 
 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {𝑠2𝜎𝑖
2 (𝑒
𝑠𝐶−1−𝑠𝐶)
𝑠2𝐶2
} (5.48) 
Combining Equations (5.42) and (5.48) and because 𝜎2 =
∑ 𝜎𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1
𝑛
, 
 𝑃(∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {𝑠
2𝑛𝜎2
(𝑒𝑠𝐶−1−𝑠𝐶)
𝑠2𝐶2
− 𝑠𝜀} (5.49) 
The right hand side of Equation (5.49) is minimised for 𝑠 as shown in Equation (5.50) 
 𝑠 =
1
𝐶
ln (
𝜀𝐶
𝑛𝜎2
+ 1) (5.50) 
Substituting Equation (5.50) in (5.49), 
 𝑃(∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {
𝑛𝜎2
𝐶2
[
𝜀𝐶
𝑛𝜎2
− ln (
𝜀𝐶
𝑛𝜎2
+ 1) −
𝜀𝐶
𝑛𝜎2
ln (
𝜀𝐶
𝑛𝜎2
+ 1)]} (5.51) 
Let  𝐻(𝑥) = (1 + 𝑥) ln(1 + 𝑥) − 𝑥 ,  to derive Bennett’s inequality: 
 𝑃(∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑛𝜎2
𝐶2
𝐻 (
𝜀𝐶
𝑛𝜎2
)} (5.52) 
Equation (5.52) bounds the sum of 𝑛 r.v.s, while for 𝜀 = 𝑛𝑡, the sample mean can be 
bounded by 
 𝑃 (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝑡) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑛𝜎2
𝐶2
𝐻 (
𝑡𝐶
𝜎2
)} (5.53) 
 
5.5. Bound calculation – Bernstein’s inequality 
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By applying the elementary inequality 
 𝐻(𝑥) ≥ 𝐺(𝑥) =
3
2
 
𝑥2
𝑥+3
 , ∀𝑥 ≥ 0 (5.54) 
to Equation (5.52) to bound Bennett’s inequality further, 
𝑃 (∑ 𝑍𝑖 ≥ 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=1
) ≤ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑛𝜎2
𝐶2
 𝐺 (
𝜀𝐶
𝑛𝜎2
)} 
 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝜀2
2(𝑛𝜎2+
𝜀𝐶
3
)
} (5.55) 
From Equation (5.55), to achieve the desired level of probability 𝛾 , the required 
sample size is 
 𝑛 ≥ −
𝜀
𝜎2
(
𝜀
2 ln 𝛾
+
𝐶
3
)  (5.56) 
By symmetry, and by applying Equation (5.55) to −𝑍𝑖, the following 2-sided bound 
for the sum of 𝑛 r.v.s can be derived, as shown in the following 
 𝑃(|∑ 𝑍𝑛𝑖=1 𝑖| ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 2𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝜀2
2(𝑛𝜎2+
𝜀𝐶
3
)
} (5.57) 
Equation (5.55) bounds the sum of 𝑛 r.v.s, while for 𝜀 = 𝑛𝑡 the sample mean can be 
bounded by 
 𝑃 (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑍𝑖 ≥ 𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) ≤  𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑛𝑡2
2(𝜎2+
𝐶𝑡
3
)
} (5.58) 
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By symmetry, applying Equation (5.58) to −𝑍𝑖  and recalling that 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑇𝑖 − 𝜇 , the 
following 2-sided bound due to Bernstein can be derived, as shown in Equation (5.59) 
 𝑃 (|
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑇𝑖 − 𝜇
𝑛
𝑖=1 | ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 2𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−
𝑛𝜀2
2(𝜎2+
𝜀𝐶
3
)
 }  (5.59) 
From Equation (5.58), to achieve the desired level of probability 𝛾 , the required 
sample size is  
 𝑛 ≥ −2 (𝜎2 +
𝐶𝜀
3
)
ln(𝛾)
𝜀2
 (5.60) 
To calculate the accuracy 𝜀 from Equation (5.58),  
let  𝑦 = −
𝜀2
2(𝑛𝜎2+
𝜀𝐶
3
)
  (5.61) 
Then Equation (5.58) is of the form 
𝑃 (∑ 𝑍𝑖 ≥ 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=1
) ≤ 𝑒−𝑦 
Solving Equation (5.61) for 𝜀, results in 
 𝜀 =
𝑦𝐶
3
+ √
𝑦2𝐶2
9
+ 2𝑛𝜎2𝑦 (5.62) 
Note, that  𝜀 =
𝑦𝐶
3
− √
𝑦2𝐶2
9
+ 2𝑛𝜎2𝑦   is rejected, since  𝜀 ≥ 0  and  
 
𝑦𝐶
3
< √
𝑦2𝐶2
9
+ 2𝑛𝜎2𝑦 
Using the inequality √𝑎 + 𝑏 ≤ √𝑎 + √𝑏  in Equation (5.62),  
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∑ 𝑍𝑖 ≥
𝑦𝐶
3
+
𝑦𝐶
3
+ √2𝑛𝜎2𝑦 =
2𝑦𝐶
3
+ √2𝑛𝜎2𝑦
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Normalizing by n, 
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑍𝑖 ≥
2𝑦𝐶
3𝑛
+ √
2𝜎2𝑦
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Finally, since 
𝑃 (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑍𝑖 ≥
2𝑦𝐶
3𝑛
+ √
2𝜎2𝑦
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
) ≤ 𝑒−𝑦 ≤ 𝛾 
or 
𝑃 (
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑍𝑖 ≤
2𝑦𝐶
3𝑛
+ √
2𝜎2𝑦
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
) ≥ 1 − 𝛾 
the confidence interval of   
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑇𝑖 − 𝜇
𝑛
𝑖=1   is given by 
− (
2𝑦𝐶
3𝑛
+ √
2𝜎2𝑦
𝑛
) ≤
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑇𝑖 − 𝜇 ≤
2𝑦𝐶
3𝑛
+ √
2𝜎2𝑦
𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
with probability at least (1 − 𝛾). 
 
5.6. Results 
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Testing of the bounding approach was conducted based on the reliability concept 
introduced previously, using the initial dataset that resulted from the simulation in 
Chapter 4 and generated based on the variation of the four attributes – data size, key 
size, padding scheme and mode of operation. 
For each collection of attributes (i.e. for each case), bootstrap sampling (i.e. sampling 
with replacement from the ECDF) was used to generate 10,000 samples, each of size 𝑛. 
Those samples generated from the reliability function, were utilized to derive the ECDF 
of events 
 𝐴 = {
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑍𝑖 = ?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=1 }, 
 𝐵 = {∑ 𝑍𝑖 = ∑ 𝑇𝑖 − 𝑛𝜇
𝑛
𝑖=1 ≥ 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=1 },  
 𝐶 = {|
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 | = |?̂? − 𝜇| ≥ 𝜀},  
 𝐷 = {|∑ 𝑍𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 | = |∑ 𝑇𝑖 − 𝑛𝜇
𝑛
𝑖=1 | ≥ 𝜀}  (5.63) 
In terms of the analysis of the bounds, the right tail of distributions of the events A, B, 
C, D (namely ?̅?𝐴, ?̅?𝐵 , ?̅?𝐶 , ?̅?𝐷 ) were investigated and a pairwise comparison with the 
derived bounds has been made. The sample size 𝑛  was subsequently varied to 
determine the impact of the sample size on the effectiveness and precision of the 
bound. 
The following subsections reveal the information gained about the closeness of 
bounding the probability of the expected mean to deviate at least 𝜀 from its theoretical 
mean. In addition, the optimal sample size 𝑛 has been calculated in order to achieve the 
desired probability of completion for 𝑛 encryptions. 
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5.6.1. Bounding the overall time – Upper Bound  
 
5.6.1.1. Chebyshev’s – Cantelli’s bounds 
 
In this subsection, ?̅?𝐵  is analyzed and compared with the corresponding bound in 
Equation (5.49). The case of interest will be Case 1, using the following encryption 
parameters. Algorithm: AES, Data size: 16 bytes, Key size: 128 bits, Mode of 
operation: CBC, Padding scheme: No Padding.  
 100 
 
 
Figure 5.1: ?̅?𝐵 for n variation – Case 1. 
 
Under this encryption scheme, 𝑛 encryptions will be generated from Case 1 ECDF to 
result the overall execution time. The difference between the sum of n encryptions and 
n times the mean encryption time of a single encryption is recorded. This process will 
be repeated 𝑘 = 10,000 times, to derive the empirical cumulative distribution ?̅?𝐵of the 
event B shown in Equation (5.63) and is plotted in Figure 5.1. The figure depicts the 
outcome of this process, as resulted from those 𝑘  statistics, for 𝑛 = 1,000 , 𝑛 =
10,000 , 𝑛 = 100,000  and 𝑛 = 1,000,000 . As illustrated in Figure 5.1, for all 
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variations of n, the mean difference is zero and the ECDF is symmetric, as expected 
from CLT for large n. As shown in Figure 5.1, due to symmetry, for  ∑ 𝑇𝑖 − 𝑛𝜇 ≥ 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
𝜀 appears equally likely to have a positive or negative value; however, of interest is the 
investigation of  ∑ 𝑇𝑖 > 𝑛𝜇 + 𝜀
𝑛
𝑖=1 , i.e. the right tail of ?̅?𝐵, since this means that the 
overall encryption time of those n encryptions will exceed the expected encryption time 
by 𝜀. 
Figure 5.2 depicts the right tail of ?̅?𝐵, i.e. the positive values that will be bounded. The 
ECDF symmetry discussed earlier is also apparent in Figure 5.2, as for 𝜀 > 0, the 
highest probability of exceeding 𝜀  is 0.5 and decays as 𝜀  increases. As mentioned 
earlier, of interest is the bound on the probability that the overall encryption time of n 
encryptions will exceed the expected encryption time by 𝜀; therefore, bounding the 
right tail is the main objective of this investigation, and the decay of the probability of 
exceeding 𝜀, as 𝜀  increases, will be further examined. 
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Figure 5.2: Right tail of ?̅?𝐵 for  𝑛 variation – Case 1. 
By applying the appropriate values of  𝑛 and 𝜎2  in Equation (5.14) and for different 
values of 𝜀 , ranging from 0 to 8e+07 with a time step of 1000 ns,  a point-wise 
comparison between the right tail of ?̅?𝐵  and Chebychev’s inequality is presented in 
Figure 5.3. The point-wise comparison allows for displaying the two lines and their 
alignment, arranged for visual inspection. Therefore, for a specific 𝜀 value in the time 
axis, the probabilities of the right tail of ?̅?𝐵  and Chebychev’s inequality can be 
compared. As shown in Figure 5.3, Chebyshev’s inequality does not provide useful 
information, as the corresponding value remains close to 1 even for 𝑛 = 1,000,000 and 
large 𝜀.  
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Figure 5.3: Right tail of ?̅?𝐵 and Chebyshev’s bound – Case 1. 
This is illustrated in the bottom right graph in Figure 5.3, where although the 
probability that the n encryptions will not exceed 𝜀 =8e+07 is close to zero, the 
corresponding value of Chebychev’s inequality for 8e+07 ns is close to 1. 
 
 
5.6.1.2. Hoeffding’s bound 
 
Following similar methodology, and in the need to derive an inequality that decays  
 
 104 
 
exponentially following the shape of the right tail of ?̅?𝐵, Hoeffding’s inequality (5.34) 
will be investigated. 
 
Figure 5.4: Right tail of ?̅?𝐵 and Hoeffding’s bound – Case 1. 
From Figure 5.4, the tightening of the bound with increasing sample size may be 
clearly seen. The curve of Hoeffding’s bound decays exponentially, which is an 
improvement compared to Chebyshev’s. Hoeffding’s somehow mimics the curve of ?̅?𝐵, 
but that tightness comes to a big cost of sample size. 
In other words, when it is necessary to provide a tight bound on the tail probability, 
there is an inherent need to employ an adequate sample size. In the specific case of 
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encryption, this means that the degree of tightness depends highly on the number of 
encryptions that have to be considered. 
This thus indicates that Hoeffding’s bound although very useful for bounding the tail 
probabilities, will only deliver an effective and adequately tight bound when the 
minimum size required in Equation (5.35) is adhered to. 
In this specific example of security mode 1, for a confidence 𝛾 = 0.05  and 
 𝜀 = 8 × 107 , the minimum sample size 𝑛 from Equation (5.35) is 102,454. The scale 
of this sample size, although large, may be a representative example of a viral 
application, such as Facebook, Google, or Amazon, where the sample may be the 
number of encryptions executed during a time window of several minutes. 
It would also be of interest to ascertain the impact of the sample size on the probability 
𝛾 for moderate sample size. In other words, it is attempted to upper bound the right tail 
of ?̅?𝐵  which is  𝑃(𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵) ≤ 𝛾, where B comes from Equation (5.63), for a sample 
size of order 𝑛 = 1,000  and 𝑛 = 10,000 . As shown in Figure 5.4, Hoeffding’s 
inequality is not tight in that scale. Hopefully, by considering the variance, Bernstein’s 
and Bennett’s inequalities can be tighter than Hoeffding’s, as presented in the next 
subsection. 
 
5.6.1.3. Bernstein’s and Bennett’s bounds 
 
Although an exponential bound has already been derived in the previous subsection, an 
attempt to make the bound even tighter will be made using equations (5.55) and (5.52). 
Figure 5.5 depicts the tightening of the bound with increasing sample size. The curve of 
Bernstein’s bound decays exponentially with a faster rate than Hoeffding’s bound.  
 106 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Right tail of ?̅?𝐵 and Bernstein’s bound – Case 1. 
By comparing Figure 5.4 and Figure 5.5 it is clear that for the same sample size 𝑛, the 
probability computed by Equation (5.55) is more accurate than the one computed by 
Equation (5.34). It has to be noted that Bernstein’s curve approaches ?̅?𝐵 even for small 
sample size 𝑛 = 1,000. 
In this specific example of security mode 1, for a confidence 𝛾 = 0.05 and 𝜀 = 8 ×
106 , the minimum sample size 𝑛 from Equation (5.56) is 8,850. It is notable how 
much tighter this result is compared to Hoeffding’s, since from Equation (5.34) the 
resulting value is 0.7. This is also shown in Figure 5.4 where 𝑛 = 10,000. 
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Figure 5.6: Bernstein’s and Bennett’s bound – Case 1. 
By plotting equations (5.52) and (5.55) for various sample sizes, it is shown that indeed 
Bennett’s and Bernstein’s inequalities are roughly the same. This was expected, since 
the approach followed to derive Equation (5.55) by further bounding Equation (5.52) 
has been made in purpose, to emphasize the similarities of those two inequalities. As 
shown in Figure 5.6, where the thick lines represent Bennett’s bound, the two curves 
are roughly the same.   
Table 5.1 presents a point-wise comparison of the two bounds for variations of 𝑛 and 𝜀, 
where even for four decimal points, the two inequalities converge numerically. 
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Table 5.1: Bennett’s and Bernstein’s values for various n and ε. 
𝒏 𝜺 (𝒏𝒔) Bennett’s bound Bernstein’s bound 
1,000 2 × 106 0.204 0.206 
1,000 4 × 106 0.0028 0.0030 
10,000 4 × 106 0.505 0.505 
10,000 8 × 106 0.688 0.690 
100,000 4 × 107 0.001 0.001 
100,000 8 × 107 2.4 × 10−12 2.45 × 10−12 
1,000,000 4 × 107 0.4969 0.4964 
1,000,000 8 × 107 0.0626 0.0626 
 
5.6.1.4. Upper bound comparison for sum 
 
In this section, a comparison of the efficiency and tightness between the analyzed 
bounds will be presented, for several sample sizes. A visualization of the point-wise 
comparison of ?̅?𝐵 and the bounds is presented in Figure 5.7. 
As discussed in previous subsections, Hoeffding’s, Bennett’s and Bernstein’s bound 
decay exponentially, with Bennett’s and Bernstein’s revealing a remarkable faster rate 
of convergence to the right tail ?̅?𝐵, even for relatively small sample size. 
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Figure 5.7: Right tail of ?̅?𝐵 vs Bounds – Case 1. 
For all variations of parameters 𝑛 and 𝜀 the following relation holds: 
?̅?𝐵 = 𝑃(𝑆𝑛 − 𝑛𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑃𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑡 ≈ 𝑃𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛 < 𝑃𝐻𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 ≪ 𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑏𝑦𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑣 (5.64) 
where 𝑆𝑛 = ∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 𝜇 = 𝐸(𝑇𝑖)   and  𝑇𝑖~𝐸𝐶𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒 1  is the r.v. representing the 
execution time of the 𝑖𝑡ℎ encryption. 
Table 5.2 presents a point-wise comparison of the relation/ranking given by (5.64), for 
𝜀 being of order 𝛼 times 𝜇. Therefore, several values of 𝜀 have been used as an input to 
illustrate the differences among bounds.  
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Table 5.2: 𝑃(𝑆𝑛 − 𝑛𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) investigation using 𝑛 and 𝑎 variation. 
𝒏 
 
𝜶 𝜺 = 𝜶𝝁 (𝒏𝒔) ?̅?𝑩 𝑷𝑩𝒆𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒕 𝑷𝑩𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝑷𝑯𝒐𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑷𝑪𝒉𝒆𝒃𝒚𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒗 
1,000 20 2,610,166 0.01 0.071 0.073 0.72 0.9 
1,000 30 3,915,248 0.0001 0.0035 0.0038 0.47 0.9 
10,000 60 7,830,497 0.011 0.076 0.077 0.74 0.9 
10,000 100 13,050,828 0 0.0009 0.0009 0.44 0.9 
100,000 200 26,101,656 0.009 0.053 0.053 0.72 0.9 
100,000 300 39,152,484 0.0001 0.0014 0.0014 0.47 0.9 
1,000,000 700 91,355,796 0.0021 0.02 0.02 0.6 0.9 
1,000,000 1,000 130,508,280 0 0.0006 0.0006 0.44 0.9 
 
As shown in this table, Bennett’s and Bernstein’s inequalities provide a tight bound for 
?̅?𝐵  at the right even for 𝑛 = 1,000. The probability of the required time of 1,000 
encryptions will not deviate more than 𝜀 = 2 × 106  ns from 1000 times (Table 5.2) the 
average encryption time of a single encryption as suggested by the generated ECDF ?̅?𝐵. 
For the same parameterization, Bennett’s and Bernstein’s result that this probability 
will not exceed 0.07. 
 
5.6.2. Bounding the overall time – Two-sided bound 
 
In this subsection, an analysis will be made on the behavior of event D in Equation 
(5.63). The probability of the absolute deviation of the sum on 𝑛 encryption times from 
𝑛 times the average execution time of a single encryption will be bounded using the 
two-sided versions of Chebyshev’s, Hoeffding’s and Bernstein’s inequalities.  
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Figure 5.8: Right tail ?̅?𝐷 and bounds – Case 1. 
Figure 5.8 illustrates the right tail ?̅?𝐷 bounded by the inequalities shown in equations 
(5.8), (5.37) and (5.57). For all variations of the sample size 𝑛, these inequalities reveal 
an exponential decay, which is desired, with Bernstein’s and Chebyshev’s 
demonstrating the ability to mimic the rate of ?̅?𝐷. 
Bernstein’s curve provides the tightest bound, whilst Hoeffding’s is relatively loose. 
Considering that the right tail of ?̅?𝐷 is examined, i.e. 𝜀 is large enough, the following 
relation holds. 
 ?̅?𝐷 = 𝑃(|𝑆𝑛 − 𝑛𝜇| ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑃𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑏𝑦𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑣 ≪ 𝑃𝐻𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (5.65) 
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Table 5.3: ?̅?𝐷, Bernstein’s, Chebyshev’s and Hoeffding’s values for various 𝑛 and 𝜀. 
𝒏 𝜺 = 𝜶𝝁 (𝒏𝒔) ?̅?𝑫 𝑷𝑩𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝑷𝑯𝒐𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 𝑷𝑪𝒉𝒆𝒃𝒚𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒗 
1,000 3 × 106 0.005 0.06 0.1 1 
1,000 4 × 106 0.0001 0.006 0.07 0.9 
10,000 1 × 107 0.002 0.03 0.1 1 
10,000 2 × 107 0 2 × 10−7 0.02 0.2 
100,000 3 × 107 0.005 0.04 0.1 1 
100,000 4 × 107 0.0004 0.002 0.07 0.9 
1,000,000 1 × 108 0.003 0.02 0.1 1 
1,000,000 2 × 108 0 6 × 10−8 0.02 0.2 
 
Table 5.3 presents a point-wise comparison of the right tail of ?̅?𝐷 and the three bounds. 
Clearly, Bernstein’s appears tight to the tail of ?̅?𝐷. 
 
5.6.3. Bounding the mean time – Upper Bound 
 
5.6.3.1. Chebyshev’s – Cantelli’s bounds 
 
This subsection presents the analysis of ?̅?𝐴 , as well as the comparison with the 
corresponding bound in Equation (5.17). In this section, Case 1 will be used to 
demonstrate and compare the bounds on the mean encryption time. Therefore, the 
analysis refers to Case 1 of the security scenario. Under this encryption scheme, 𝑛 
encryptions will be generated from Case 1 ECDF to result the mean execution time of 
those n encryptions.  
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Figure 5.9: ?̅?𝐴 for  n variation – Case 1. 
The difference between the mean of n encryptions and the mean encryption time of a 
single encryption is recorded. This process will be repeated 𝑘 = 10,000  times, to 
derive the empirical cumulative distribution ?̅?𝐴of the event A shown in Equation (5.63) 
and is plotted in Figure 5.9. The figure depicts the outcome of this process, as resulted 
from those 𝑘 statistics, for 𝑛 = 1,000, 𝑛 = 10,000, 𝑛 = 100,000 and 𝑛 = 1,000,000. 
As illustrated in Figure 5.9, for all variations of n, the mean difference is zero and the 
ECDF is symmetric, as expected from CLT for large n. As shown in Figure 5.9, due to 
symmetry, for  ?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀, 𝜀 appears equally likely to have a positive or negative value; 
however, of interest is the investigation of ?̂? ≥ 𝜇 + 𝜀, i.e. the right tail of ?̅?𝐴, since this 
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means that the mean encryption time of those n encryptions will exceed the expected 
encryption time by 𝜀.  
 
Figure 5.10: Right tail of ?̅?𝐴 for  n variation – Case 1. 
Figure 5.10 depicts the right tail of ?̅?𝐴, i.e. the positive values that will be bounded. The 
ECDF symmetry discussed earlier is also apparent in Figure 5.10, as for 𝜀 > 0, the 
highest probability of exceeding 𝜀  is 0.5 and decays as 𝜀  increases. As mentioned 
earlier, of interest is the bound on the probability that the mean encryption time of n 
encryptions will exceed the expected encryption time by 𝜀; therefore, bounding the 
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right tail is the main objective of this investigation, and the decay of the probability of 
exceeding 𝜀, as 𝜀  increases, will be further examined. 
 
Figure 5.11: Right tail of ?̅?𝐴 and Chebyshev’s bound – Case 1. 
A point-wise comparison of the right tail of ?̅?𝐴 and Equation (5.17) for the values of n 
shown in Figure 5.10 is presented in Figure 5.11. By applying the appropriate values of  
𝑛 and 𝜎2  in Equation (5.17) and for different values of 𝜀, ranging from 0 to 4,000 ns 
with a time step of 10 ns,  a point-wise comparison between the right tail of ?̅?𝐴 and 
Chebychev’s inequality is presented in Figure 5.11. The point-wise comparison allows 
for displaying the two lines and their alignment, arranged for visual inspection. 
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Therefore, for a specific 𝜀 value in the time axis, the probabilities of the right tail of ?̅?𝐴 
and Chebychev’s inequality can be compared. As suggested form Figure 5.11, 
Chebyshev’s inequality captures the slope of ?̅?𝐴 even for small sample size.  
From Equation (5.18), to assure a probability 0.05 for the deviation between sample 
and true mean to be more than 4,000 ns, the required number of encryptions is 1,367. 
For the difference being of the order 2,000 ns, 5,466 encryptions are required to 
achieve the desired probability which is equal to 0.05. To ascertain the impact of the 
sample size on the probability 𝛾, from Equation (5.18) and by varying the value of 𝜀, 
the sample size was calculated and a plot of the probability 𝛾 against the sample size n 
was produced. 
 
Figure 5.12: Probability 𝛾 vs sample size n for Chebychev’s bound – Case 1. 
As shown in Figure 5.12, the two variables are inversely associated, since when the 
value of n increases, the value of the probability 𝛾  decreases. The impact of the 
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variation of 𝜀 on the sample size is also depicted. The relationship between the latter is 
inverse as well, since when the value of 𝜀 increases, the probability 𝛾 tends to zero for 
smaller n. 
This suggested investigation of the relationship between 𝜀 and 𝛾. The values of 𝜀 were 
calculated by fixing n and applying Equation (5.19) to deliver a value for a chosen 
probability 𝛾. As shown in Figure 5.13 there is an inverse association between 𝜀 and  𝛾 
as well. For higher values of 𝜀, the probability 𝛾 decreases. The impact of the variation 
of n on 𝜀 is also depicted. The inverse relationship between n and 𝜀 is apparent, as for 
higher sample sizes the probability 𝛾 tends to zero for lower values of 𝜀. 
From both the above investigations, as well as from Equations (5.18) and (5.19) as 
derived from the bound shown in Equation (5.17), it is concluded that there is an 
inverse association between n and 𝜀. 
 
Figure 5.13: Probability 𝛾 vs accuracy 𝜀 for Chebyshev’s bound – Case 1. 
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5.6.3.2. Hoeffding’s bound 
 
Following similar methodology, an investigation of Hoeffding’s bound (5.26) will be 
implemented. In Figure 5.14 a visual comparison of ?̅?𝐴  and Hoeffding’s bound as 
resulted from Equation (5.26) is presented. The decay of Hoeffding’s curve is 
somewhat exponential, but fails to mimic the rate of ?̅?𝐴, as the bound appears relatively 
loose. For Case 1,  𝛾 = 0.05 and 𝜀 = 2,500 ns, the minimum number of encryptions n 
from Equation (5.27) is 9,994 – for a=100,000 ns and b=304,200 ns. 
 
Figure 5.14: Right tail of ?̅?𝐴 and Hoeffding’s bound – Case 1. 
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A further investigation on the impact of the number of encryptions n on the probability 
𝛾 was made from Equation (5.27) for variations of 𝜀, as shown in Figure 5.15. There is 
therefore an inverse association between n and 𝛾. Comparing Figure 5.12 to Figure 
5.15, it can be seen that the impact of n on Chebyshev’s inequality is stronger than 
Hoeffding’s, as for any 𝜀 and n fixed, 𝛾𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑏𝑦𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑣 < 𝛾𝐻𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔. The inverse association 
between 𝜀 and 𝛾 is shown in Figure 5.15.  
 
Figure 5.15: Probability 𝛾 vs sample size n for Hoeffding’s bound – Case 1. 
From Equation (5.28), Figure 5.16 is derived, that highlights this relationship for 
variations of n. From Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.16, it is clear that the accuracy of 
Chebyshev’s is superior to Hoeffding’s for any variation of n. 
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Figure 5.16: Probability 𝛾 vs accuracy 𝜀 for Hoeffding’s bound – Case 1. 
 
5.6.3.3. Bennett’s – Bernstein’s 
 
So far, two bounds have been investigated, namely Chebyshev’s and Hoeffding’s 
inequalities. It is already clear that the first inequality allows for better predictions, 
which means that the value resulted from Equation (5.17) is closer to the probability of 
?̂? − 𝜇 deviating more than 𝜀, given by ?̅?𝐴. In what follows, Bennett’s and Bernstein’s 
inequalities (5.53), (5.58) will be analyzed, to provide sharper bounds. Figure 5.17 
depicts the tightness between Bennett’s and Bernstein’s curves. Both curves decay 
exponentially, approaching the curve of ?̅?𝐴 for all variations of n. 
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Figure 5.17: Right tail of  ?̅?𝐴, Bennett’s and Bernstein’s bounds – Case 1. 
From Equation (5.60), to assure a probability 0.05 for ?̂? − 𝜇 being more than 4,000 
(ns), the required n value is 518, roughly 10 times less than the minimum n calculated 
from Equation (5.18) for Chebyshev’s inequality. Further investigation on the impact 
of both n and 𝜀 on 𝛾 was implemented using Equation (5.60). Figure 5.18 visualizes 
this relationship.  
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Figure 5.18: Probability 𝛾 vs sample size n – Case 1. 
As n gets larger, the probability 𝛾 gets closer to zero and the rate of the convergence of 
𝛾 to zero increases by increasing the magnitude of the accuracy 𝜀. In other words, as 
the number of encryptions increases, it is possible to establish a desired error 𝜀 that will 
enable the control of the threshold probability 𝛾. This 𝛾 will upper bound the right tail 
of ?̅?𝐴 of event {?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀} and the prediction will be accurate. 
 
5.6.3.4. Upper bound comparison for mean 
 
This subsection summarizes and compares the accuracy of each inequality that was 
investigated in this chapter. For various sample size values n, a point-wise comparison 
of the right tail of ?̅?𝐴 and the bounds is presented in Figure 5.19. 
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Figure 5.19: Right tail of ?̅?𝐴 vs bounds – Case 1. 
In Figure 5.19 it is shown that Bennett’s and Bernstein’s inequalities admit a fast decay. 
Chebyshev’s starts somewhat sharp, but fails to follow the curve of Bernstein’s and 
Bennett’s that mimic the exponential decay of ?̅?𝐴. Hoeffding’s decay is relatively slow 
and for small n, fails to provide a tight upper bound on ?̅?𝐴. Conditioning that the tail of 
?̅?𝐴 is of interest, it is derived that for any magnitude of n, the following relation holds. 
?̅?𝐴 = 𝑃(?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑃𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑡 ≈ 𝑃𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛 < 𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑏𝑦𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑣 ≪ 𝑃𝐻𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔(5.66) 
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Table 5.4: 𝑃(?̂? − 𝜇 ≥ 𝜀) investigation for  n and 𝛼 variation. 
𝒏 𝜶 𝜺 (𝒏𝒔)
= 𝜶𝝁 
?̅?𝑩 𝑷𝑩𝒆𝒏𝒏𝒆𝒕𝒕 𝑷𝑩𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝑷𝑪𝒉𝒆𝒃𝒚𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒗 𝑷𝑯𝒐𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 
1,000 0.02 2,610 0.01 0.07 0.07 0.14 0.7 
1,000 0.05 6,525 0 6𝐸 − 07 9𝐸 − 07 0.026 0.1 
10,000 0.006 783 0.01 0.07 0.077 0.15 0.7 
10,000 0.01 1,305 0 0.0009 0.0009 0.06 0.4 
100,000 0.002 261 0.009 0.05 0.05 0.14 0.7 
100,000 0.003 391 0.0001 0.0014 0.0014 0.06 0.47 
1,000,000 0.0007 91.3 0.002 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.6 
1,000,000 0.001 130.5 0 0.0006 0.0006 0.06 0.4 
 
where ?̂? =
1
𝑛
∑ 𝑇𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  is the average time of n encryptions, 𝜇 = 𝐸𝑇𝑖  is the mean 
encryption time of a single execution and 𝑇𝑖~𝐸𝐶𝐷𝐹𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒 1  is a r.v. representing the 
execution time of the i
th
 encryption. 
Table 5.4 presents a point-wise comparison of the relation/ranking given by Equation 
(5.66), for 𝜀 being of order 𝛼 times 𝜇,  0 ≤ 𝛼 < 1. 
Bennett’s and Bernstein’s inequalities provide a tight bound for ?̅?𝐴 for all variations of 
n. For example, if 1,000 encryptions are implemented, then from Table 5.4, 
?̅?𝐴 = 𝑃(?̂? − 𝜇 > 2,610) = 0.01 ≤ 0.07 ≤ 0.14 ≤ 0.7 
The value 0.07 resulted from Bennett’s (5.53) and Bernstein’s (5.58) inequalities, is 
tight to the probability generated by ?̅?𝐴. Chebyshev’s value on the other hand is 0.14, 
which is relatively close to ?̅?𝐴, however it is weaker compared to the first two bounds. 
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Hoeffding’s curve decays exponentially, but it is not sharp enough to capture the tail of 
the distribution of ?̅?𝐴 . Also, compared to the first three inequalities, tightness is 
achieved for larger sample sizes n. 
 
5.6.4. Bounding the mean time – Two-sided bound 
  
In this subsection, the behavior of event C in Equation (5.63) is examined. The 
probability of the absolute difference between the sample mean ?̂? and the theoretical 
mean 𝜇 not deviating more than 𝜀, where 𝜀 ≥ 0, will be bounded using the two-sided 
versions of Chebyshev’s (5.9), Hoeffding’s (5.30) and Bennett’s (5.59) inequalities. 
By the strong law of large numbers, it is obtained that 
 𝑃 [lim𝑛→∞
1
𝑛
∑ (|𝑇𝑖 − 𝐸[𝑇𝑖]|)
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 0] → 1 (5.67) 
The probability in Equation (5.67) indicates that with enough samples, the empirical 
mean is a good approximation to its true mean. According to the strong law of large 
numbers, the sample mean converges almost surely to the expected mean. A 
quantitative version of the law of large numbers for bounded variables is the 
investigation of that rate of convergence [85], by bounding the tail of ?̅?𝐶. The decay 
rate, given by a bound, will provide useful information about the impact of finite 
values n on the convergence |?̂? − 𝜇| → 𝜀,  𝜀 ≥ 0. 
Figure 5.20 depicts the right tail ?̅?𝐶 bounded by inequalities given by (5.9), (5.30) and 
(5.59). For all variations of the sample size n, the three inequalities admit an 
exponential decay, with Bernstein’s and Chebyshev’s being able to mimic the tail of 
?̅?𝐶. Bernstein’s appears sharper to the tail, while Hoeffding’s performance is somewhat  
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Figure 5.20: Right tail of ?̅?𝐶 vs bounds – Case 1. 
poor compared to the rest of the inequalities. Therefore, under the condition that the 
right tail of ?̅?𝐶  is examined, i.e. 𝜀 is large enough, the following relation holds 
 ?̅?𝐶 = 𝑃(|?̂? − 𝜇| ≥ 𝜀) ≤ 𝑃𝐵𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑏𝑦𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑣 ≪ 𝑃𝐻𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 (5.68) 
Table 5.5 highlights Bernstein’s ability to provide a tight bound even for small n 
values. For 1,000 encryptions, 𝑃(|?̂? − 𝜇| ≥ 3,000) = 0.005  as resulted from the 
generated distribution ?̅?𝐶 . Under the same parameterization on n and 𝜀 , Bernstein’s 
value is 0.06, while Hoeffding’s fails to follow and Chebyshev’s performance is weak.  
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Table 5.5: ?̅?𝐶, Bernstein’s, Chebyshev’s and Hoeffding’s values for various n and 𝜀. 
𝒏 𝜺 (𝒏𝒔) = 𝜶𝝁 ?̅?𝑪 𝑷𝑩𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒏 𝑷𝑪𝒉𝒆𝒃𝒚𝒔𝒉𝒆𝒗 𝑷𝑯𝒐𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒅𝒊𝒏𝒈 
1,000 3,000 0.0005 0.06 0.1 1 
1,000 4,000 0.0001 0.006 0.07 0.9 
10,000 1,000 0.002 0.03 0.1 1 
10,000 1,200 0.0003 0.005 0.08 1 
100,000 300 0.005 0.04 0.1 1 
100,000 400 0.0002 0.002 0.07 0.9 
1,000,000 100 0.003 0.02 0.1 1 
1,000,000 150 0 0.0001 0.05 0.6 
 
Chebyshev’s values are relatively close to Bernstein’s, in terms of tightness, for small 
or moderate n, with the tightness relaxed when n gets larger, failing to follow 
Bernstein’s sharpness. 
 
5.7. Discussion 
 
In this chapter an adaptive security scheme that suggests a new approach in the area of 
low energy encryption has been presented. The method relies on the application of 
Chernoff – type bounds on the tail probability that the mean time of n encryptions will 
exceed the expected time by a desired threshold so that the probability on an extreme 
value can be bounded. This method has also been used to provide a bound for the 
probability that the overall execution time of n encryptions will not exceed n times the 
mean encryption time of a single execution. Two-sided inequalities have been 
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calculated and presented for those exponential bounds, for both the mean and overall 
encryption time. This provides knowledge about the rate of convergence of the sample 
mean to the true mean or the sum of n encryptions times to n times the mean, as 
concentration inequalities quantify what is known from the law of large numbers. 
Another advantage of the presented methodology is that relaxes the CLT’s assumption 
in Chapter 4, as number of executions can be considered finite. CLT presented in 
Chapter 4, is an asymptotic result and assures that the time distribution of the n 
encryptions is approximately Gausian as 𝑛 → ∞. In this chapter, the scope was to 
develop a framework for investigating the trade-off between the number of encryptions 
n, the level of accuracy 𝜀 and the tightness of each inequality to the right tail of the 
distribution. 
Performance evaluation of the probabilistic concentration inequalities was presented for 
both upper and two-sided bounds of mean and sum. This framework is flexible, 
Chebyshev’s, Hoeffding’s, Bennett’s and Bernstein’s bounds are distribution free and 
no assumption needs to be made for the distribution. 
Bennett’s and Bernstein’s inequalities are approximately equal as presented. The 
investigation highlighted their superior performance compared to the other two 
inequalities, as they bound tightly the right tail of the distribution even for small or 
moderate sample size n. This makes it possible to set up and optimise energy efficient 
encryption schemes for policy makers with relatively small number of expected 
encryptions.  A typical example of an encryption scheme with sample size equal to 
1,000 executions might be the daily contactless payments of a central coffee shop or a 
supermarket. On the other hand, an expected number of transactions of order 106 or 
more, might be the daily usage of contactless passes in London’s tube. In both 
situations, Bernstein’s bound will result in tight predictions. 
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Although Hoeffding’s inequality did not perform well compared to Bernstein’s, it could 
contribute at the early stages of an encryption scheme, where no data may be available 
for a performance analysis. This inequality requires the time to be independent random 
variable and bounded, i.e. the best and worst case scenario of the algorithm’s 
encryption time. Having that knowledge, rough approximations of the scheme’s 
performance could be made for n encryptions that the algorithm is expected to be 
executed during a specified time window, and by incorporating knowledge from 
Chapter 4 regarding the limiting behaviour of scheme’s encryption time, an optimal set 
up will be enabled. During the operation of the scheme, the recorded data will provide 
the decision maker with statistical confidence that the sample variance is a valid 
approximation of the true variance. Finally, having knowledge of the variance, tighter 
predictions can be made by applying Bernstein’s bound, while any modifications at the 
scheme will be made at that stage.   
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Chapter 6 - Statistical considerations 
Traditional approaches that evaluate the encryption performance in terms of the energy 
cost, mainly compare different algorithms and/or parameters in terms of effectiveness 
and provide results on their behaviour with respect to their impact on energy 
consumption [3]. However, the correlation between encryption parameters and their 
overall impact on energy consumption is not utilized to provide a unified adaptive 
security scheme.  
It is envisioned that the offset between minimum energy consumption and maximum 
encryption strength will be essential to provide low energy encryption solutions. 
Furthermore, the relationship between energy consumption and functional encryption 
parameters, as well as the dependencies between the latter, has to be taken into 
consideration to efficiently adjust encryption parameters in an adaptive security 
scheme. 
In this chapter, a statistical analysis technique is presented that identifies the impact of 
the encryption parameters on the energy consumption of the system, both individually 
and as a total. Specifically, multiple linear regression is utilised to determine whether 
energy consumption (ENERGY) can be predicted from the encryption parameters of 
the model, namely data size (DATA), key size (KEY), mode of operation (MODE) and 
padding scheme (PADDING).   
 
6.1. Variables and transformation 
 
The analysis is based on a data of 57600 sample size - 100 trials of a sample of 576 
encryption scenarios - simulated for all possible combinations between encryption 
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parameters. The results of the regression analysis are presented and explained later in 
this chapter. The independent variables MODES, PADDING, KEY and DATA were 
tested for correlation. The correlations that occurred among the variables were taken in 
account in the estimation of the coefficients by SPSS. 
Since all predictors apart from the data size are categorical variables, they do not 
convey numeric information and therefore they should not be included in the 
regression model. Instead, each value of the categorical variable is represented in the 
model with an indicator variable [86]. The nominal variable MODE takes on four 
levels that have been coded as CBC, CFB, ECB and OFB. CBC is the reference 
category and therefore the coefficients of the other three variables are interpreted in 
comparison to that one, the impact of which is included in the constant coefficient. 
Similarly, the nominal variable PADDING takes on three levels that have been coded 
as PKCS5, NO_PADDING and ISO, with the first of these three being the reference 
category. Finally, the ordinal variable KEY has been coded as KEY_SIZE_1 (reference 
category), KEY_SIZE _2 and KEY_SIZE _3. 
 
6.2. Assumptions and exploratory data analysis 
 
Linear regression models rely upon five principal assumptions, namely linearity, 
normality, independence, homoscedasticity and non multi-collinearity,  about the 
predictor variables, the response variable and their relationship [87]. The validity of 
the results requires that these assumptions be satisfied [88]. If any of these 
assumptions is violated, then the results may not be trustworthy.   
Some methods for assessing the assumptions of the regression model are based on the 
residual analysis. The residual represents the difference between the regression 
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predictions and the actual data [89]. Standardized residuals, which are calculated by 
dividing each residual by its standard error, are plotted against the predicted values to 
assess the assumptions of the regression model and also to evaluate the goodness of 
fit. 
In this section, the assumptions of the regression model are investigated. 
 
6.2.1. Linearity 
 
Regression models assume that there is a linear relationship between the dependent 
and each independent variable. However, when working with real world data, the 
assumption of linearity might not be met and the results of the raw data may be 
untrustworthy.  
Transformation of the data is the one of the most common ways to deal with this 
problem. For non-linearity problems, transformation of the dependent variable, 
independent variables, or both, may be necessary [90]. In this study, evaluation of 
linearity led to the log transformation of DATA and ENERGY [91]. Specifically, the 
decimal logarithm of base 10 has been used in order to efficiently handle the 
relationship between the predictor variable DATA and the response variable.  
The assumption of linearity is assessed by examining the relationship between the 
response variable and the predictors. Review of the partial scatterplot of the 
independent variable DATA and the dependent variable ENERGY indicates linearity is 
a reasonable assumption. The boxplot in Figure 6.1 shows the linear relationship 
between the logarithm of ENERGY and the logarithm of DATA – as the data size 
increases, there is an upward trend in the energy consumption. The four rectangles 
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represent the second and third quartiles for the four different data sizes (16, 1000, 
2000 and 4000 bytes respectively) in bytes. The first and fourth quartiles are shown by 
the lines (whiskers) extending vertically from the boxes and indicate variability 
outside the upper and lower quartiles. The data points beyond the whiskers represent 
the outliers. Although outliers exist for all data sizes, the median of each data size, 
which is represented by the horizontal line that divides the box into two parts, 
increases linearly with the increase of the energy consumed during the encryption.  
 
Figure 6.1: Boxplot of ENERGY and DATA. 
However, categorical variables are nominal-levelled, with more than two groups and 
therefore their relationship with the continuous variable ENERGY cannot be described 
meaningfully as a linear one [92]. Instead, a Pearson’s correlation test [93] was run to 
measure the strength of the linear relationship between the dependent and each of the 
independent variables. The test indicated that there is a statistically significant linear 
relationship between the output variable and the predictors [93]. In order to decide 
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whether there is any or no evidence to suggest that linear correlation is present in the 
population, a significance test is performed. The null hypothesis H0 is tested that there 
is no correlation in the population against the alternative hypothesis H1 that there is 
correlation. SPSS reports the p-value for this test always ≤0.006 as shown in Table 
6.1, where the total number of points tested (N) was 100576 = 57600 in all cases. 
With a p-value below 0.05, the hypothesis test H0 is rejected, meaning that there is 
strong evidence of linearity between the variables. 
Table 6.1: Correlations 
ENERGY ENERGY DATA CFB ECB OFB NO 
PADDING 
ISO KEY 
SIZE 2 
KEY SIZE 3 
Pearson Correlation 
Sig. (2-tailed) 
1 .787** .026** -.062** .025** -.012** .011** .044** .054** 
 .000 .000 .000 .000 .005 .006 .000 .000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
6.2.2. Normality 
 
The most common method to assess the normality assumption is to study how close 
the distribution of the residuals conforms to a normal distribution. The normality 
assumption is assessed by examining the normal probability plot and the histogram of 
the residuals [64]. A normal probability plot is obtained by plotting the residuals 
against the associated values from a theoretical standard normal distribution in a way 
that data points should form a diagonal and approximately straight line.  If random 
errors are normally distributed, the data points will lie close to the line. Instead, if they 
deviate significantly from the diagonal line, then the residuals might not come from a 
normal distribution [64]. A histogram is another way to graphically represent the 
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distribution of the data. It is constructed by splitting the data range into bins of equal 
size and measuring the frequency of the data points for each bin [64]. 
In this study, examination of the normal probability plot of residuals and the residual 
histogram indicated normal distributional shape and therefore normality was a 
reasonable assumption [93], as shown in Figure 6.2 and 6.3 respectively. Both figures 
have been obtained using SPSS and the whole data set of 57600 instances has been 
used. 
 
Figure 6.2: Normal probabiltiy plot. 
 
The normal P-P plot in Figure 6.2 plots the observed cumulative probability of the 
residuals against the predicted cumulative probability. The X-axis represents the 
observed cumulative probability of the residuals, as resulted from their frequency 
distribution. The Y-axis represents the cumulative density of a standard normal 
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distribution. The plot indicates that it is reasonable to assume that random errors are 
drawn from approximately normal distributions. When data is normally distributed, 
the result is a diagonal line in a linear fashion, where the data points lie close to the 
diagonal line. R
2 
measures the proportion of the total variation in the dependent 
variable that is explained by variation in the independent variables [100].
 
As shown in 
the output, R
2 
= 0.98 indicates relatively high linearity of the fitted line and therefore 
the P-P plot suggests that the normality assumption is met. 
In Figure 6.3 the histogram of the standardized residuals is used to evaluate the 
normality assumption. As long as the histogram matches the bell-shaped curve, which 
is the density of the standard normal distribution, the residuals follow a standard 
normal distribution (mean=0, σ=1) [94]. As shown in the figure, a histogram 
distributed evenly around zero, with most of the frequencies gathered in the centre, 
indicates that the normality assumption holds.  
 
Figure 6.3: Standardized residuals histogram. 
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Although there is a low positive asymmetry in the residual distribution with a slight 
right skew, only few observations fall out of the [-3, 3] range as shown in the 
histogram, confirming the conclusions from the P-P plot regarding the normality 
assumption.  This is also depicted in statistics Table 6.2 below.  
Table 6.2: Statistics 
Standardized Residual   
Mean .0000000 
Std. Deviation .99993055 
Percentiles 
68 .2652233 
95 1.9344824 
99.7 2.704627 
 
According to the 68-95-99.7 rule, in a normal distribution 68% of the data points lie 
within 1 standard deviation of the mean, 95% are located within 2 standard deviations 
and 99.7% of the values are located within 3 standard deviations of the mean [95]. 
Therefore, for an observation 𝑥  from the distribution with µ=0 (mean of the 
distribution) and σ=1 (standard deviation), it is expected that: 
 𝑃(𝜇 − 𝜎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝜇 + 𝜎) =  𝑃(−1 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 1) ≈ 0.68  (6.1) 
 𝑃(𝜇 − 2𝜎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝜇 + 2𝜎) =  𝑃(−2 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 2) ≈ 0.95 (6.2) 
 𝑃(𝜇 − 3𝜎 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 𝜇 + 3𝜎) =  𝑃(−3 ≤ 𝑥 ≤ 3) ≈ 0.997  (6.3) 
which is in line with the results shown in Table 6.2 and therefore it can be concluded 
that the residuals come from a roughly normal distribution. 
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6.2.3. Independence 
 
Another assumption of the regression model that has to be assessed is the 
independence of variables. The validity of independence is mainly based on unbiased 
sampling, meaning that the observations are not related to one another. If knowing the 
value of one variable does not reveal any information about the prediction of any other 
variable, then the variables are independent of each other [96]. In this study, the 
assumption of independence was assured by the way the experiment was conducted. 
Apart from the examination of the way data was collected, another method to assess 
the independence of variables is to plot the residuals against the case identification 
number, or their collection order etc. A dependency is shown by an upward or  
 
Figure 6.4: Residual scatterplot. 
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downward trend [97] and the assumption of independence is valid if there is no pattern 
in the plot. 
In this study, review of the standardized residuals scatterplots which indicated an 
evidence of independence, as shown in Figure 6.4.  The plot shows the relative 
randomness of the residuals above and below zero, validating the assumption of 
independence. 
Finally, another statistical examination of independence is to run a Durbin-Watson test 
on the residuals. The Durbin-Watson test determines whether there is a relationship 
between consecutive residuals and is defined as in [96] 
 𝑑 =
∑ (𝑒𝑖−𝑒𝑖−1)
2𝑛
𝑖=2
∑ 𝑒𝑖2
𝑛
𝑖=1
  (6.4) 
Where 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤ 4 and 𝑖 is the time period between consecutive residuals 𝑒𝑖 and 𝑒𝑖−1. 
Table 6.3: Model summary and Durbin-Watson test for independence 
R R Square Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
Durbin-Watson 
.796a .633 .633 .17908 1.998 
 
As shown in Table 6.3, the observed 𝑑 = 1.998 , means that there is no cause for 
concern regarding the independence assumption, as it is within the [1.5 - 2.5] accepted 
limits [97]. 
 
6.2.4. Homoscedasticity 
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Homoscedasticity is another assumption of the regression model that has to be 
assessed. Homoscedasticity holds if the variance of the residuals is constant. Constant 
variance is assessed by examining the residuals of the fitted model. If the variance of 
the residuals is not constant, the assumption is violated and in the residual plot the 
non-constant variance – also known as heteroscedasticity – is indicated by a cone-
shaped pattern [97].  
 
Figure 6.5: Standardized residual scatterplot. 
The plot of the standardized residuals against standardised predicted values in Figure 
6.5 indicates that the homoscedasticity assumption is valid, as no cone-shaped pattern 
is shown. The figure has been obtained using SPSS and the whole data set of 57600 
instances has been used. The figure shows a scatterplot of the standardized residuals to 
the predicted values, where the residuals lie in the range [-3, 3] according to the 68-95-
99.7 rule [95]. The residuals appear to be randomly scattered over and below zero, 
suggesting that there is no violation of the homoscedasticity assumption [94]. The 
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homogeneity of variance across the entire range of the fitted values and the lack of 
patterns (i.e. higher predicted values have lower residuals) provided evidence of 
homoscedasticity [97]. 
6.2.5. Non multi-collinearity 
 
Multi-collinearity refers to the inter-correlation among the predictor variables of the 
regression model, such that their effects cannot be separated because they explain the 
same variability in the predicted outcome [98].  
Table 6.4: Coefficients and Collinearity statistics 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. Collinearity  
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
 
(Constant) 1.229 .003  401.890 .000   
DATA .248 .001 .787 312.157 .000 1.000 1.000 
CFB .007 .002 .011 3.525 .000 .667 1.500 
ECB -.038 .002 -.055 -17.799 .000 .667 1.500 
OFB .007 .002 .010 3.177 .001 .667 1.500 
KEY_SIZE_2 .059 .002 .094 32.424 .000 .750 1.333 
KEY_SIZE_3 .063 .002 .101 34.730 .000 .750 1.333 
NO_PADDING -.005 .002 -.008 -2.755 .006 .750 1.333 
 ISO .005 .002 .007 2.534 .011 .750 1.333 
a. Dependent Variable: ENERGY 
Collinearity diagnostics test are run in order to measure the strength of the correlation 
among predictor variables and how this affects the stability and variance of the 
regression estimates [99]. The severity of multi-collinearity is quantified by three 
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measures – tolerance, variance inflation factor (VIF) and condition index. Tolerance is 
the percentage of the variance in a predictor variable that cannot be explained by other 
variables. When tolerance is ≤0.1, it is considered problematic, as it reveals multi-
collinearity among variables [98]. VIF measures how much the variance of the 
regression estimates is increased because of collinearity. A VIF >10 indicates multi-
collinearity as well [98]. The condition index indicates the severity of multi-
collinearity. A condition index >30 suggest a serious problem with multi-collinearity, 
while a condition index >15 indicates possible multi-collinearity issues [98]. 
The collinearity statistics shown in Table 6.4 have been obtained using SPSS and the 
57600 instance data set has been used. The table provides information about several 
aspects of multiple linear regression. Specifically, B values, or coefficients, provide 
information about the relationship between energy consumption and each predictor 
variable – in this case encryption parameters and their variation. It measures the 
impact of each predictor variable on the predicted value of the response variable [99]. 
A positive value demonstrates a positive relationship between the predictor and the 
response variable, whilst a negative value represents a negative relationship. The 
associated standard error indicates to what extend each coefficient vary across 
different samples. The significance of the t-test associated with a B value indicates 
whether the predictor variable contributes significantly to the accuracy of the model 
[99]. The smaller the value of significance, the greater the contribution of the predictor 
variable to the model [100]. If the significance value is less than 0.05, the t-test is 
significant, which means that the predictor variable contributes significantly to the 
model [101]. The standardized Beta values do not depend on the units of measurement 
of the variables and are therefore easier to interpret and compare. These values provide 
the number of standard deviations that the response variable will change when the 
predictor variable changes by one standard deviation [102].  
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Table 6.5: Collinearity diagnostics 
Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) DATA CFB ECB OFB ISO KEY_S
IZE_2 
KEY_S
IZE_3 
NO 
PADDING 
4.168 1.000 .00 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 .01 
1.001 2.040 .00 .00 .04 .15 .04 .01 .12 .12 .01 
1.000 2.042 .00 .00 .01 .03 .01 .23 .00 .00 .23 
1.000 2.042 .00 .00 .25 .00 .25 .00 .00 .00 .00 
.999 2.043 .00 .00 .04 .15 .04 .01 .13 .13 .01 
.333 3.536 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .38 .37 .37 .37 
.286 3.817 .00 .01 .28 .28 .28 .21 .21 .22 .22 
.171 4.933 .03 .28 .30 .30 .30 .09 .09 .09 .09 
.042 10.020 .96 .71 .08 .08 .08 .05 .05 .05 .05 
 
Table 6.5 reports collinearity diagnostics derived from SPSS, namely eigenvalues of 
cross-products matrix, condition indices and variance-decomposition proportions for 
each predictor variable [103]. Eigenvalue is a measure of the variance contained in the 
correlation matrix, such that the sum of eigenvalues is equal to the number of variables 
of the model; in this case it is equal to 9. Eigenvalue is an indicator of the model’s 
accuracy, as relatively similar values provide evidence that with small variations in the 
input data the model will be unchanged. The constant value is not considered in the 
comparison. As shown in Table 6.5, the eigenvalues of the 8 predictor variables are 
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considered relatively close. This was expected, since the maximum value for the 
condition index is ≤ 15, which is an evidence of non-collinearity. Condition indices 
are an alternative way of expressing these eigenvalues and represent the square root of 
the ratio of the largest eigenvalue to the eigenvalue of interest [103]. The Variance 
proportions shown in Table 6.5 show the proportion of variance for each predictor 
coefficient that is attributed to each conditional index. For a predictor variable with 
conditional index ≤ 15  and variance proportion > 0.9  there is an indication of an 
unacceptable level of multi-collinearity. This is not indicated in Table 5.6, since 71% 
of the variance in the regression coefficient of the variable DATA is associated with 
condition index equal to 10, while all the other predictor variables the corresponding 
variance proportion lies in the range of 0.05-0.08. 
In this study, collinearity statistics revealed that tolerance was ≥0.6 and VIF was ≤1.5 
for all variables, suggesting that multi-collinearity was not an issue [93], as shown in 
Table 6.4. Finally, the collinearity diagnostics shown in Table 6.5, confirm that the 
assumption is not violated, as the condition index was found to be ≤10, providing 
further evidence of non-multi-collinearity [93] as shown in Table 6.5.  Table 6.5 has 
been obtained from SPSS, using the 57600 instances data set. 
Although the above preliminary analysis regarding the multiple linear regression 
assumptions is reasonable, an in depth attempt to provide sufficient evidence that the 
regression assumptions have been met will be presented after the model fit, mainly 
based on the residual analysis. 
 
6.3. Regression model 
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Regression methods control how variables are included into the model. In this study, 
all variables are entered in the model in one step and therefore the Enter method was 
selected to investigate the influence of all the predictor variables on the output variable 
[98]. To test how encryption parameters affect the energy consumption, the null 
hypothesis testing H0 is used. First, the null hypothesis is stated by assuming that 
encryption parameters have no impact on energy consumption. Following this, the test 
assesses whether evidence obtained from the data does or does not support this 
hypothesis and rejects or accepts the test accordingly [57]. The results of the multiple 
linear regression analysis in Table 6.4 indicate that all predictors contribute 
significantly in the prediction of the energy consumption.  
The correlation coefficient R expresses the strength of the linear relationship between 
variables and is given by [100] 
 𝑅𝑥𝑦 =
∑((𝑥𝑖−?̅?)(𝑦𝑖−?̅?))
√∑(𝑥𝑖−?̅?)2 ∑(𝑦𝑖−?̅?)2
  (6.5) 
This measure can take values between -1 and 1, with the sign defining the positive or 
negative relationship. The closest the correlation coefficient to |1|, the stronger the 
relationship, while a correlation coefficient close to zero indicates a weak relationship 
[65]. According to the model summary shown in Table 6.3 the multiple correlation 
coefficient R = 0.796 indicates that the observed energies and those predicted by the 
regression model are strongly correlated.  
It is also important to examine the coefficient of determination - R square - which is 
calculated by squaring the correlation coefficient and measures the proportion of the 
variance in one variable that is accounted for by another variable [100]. R square is a 
statistical measure of how close the data is to the fitted regression line. Therefore, in 
terms of variability in the observed energy consumption accounted by the fitted model, 
 146 
 
the percentage of the response variable variation that is explained by the model is R
2
 = 
0.634. This means that 63% of the variation in ENERGY is explained by the model. 
Table 6.6: ANOVA table 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
 
Regression 3188.895 8 398.612 12449.477 .000b 
Residual 1843.969 57591 .032   
Total 5032.864 57599    
a. Dependent Variable: ENERGY 
b. Predictors: (Constant), KEY_SIZE_3, DATA, ISO, OFB, ECB, NO_PADDING, KEY_SIZE_2, 
CFB 
 
Table 6.6 is the ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) table obtained using SPSS. The 
ANOVA table reports how well the regression equation fits the data, by analysing the 
breakdown of variance in the response variable. The total variance is partitioned into 
the variance that can be explained by the predictor variables used in the regression 
model and the variance which is not explained by the predictor variables (residuals) 
[98]. The column Sum of Squares describes the variability in the response variable 
Energy. The sum of squares in Table 6.6 indicates that the vast majority of the total 
variability is explained by the model. By averaging the sum of squares of regression 
and residuals by their corresponding number of observations (degrees of freedom - df) 
column, the mean square is derived. The ratio of the mean square of the regression 
and the mean square of the residuals gives the F-statistic [98]. 
The F-statistic tests the hypothesis that the predictors show no relationship to the 
response variable [98] and therefore that they do not contribute to the model’s ability 
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to explain the variance of the response variable. If the p-value is lower than the 
significance level (0.05), the null hypothesis is rejected. The analysis of variance 
shown in Table 6.6 reveals that the estimated multiple linear regression is considered 
statistically significant, F(8,57591) = 12449,  p<0.05. Table 6.6 has been obtained 
from SPSS by running the analysis of variance test statistics, using the 57600 data set. 
In addition, all the predictors define statistically significantly the energy consumption 
(p<0.05) as shown in the coefficients Table 6.4, indicating that all predictor variables 
contribute much to the model. The Beta weight measures the number of standard 
deviations change on the dependent variable that will be caused by a change of one 
standard deviation on the independent variable under examination [98]. The results of 
the multiple linear regression analysis suggest that a significant proportion of the total 
variation in encryption time was predicted by DATA, followed by the KEY, then 
MODE and finally the PADDING. 
Based on the outcomes of the analysis above, a regression equation was derived. The 
dependent variable is denoted by y and the independent variables are 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛 . 
When there are correlations between the dependent and independent variables, a 
multiple regression equation between 𝑦 and 𝑥1, 𝑥2, … , 𝑥𝑛  according to [101] can be 
written as 
 𝑦 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑥1 + 𝑎2𝑥2 + ⋯ + 𝑎𝑛𝑥𝑛 (6.6)  
where 𝑎0, 𝑎1, … , 𝑎𝑛 are the regression coefficients.   
A regression equation for the energy consumption assessment as derived from the 
coefficients in Table 6.4 is: 
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 𝐸𝑁𝐸𝑅𝐺𝑌 = 10f(𝐱) (6.7) 
f(𝐱) = 𝐚 ∙ 𝐱T  
𝐱 = [1  log 𝐷𝐴𝑇𝐴   𝐶𝐹𝐵  𝐸𝐶𝐵  𝑂𝐹𝐵  𝑃𝐾𝐶  𝐼𝑆𝑂  𝐾𝑆2  𝐾𝑆3] 
𝐚 = [1.224   0.248   0.007 − 0.038  0.007  0.005  0.01  0.059  0.063] 
where vector a represents the constant value and the coefficients (B values – Table 
6.4) for all the predictor variables used in the model and vector x represents the 
predictor variables.  
The regression equation is the sum of all the products of each predictor variable-
coefficient pair and the constant value that derived from the regression model. 
First, the dependent variable ENERGY and the independent variable DATA are 
inversely transformed to return to the original scale as these were prior to the log-
transformation. By substituting all independent control variables and their coefficients 
that resulted from the regression analysis in Equation (6.7), one can predict the energy 
for any set of encryption parameters. 
 
6.4. Goodness of fit 
 
Goodness of fit of a regression model attempts to evaluate how well the model fits a 
set of data, or how well it predicts a given set of variables. This section concerns the 
model evaluation. Residuals and diagnostic statistics are used to evaluate the model 
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and ensure that the assumptions have been met.  
Figure 6.5 shows a scatterplot of the standardized residuals to the predicted values, 
where the residuals lie in the range [-3, 3] according to the 68-95-99.7 rule [95]. The 
residuals appear to be randomly scattered over and below zero, suggesting that there is 
no violation of the assumptions presented in the previous section [94].  
In addition, the normal probability plot of the residuals in Figure 6.2 shows the points 
close to a diagonal line; therefore, the residuals appear to be approximately normally 
distributed [101]. The criterion for normal distribution is the degree to which the plot 
for the actual values coincides with the diagonal line of expected values, with linearity 
0.982. For this study, the residual plot fits the linear pattern well enough to conclude 
that the residuals are normally distributed.  
The histogram also indicates that it is reasonable to assume that the random errors for 
these processes are drawn from approximately normal distributions.  
Although the histogram and normal P-P plot show that the relationship is not perfectly 
deterministic, the observation points form a nearly linear pattern, indicating a linear 
relationship and supporting the condition that the errors are normally distributed.  
 
6.5. Discussion 
 
Although the regression model fits the data that is around the mean well, this is not 
true for data points that deviate much from the mean. Figure 6.6 depicts the difference 
between the observed energy with the respective estimated values for 60 random cases 
of the data. Equation 6.7 has been used to predict the energy consumption for these 60 
cases. For each case and the corresponding predictor variables (encryption 
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parameters), equation 6.7 has been applied to estimate the energy consumption for 
each encryption, by adding the constant value and the coefficients of each encryption 
parameter of the case.  
 
Figure 6.6: Estimated energy vs observed energy. 
The predicted values are shown in red in Figure 6.6. The mean energy consumption of 
the 100 observed values for each one of the 60 cases have been used to compare the 
predicted and observed values. The observed values are shown in blue. A pointwise 
comparison is illustrated in Figure 6.6, where the mean observed energy for all 57600 
observations is represented by the green horizontal line. The graph shows that for 
cases when the observed energy lay around the statistical mean, the energy estimated 
from the regression model is a good fit and the prediction is close enough to the 
simulated energy consumption. As the observed energy deviates from the statistical 
mean, the estimated values do not make such good predictions.  
The reason is that data points that deviate more than 3 standard deviations from the 
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mean, are considered extremes [102]. Specifically, in the above example the statistical 
mean is 𝜇 = 99.9 and the standard deviation is 𝜎 = 33.2. To check whether a data 
point is extreme, the range around the mean ± 3 standard deviations [𝜇 − 3𝜎, 𝜇 + 3𝜎] 
is calculated. In this example, values outside the range [0, 200] are considered 
extremes. Hence, while the regression model is good fit for values that lay around the 
statistical mean, this is not true for extreme values [65].  
The next chapter, which is the second statistical approach, examines the betweenness 
centrality of each encryption parameter. It is expected that the results will be in line 
with the ones obtained from the regression analysis, as both approaches lie in the area 
of statistical analysis. A comparison between the two statistical approaches is also 
presented.  
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Chapter 7 - Betweenness Centrality  
In the proposed energy conscious adaptive security framework, energy consumption 
analysis is performed for the identification and selection of the most efficient 
security mode. It is critical to select a mode that provides adequate security within 
the constraint of energy and time requirements. In this chapter, a novel application of 
betweenness centrality to energy efficient mode selection is presented. By treating 
the encryption system as a graph, it is possible to identify high impact components in 
the encryption system by finding indices with high betweenness centrality in the 
graph. The efficiency of these high impact components is analyzed in order to 
conclude the optimal security mode. 
Assessing the significance of encryption parameters against reliability of successful 
encryption in terms of energy consumption is a challenging task. Graph metrics, such 
as betweenness centrality, can give an indication of significant encryption 
parameters. The objective of this chapter is to extend the reliability framework 
presented earlier in this thesis, where reliability was employed to deduce a global 
quality factor for optimal security mode selection, with respect to energy 
consumption. An important operational concept for this analysis is centrality. 
Therefore, matching reliability with betweenness centrality, the subsequent approach 
incorporates the betweenness centrality into the reliability model. The results suggest 
that a centrality approach represents an alternative and meaningful direction to the 
study of the most efficient security mode selection. 
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7.1. Betweenness centrality of components 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Possible paths in a graph. 
By representing an encryption system as a graph, where the nodes depict the 
encryption components and the edges represent the flow of the encryption procedure, 
it will appear as a set of interconnected nodes, where the shortest paths in terms of 
lowest encryption time can be recovered. Figure 7.1 shows the type of different paths 
that can be detected in the graph.  
In this approach, the observation that the components of the encryption system tend to 
associate with other components through a variety of paths, which often form the 
shortest possible paths, is exploited. The objective is to evaluate the significance of 
each component in the system. Betweenness centrality is the method that measures 
the significance of a component in the graph and therefore concludes the importance 
of the component in the system.  
The betweenness centrality of the encryption components in this approach is 
examined using the R platform. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the betweenness 
centrality of a vertex is defined by the number of geodesies g going through this 
vertex v [69]. Therefore from (2.21), the betweenness of the encryption component 
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represented by vertex v is calculated by    
sum(gs→v→t  / gs→t ),  s!=t, s!=v, t!=v  
where gs→v→t denotes the number of shortest paths between s and t passing through v 
and gs→t, the total number of shortest paths between s and t. The result in R is a 
numeric vector with the betweenness score for each vertex. 
In the subsequent experiment, shortest paths are considered for only the cases that for 
a desired reliability level will finish the encryption procedure prior to the time 
threshold. Thus, the time threshold and reliability level will be the initial parameters 
that have to be set by the user. In the specific case of encryption, the total number of 
shortest paths is translated into the number of security modes that meet the reliability 
and time requirements, while the shortest paths that pass through v are considered the 
cases that encrypt using the parameter – vertex  under investigation i.e. ECB, 
PaddingPKCS5 . The concept of computing the betweenness of the vertices is the 
following. First, the security requirements are set, i.e. the AES standard has to be used 
for the encryption. Following on, all shortest paths between vertices are identified. 
For each vertex v, the shortest paths that pass through it are counted. Finally, the 
fraction of shortest paths that pass through v and the total number of shortest paths is 
calculated, to conclude the betweenness centrality of the vertex.  
The algorithm for the betweenness centrality implementation is shown in Figure 7.2. 
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 Variables:  list Cases # 576 cases data set 
  list path # list of vertices for a case 
  list Paths # list of paths 
  float R # reliability 
  float B # betweenness centrality 
 
 1: for case in Cases 
 2:  Calculate R 
 3:  if R ≠ Rreq 
 4:   delete case 
 5:  else 
 6:   add path to Paths  
 7:  end if 
 8: end for 
 9: 
10: for path in Paths 
11:  for v in path 
12:   Calculate B  
13:  end for 
14: end for 
 
 Figure 7.2: Betweenness centrality algorithm. 
Figure 7.3 illustrates all possible paths of the encryption flow among encryption 
parameters. In this graphical representation of the encryption system, the encryption 
parameters are arranged into distinct layers of parameters. For example, the key size 
layer contains the available key sizes, i.e. 128, 192, 256 and is followed by the 
padding layer, which is composed by the NoPadding, the ISO and PKCS5 node, and 
in turn is followed by the mode of operation layer. This consists of the CBC, CFB, 
ECB, OFB modes. In this multilayer graph, a path can only traverse one node of each 
layer, i.e. there is no way to encrypt using two padding schemes, and a node can only 
have a directed connection to another node from the immediately subsequent layer.  
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Figure 7.3: Encryption parameters’ connectivity. 
Therefore, the direction of the path cannot forward to a node that belongs to a 
precedent layer. In addition, in this chain-like graph, the two end points have no 
betweenness, as there are no other paths that pass through these points, apart from the 
paths that start from there. For this reason, the graph is formed as a sequence of 
vertices and edges, beginning and ending with the start and end node, respectively.  
The next section is based on an example case study that examines the betweenness 
centrality of the encryption parameters, and discusses the results that derived from the 
experiment. 
 
7.2. Implementation and results 
 
The experiment was conducted based on the reliability concept that was presented in 
Chapter 3, using the initial dataset as resulted from the simulation. Betweenness 
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centrality has been calculated and the relevant results were examined in terms of the 
effect of each encryption parameter on the final decision making for the optimal 
security mode selection. In addition, the variation of the reliability criterion was used 
to establish the significance of each parameter, and thus its impact on the overall 
behaviour of the system. 
The following case study examines the centrality of the key size, padding scheme and 
mode of operation, based on a time threshold t = 300000 ns, for a requested 
encryption of 2048 byte data, using the AES encryption algorithm. The reliability 
level is varied between 0.4 and 0.1.  
First, the reliability level is set equal to 40%, and the shortest paths are identified. 
Following on, the betweenness centrality is calculated for each node as follows. Let 
SE  be the total number of shortest paths from the start node S to the end node E, and 
 128SE  the number of shortest paths from S to E that pass through 128 bit key size. 
Then, from Equation (2.20), 
𝐶(128) =
𝜎𝑆𝐸(128)
𝜎𝑆𝐸
= 0.8 
The rest of the results are shown in Table 7.1. Figure 7.4 shows the shortest paths of 
the system for the specified requirements. The yellow-shaded nodes represent the 
most central parameters of the encryption flow. The graph reveals the significance of 
the 128 key size node, as most of the shortest paths traverse this node. Thus, it is 
anticipated that the betweenness centrality of this node will be high. According to the 
results in Table 7.1, this expectation proved to be true, as node 128 showed the 
highest centrality among all components in the graph, followed by nodes PKCS5 and 
CFB. 
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Table 7.1: Betweenness centrality: R = 0.4. 
Parameter Betweenness  
Centrality 
128 0.8 
192 0 
256 0.2 
No Padding 0.2 
ISO 0.2 
PKCS5 0.6 
CBC 0.2 
CFB 0.4 
ECB 0.2 
OFB 0.2 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Shortest paths and most central nodes: R = 0.4. 
On a parameter basis, the results show that, in terms of the key size, the 128 bit key 
has a significantly high centrality of BC128 = 0.8, compared to BC192 = 0 and BC256 = 
0.2. Similarly, PKCS5 with BCPKCS5 = 0.6 is the most significant padding scheme 
compared to ISO and no padding that resulted in BCNO = BCISO = 0.2. Finally, CFB 
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with BCCFB = 0.4 is the most frequent mode of operation to be present in the shortest 
paths of this service, followed by BCCBC = BCECB = BCOFB = 0.2. 
As shown in Figure 7.4, although key size 256 is the key size that normally consumes 
the highest energy, it is included in one of the shortest paths. This can be explained by 
the fact that the reliability for this scenario is fixed and in the specific case it is quite 
high (40%).Therefore, even though other key sizes could be used instead, that 
consume less energy, these have been excluded from the shortest path list, as they do 
not meet the reliability requirement that has been set by the user. Although 128 bit 
key size appears in most of the shortest paths, it is used in combination with high 
consuming parameters i.e. CFB mode of operation. 
 
Figure 7.5: Shortest paths and most central nodes: R = 0.3. 
Following, the reliability level is set equal to 30%. Figure 7.5 depicts the shortest 
paths of this service, where the ISO padding scheme appears to be the most 
significant node of the graph. Key size 128 and 256, as well as ECB mode of 
operation are traversed by shortest paths in 50% of the cases. The nodes that are not 
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present in any of the shortest paths, and therefore are not connected to any other node, 
have zero centrality. As in the previous scenario, key size 256 has 50% betweenness 
centrality, which means that 50% of the shortest paths pass through this node. For the 
same reason that was explained in the previous scenario and because reliability is 
relatively high (30%), the shortest paths that consume less energy have been 
eliminated due to the reliability requirement. 
As shown in Table 7.2, key size 128 bit and key size 256 share an equal significance 
of BC128 = BC256 = 0.5, while key size 192 bit with BC192 = 0 is not present in any of 
the shortest paths of this service. ISO padding was present in 75% of the shortest 
paths with BCISO = 0.75, while PKCS5 was involved in 25% of the cases with 
BCPKCS5 = 0.25 and NoPadding in none of the shortest paths with BCNO = 0. 
Regarding the modes of operation, ECB has a relatively high centrality BCECB = 0.5  
Table 7.2: Betweenness centrality: R = 0.3. 
Parameter Betweenness  
Centrality 
128 0.5 
192 0 
256 0.5 
No Padding 0 
ISO 0.75 
PKCS5 0.25 
CBC 0.25 
CFB 0 
ECB 0.5 
OFB 0.25 
 
compared to CBC and OFB with BCCBC = BCOFB = 0.25 and CFB with BCCFB = 0. 
In the next scenario, the reliability level is decreased to 20%. Figure 7.6 illustrates the 
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connectivity of the nodes that are involved in the shortest paths of the encryption. 128 
bit key size, No padding and ECB mode of operation are the most central nodes. The 
results are summarized in Table 7.3. 
The key size with the highest centrality was found to be the 128 bit key with BC128 = 
0.57, followed by key size 192 with BC192 = 0.43. Key size 256 is not involved in the 
shortest paths and therefore BC256 = 0. NoPadding showed a relatively high centrality 
of BCNO = 0.57, followed by PKCS5 with BCPKSC = 0.28 and BCISO = 0.14. Finally, 
ECB was the most significant mode of operation with BCECB = 0.57, followed by the 
equal centralities of the rest modes with BCCBC = BCCFB = BCOFB = 0.14. 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Shortest paths and most central nodes: R = 0.2. 
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Table 7.3: Betweenness centrality: R = 0.2. 
Parameter Betweenness  
Centrality 
128 0.57 
192 0.43 
256 0 
No Padding 0.57 
ISO 0.14 
PKCS5 0.28 
CBC 0.14 
CFB 0.14 
ECB 0.57 
OFB 0.14 
 
Finally, the test is repeated for a desired reliability level of 10%. As shown in Figure 
7.7, key size 128 and ECB mode of operation are traversed by all shortest paths. The  
 
Figure 7.7: Shortest paths and most central nodes: R = 0.1. 
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Table 7.4: Betweenness centrality for R = 0.1. 
Parameter Betweenness  
Centrality 
128 1 
192 0 
256 0 
No Padding 0.5 
ISO 0.5 
PKCS5 0 
CBC 0 
CFB 0 
ECB 1 
OFB 0 
 
rest key sizes and modes of operations, as well as PKCS5 padding, have no 
significance in the graph, as there is no shortest path that passes through these nodes.   
In the last variation of the reliability level, it was found that key size 128 was 
involved in all shortest paths with BC128 = 1, while none of the rest keys was present 
in a shortest path, BC192 = BC256 = 0. NoPadding and ISO share a centrality of BCNO = 
BCISO = 0.5, meaning that PKCS5 was not involved in any shortest path with BCPKCS5 
= 0. ECB with BCECB = 1 revealed its presence in all shortest paths for this service and 
that the rest of the modes were not significant in the graph, as BCCBC = BCCFB = 
BCOFB = 0. Table 7.4 depicts the results for 10% reliability. 
 
7.3. Discussion 
 
To conclude, Table 7.5 depicts the most central encryption components of the case 
study.  
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Table 7.5: Most significant parameters 
Reliability Key size Padding scheme Mode of operation 
Centrality 
0.4 128 PKCS5 CFB 
0.3 128, 256 ISO ECB 
0.2 128 NO ECB 
0.1 128 NO, ISO ECB 
 
The results suggest that key size 128 is always present in the shortest paths of this 
example, with a centrality varying between 50% and 100%. Similarly, the centrality 
results regarding the modes of operation indicate that ECB traverses the shortest paths 
75% of the cases. Specifically, for a reliability level in the interval of 10% and 30%, 
ECB is the most central mode of operation with centrality varying between 50% and 
100%. In addition, the results indicate that there is a negative relationship between 
ECB and reliability, as the centrality of ECB increases as the reliability level 
decreases, meaning that the higher the probability that the encryption will have finish 
prior to the threshold, the stronger the betweenness of ECB will be. Unlike key size 
and mode of operation, there is no evidence that centrality can be used as an indicator 
of the most significant padding scheme for this example.  
Figure 7.8 shows the relationship between the reliability level and the betweenness 
centrality metric for the encryption parameters. The observations of the results reveal 
that the impact of the energy consumption is in line with the conclusions made in 
Chapter 6. Specifically, in the regression model analysis, it was found that the key 
size is the most significant parameter, followed by the mode of operation, while the 
padding scheme has the lowest impact on the energy consumption of the encryption 
procedure.  
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Figure 7.8: Betweenness vs Reliability. 
Table 7.6 summarizes the impact of the predictor variable (encryption parameters) on 
the response variable (energy), as resulted from the regression analysis. As 
mentioned in Chapter 6, the higher the coefficient of a predictor variable, the highest 
the impact of the encryption parameter on the energy consumption and therefore the 
more energy is consumed during encryption. Therefore, for a specific encryption 
parameter, when the rest of the predictor variables are fixed, by applying the 
regression equation to predict the energy consumption, and by adjusting the 
encryption parameter of interest, based on the coefficient, the model will result in 
different values of energy. 
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Table 7.6: Regression coefficients 
Encryption parameter Regression coefficient 
Key size 1 0 
Key size 2 0.059 
Key size 3 0.063 
No Padding 0 
ISO 0.01 
PKCS5 0.005 
CBC 0 
CFB 0.007 
ECB -0.038 
OFB 0.007 
 
As everything apart from the variable of interest is fixed in the regression equation, 
the energy will vary based on the coefficients of the specific variable. Therefore, the 
higher the coefficient, the higher will be the value of the estimated energy. Thus, the 
higher the coefficient, the highest the impact of the corresponding variable on the 
energy consumption will be. As shown in Table 7.6, Key size 1 (128) has the lowest 
impact on the energy consumption, whilst Key size 3 (256) has the highest one. 
Regarding the Padding scheme, NoPadding is the most efficient one, followed by 
PKCS5, whilst ISO padding has the highest impact on the response variable and 
therefore consumes the highest energy during encryption. Finally, ECB mode of 
operation has the lowest impact on the energy consumption, followed by CBC, 
whilst OFB and CFB have the highest impact on the energy consumed during 
encryption. Table 7.5 summarises the most significant parameters; the ones with the 
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highest betweenness centralities. As mentioned earlier, the higher the betwenness 
centrality, the lowest the impact on energy consumption. From Table 7.5, it is shown 
that key size 1 (128) is the one with the lowest impact on energy consumption. 
Similarly, for the mode of operation, ECB is the mode with the lowest impact on 
energy in most of the cases. Regarding the padding scheme, NoPadding and ISO are 
the ones that appear in the paths with the lowest energy consumption in most of the 
cases. Taking into consideration the centralities as resulted from the betweenness 
analysis for R = 0.1, as for higher reliability there is uncertainty in terms of 
completion, there is a consistency between the betweenness centrality results and 
those resulted from the regression analysis. Specifically, according to the centrality 
results, key size 128 appears to be the most central node in the shortest paths, which 
is in line with the regression model as key size 1 (128) has the lowest impact on the 
energy consumption. Key sizes 192 and 256 resulted in 0 centrality, conforming to 
the regression coefficients of 0.059 and 0.063 respectively. Similarly, No Padding is 
one of the most central nodes in the shortest paths for low reliability levels, which is 
in agreement with the zero impact of the padding scheme on the energy consumption 
as per the regression model. Finally, regarding the mode of operation, ECB is by far 
the node with the highest centrality, conforming to the regression results where ECB 
has the lowest impact on the energy consumption with a coefficient equal to -0.038.   
In this chapter, the problem of low energy encryption was studied to identify the 
most efficient security mode. The encryption flow was modelled using ideas from 
graph theory, and a novel approach was developed, based on the betweenness 
centrality measure. The goal was to transform the impact of each encryption 
parameter on the probability that the system will finish the encryption prior to a 
threshold into a knowledge asset that can be used for the decision making, regarding 
the selection of the most efficient security mode. The results demonstrated that 
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betweenness centrality is a useful measure that facilitates the study of the security 
mode selection taking into consideration the energy consumption. Even though in 
some cases the results might seem anomalous, considering that reliability is fixed and 
also because of the combination of the high energy consuming parameters with the 
low consuming ones, this concern can be justified.  
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Chapter 8 - Conclusions and future work 
Over the preceding chapters it has been shown that the use of the proposed adaptive 
security framework when energy efficient encryption is necessary, may be one 
possible beneficial method. 
The motivation for the development of this framework including all variations 
presented through different approaches was the identification of a gap in the area of 
energy efficient encryption systems. This framework addresses the global impact of 
the encryption parameters on energy levels, which has not previously been addressed 
by traditional mechanisms. This thesis has not aimed at focusing on specific 
algorithms or security threats, but has rather presented an approach for the selection 
of the most efficient security mode. The framework presented in this work enables a 
novel decision making procedure, using several stochastic and statistical methods, as 
well as ideas from graph theory. 
In this chapter, the thesis contributions are summarized and the prospective 
directions of future work are introduced. 
Chapter 1 presented the motivation of this work. The problem identification was 
outlined and the rationalization for addressing the energy implication on encryption 
was introduced. Chapter 2 introduced notions of energy and security, as well as 
mathematical methods that have been used for the development of the proposed 
framework and are further analyzed in the following chapters. Existing efforts in the 
area of low energy encryption were also highlighted and limitations in terms of 
universal deployment and adaptability were discussed. 
In Chapter 3, the concept of how a global metric for energy performance evaluation 
allows for optimal security mode selection with respect to energy consumption was 
 170 
 
presented, followed by an implementation overview where the simulation and data 
analysis techniques are discussed. In total five ciphers were simulated and the 
variation of four encryption parameters resulting in 576 possible security modes. 
These modes are further analyzed in terms of performance in the subsequent 
chapters. 
Chapter 4 provided a detailed analysis of the reliability model. A framework was 
developed for the determination of the encryption performance for all security 
modes. This allowed for relationships to be formed based upon the probability that 
the encryption will be completed prior to a time or energy threshold. The model was 
also optimized to provide the optimum threshold that is essential when the security 
mode has to be adjusted according to the severity of the requested service. The 
results showed how the threshold can affect the reliability metric and vice versa. 
Finally, the analysis of the derived asymptotic distributions of distinct, as well as 
compound encryption policies, provided a probabilistic framework for predicting, 
ranking and comparing the energy consumption induced by different policies, 
allowing for customization according to the security requirements. Overall, the 
benefits of deploying the reliability model for the decision making for the selection 
of the most effective security mode were highlighted. As shown in Chapter 4, the 
investigation of the probability that a single encryption will be completed prior to a 
given threshold is feasible using the ECDF derived from the simulations. This acts as 
a first indicator of performance for the corresponding security mode. Naturally, the 
question that arises concerns the performance evaluation of n encryptions i.e. What 
happens when n cases need to be encrypted using a specific security mode? What is 
the probability that the overall encryption time will not exceed a threshold specified 
by the user? In Chapter 4, a Normal approximation has been presented under the 
mathematical assumption that 𝒏 → ∞. To answer the question above, knowledge 
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about the distribution is needed. By applying CLT, the distribution was found to be 
Normal. The flexibility of CLT is that it requires independent random variables with 
finite variance and 𝒏 → ∞ . This allowed for the investigation of the compound 
encryption scenario. In section 4.5 the compound scenario has been presented, that 
can be used as a decision making policy for the allocation of k encryptions to a 
specific security mode and n-k to another one. This policy could be further extended 
and include more security modes. The distribution of the overall encryption time of 
the n encryptions would be Normal and the corresponding 𝝁  and 𝝈𝟐 values could be 
used to derive the compound mode distribution from Equation (4.15).  
CLT is very useful and it is widely used for decision making and inference on the 
sum or mean of n statistics. However, the assumption that 𝒏 → ∞ sometimes is not 
fully stated or it is assumed that as n is large, it approaches to infinity. Most of the 
results in probability theory are asymptotic, i.e. assumption that 𝒏 → ∞. Since this 
work considers a real world application (the overall encryption time or the mean 
encryption time of n encryptions), it is considered that this asymptotic assumption is 
not realistic, as n is finite (on a scale of hundreds or thousands of encryptions). In 
order to relax this assumption and maintain the inference in a mathematically 
rigorous way, Chernoff type bounds can be used, as presented in Chapter 5. In 
Chapter 5, a second probabilistic approach was presented, that bounds the tail of the 
distribution of both the overall and the mean execution time of n encryptions. Several 
inequalities have been presented, for both upper and two-sided bounds, resulting in a 
framework that allows for optimal policies to be identified, under certain user 
constraints. The advantage of this framework is that is mathematically rigorous and 
also flexible, since knowledge of distribution is not required. Finally, this approach 
relaxes the CLT’s assumption made in Chapter 4, as a number of executions n can be 
considered finite. Thus, the trade-off between the number of encryptions, level of 
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accuracy and sharpness of predictions can be achieved. 
In Chapter 6 a statistical analysis was presented that identified the impact of the 
encryption parameters on the overall energy consumption and that can be used to 
predict the energy consumption for certain encryption parameter values. The results 
showed that the regression model fits well for cases that the energy consumption 
levels lay around the statistical mean, but also showed some possible drawbacks for 
extreme cases. The validity of the regression model has been confirmed by assessing 
the principal assumptions – linearity, normality, independence, homoscedasticity and 
non multi-collinearity – about the predictor variables, the response variable and their 
relationship. R
2
, which is an indicator for goodness of fit, was found to be 0.634. 
This means that 63% of the variation in energy is explained by the model and 
indicates a relatively good fit. A complicated and risky situation (interpolation) may 
exist when prediction outside the range of the data set that has been used to derive 
the regression model is attempted. In this case, the model would be statistically 
unreliable and the results would not be trustworthy. However, in this work, this 
situation has been taken into consideration, as no attempt has been made to make 
predictions using predictor values outside the range of the data set that has been used 
for the regression model. In addition, as discussed in section 6.2, small variations in 
the input data would not affect the model, as there is no multi-collinearity. Therefore, 
variations of the predictors would not violate the statistical accuracy of the model, as 
long as the risk of interpolation is taken into consideration i.e. predictors’ values vary 
between the minimum and maximum observed values. As shown in Chapter 6, 
regression analysis can also provide useful information about the influence of each 
encryption parameter on energy. Overall, the regression model provided reasonable 
results, which were in line with the betweenness centrality ones, presented in Chapter 
7.  
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Betweeness centrality, presented in Chapter 7, was used to measure the significance 
of each encryption parameter within the encryption process. In this approach, the 
encryption system was treated as a graph and the components with the highest impact 
on the energy consumption were identified. It was found that the key size showed the 
highest betweenness centrality, followed by the mode of operation, while the padding 
scheme had the lowest impact on the energy consumption. It was observed that the 
results were in line with the statistical analysis in Chapter 6. One of the drawbacks of 
this approach is that in order to make a reasonable comparison of the security modes, 
the reliability requirement had to be fixed; otherwise it would not be reasonable to 
compare different levels of reliability i.e. < 0.3 because in that case, many high 
energy consuming nodes would appear in the shortest paths, as they would meet the 
reliability requirement and therefore the centrality comparison would not be fair. 
Thus, for a fixed reliability, when the latter is high, in some cases high energy 
consuming nodes will be included in the resulting shortest paths. However, these are 
usually combined with low energy consuming parameters; therefore the results are 
sensible. 
This study found that the adaptability of an encryption system can indeed be based 
on the energy consumption of the encryption algorithms. By adjusting the encryption 
parameters and therefore the level of security, unnecessary energy consumption can 
be avoided. Therefore, a system that adapts to the specified security requirements can 
be used to achieve the minimum energy consumption possible. The combination of 
the statistical and stochastic methods can facilitate the development of the energy 
conscious adaptive security scheme, as it allows for a thorough investigation of the 
behaviour of the encryption algorithms and the corresponding parameters. In 
addition, depending on the needs of the system, the analysis can be made based on 
the specific purpose. For example, when the scheme is aimed for low risk 
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applications, regression analysis might provide adequate information for the 
development of the system. However, for cases where extreme scenarios need to be 
considered, probabilistic bounds should be used in order to provide more meaningful 
results that should be taken into consideration for the implementation of the scheme. 
The combination of the techniques presented in this work could therefore provide an 
integrated solution. This would allow for effective decision making in terms of the 
most efficient selection of the encryption algorithm and the encryption parameters. A 
formal decision making framework that incorporates statistical and stochastic 
approaches and provides improvement strategies (such as bounds) and verification 
methods (such as regression analysis and betweenness centrality) can therefore be 
applied to energy conscious adaptive security schemes regardless of the available 
algorithms and primitives. 
Overall, the original aims of this thesis have been fulfilled. It has been demonstrated 
that the proposed techniques can be used to optimise the decision making with 
respect to the most efficient security mode selection. The proposed methods are not 
tied to any specific security primitives and thus provide a flexible solution that may 
find application in any type of communication system. Therefore, the proposed 
methods could be considered as a security framework for encryption systems where 
the energy cost is of prime importance. 
The ideas presented in this work can be further developed in several ways. One 
direction of future work is to test and evaluate the proposed framework in a real 
world system. It would be reasonable to perform a comparison of simulation methods 
and real world encryption systems. The aim would be to compare encryption time 
and energy consumption for identical models on real and simulated data. 
Specifically, the area of WSNs is currently investigated so that a real world 
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application of the proposed energy conscious adaptive security scheme will be 
realised. The work, which is at its initial stage, is currently attempted using real 
equipment and it is expected that it will successfully provide useful results. 
In addition, regarding the regression analysis, although the generalisation of 
algorithms and modes was one of the intentions of this work, it would be interesting 
to investigate further the behaviour of the algorithms and the encryption parameters’ 
variation for specific standards. It would be interesting to fit a regression model 
based on a specific algorithm and compare the results (coefficients, R
2
, response 
variable) to the generalised ones. This could lead to more accurate predictions and a 
clearer view of the impact of the encryption parameters on energy. 
Another possibility of future work would be to include more encryption algorithms 
in the system. The resulting scheme would allow for the optimum selection among a 
plethora of options and hence provide a more general purpose decision making tool. 
Moreover, examining algorithms other than those used in this work, would provide 
an interesting point of comparison.  
Furthermore, although in the presented approach security is considered as a 
requirement set by the user or the system administrator, this could be further 
extended so that the system can automatically rank the available security modes 
based on their strength. This could be achieved by assigning a security metric to each 
security mode i.e. by performing several attacks and evaluating the algorithms’ 
resistance or the probability of being compromised within a certain time threshold. 
Although this is a rather challenging task, as it is not easy to consider all possible 
attacks, such a system would be very useful, especially for cases where the main 
concern is the security strength, rather than the energy consumption. 
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Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis, another direction of work would be to 
investigate when the encryption scheme is considered adequate, in terms of security, 
by the user. Allowing a probability that a single encryption may be intercepted, the 
aim would be to find the probability that a stream of n encryptions can also be 
intercepted. Modern security schemes are designed to ensure secure communication 
between two parties, even for cases where the attacker has information about the 
encrypted message. The investigation of the entropy could possibly contribute to the 
optimisation of the policy that will eliminate the attacker’s knowledge to a desired 
threshold of information. It is expected that the framework proposed in this thesis 
could be adapted to this direction. To this end, future research plans include the 
investigation of the entropy and its adaptation to the energy conscious adaptive 
security proposed in this thesis. 
The investigation of the global impact of the encryption parameters on energy levels 
offers the potential for significant steps forward in the area of green cryptography. 
The concept of reusing ideas from existing algorithms and primitives in the 
development of new security protocols or algorithms could be deployed. Examining 
the parameters’ variation in terms of energy consumption could be used to identify 
emerging areas of low energy encryption, through the proposed methods, to identify 
potential new low energy security protocols. 
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APPENDIX A – Encryption schemes’ summary statistics 
 
CASE SCHEME MODE KEY DATA PADDING Min Max Mean Variance Median 
1st 
Quartile 
3rd 
Quartile 
1 AES CBC 128 16 NoPadding 100000 304200 130500 1150647256 123300 111000 133000 
2 AES CBC 192 16 NoPadding 109800 1041000 143500 9965921223 125300 114500 134000 
3 AES CBC 256 16 NoPadding 100000 329900 122100 1041722756 112000 107500 121700 
4 AES CBC 128 2048 NoPadding 266800 450900 293100 661472724 283600 279100 297000 
5 AES CBC 192 2048 NoPadding 279900 876100 317400 4407720451 300600 291700 319500 
6 AES CBC 256 2048 NoPadding 296100 547600 324100 1056765518 314100 306700 328100 
7 AES CBC 128 4096 NoPadding 442800 982000 480200 3146667005 469900 461200 478100 
8 AES CBC 192 4096 NoPadding 474100 729700 503700 1030441118 495300 490200 502300 
9 AES CBC 256 4096 NoPadding 494800 1024000 534500 3072120189 521600 514900 540000 
10 AES CFB 128 16 NoPadding 87440 661000 129800 3943247964 112000 106700 124900 
11 AES CFB 192 16 NoPadding 100000 268500 120800 969624054 109000 105500 121300 
12 AES CFB 256 16 NoPadding 100900 267900 120400 652919085 111600 106900 121000 
13 AES CFB 128 2048 NoPadding 266200 540600 300600 1677312851 290000 284900 299000 
14 AES CFB 192 2048 NoPadding 286100 831700 324100 6376218216 303100 298000 317100 
15 AES CFB 256 2048 NoPadding 297500 511200 331200 1080600766 322500 314200 333800 
16 AES CFB 128 4096 NoPadding 456800 709900 493900 1811391030 481100 472500 497800 
17 AES CFB 192 4096 NoPadding 484100 828600 522200 1986281871 508400 502200 527200 
18 AES CFB 256 4096 NoPadding 509600 742600 547500 1070556514 536900 528800 560500 
19 AES ECB 128 16 NoPadding 87440 274300 112900 911539166 101400 95750 119200 
20 AES ECB 192 16 NoPadding 86320 268200 109900 1049264931 96520 92330 114100 
21 AES ECB 256 16 NoPadding 88000 246100 112900 649289121 105300 97150 119400 
22 AES ECB 128 2048 NoPadding 240300 392500 264800 680479145 256000 248900 268500 
23 AES ECB 192 2048 NoPadding 248900 483600 286300 1417235821 274500 263900 296300 
24 AES ECB 256 2048 NoPadding 262300 438300 295600 701566146 290000 276200 309000 
25 AES ECB 128 4096 NoPadding 398700 672700 433600 1108952453 425600 414800 446500 
26 AES ECB 192 4096 NoPadding 425200 593900 458200 779226064 450900 441400 464700 
27 AES ECB 256 4096 NoPadding 448100 654000 482000 1154747526 472400 463400 487800 
28 AES OFB 128 16 NoPadding 97780 298400 120200 847303671 109900 106200 123300 
29 AES OFB 192 16 NoPadding 98340 309800 120200 1231366065 107700 103900 118200 
30 AES OFB 256 16 NoPadding 98340 327100 119100 1154752087 109200 105900 118700 
31 AES OFB 128 2048 NoPadding 268200 498900 295800 1278323750 285800 280400 295000 
32 AES OFB 192 2048 NoPadding 277100 462900 310200 965214361 300600 294100 315500 
33 AES OFB 256 2048 NoPadding 294200 880300 342700 6684871957 318900 311100 342500 
34 AES OFB 128 4096 NoPadding 449200 1037000 490600 3974727421 474800 466300 494800 
35 AES OFB 192 4096 NoPadding 478000 1072000 530500 9327494283 500300 495500 527700 
36 AES OFB 256 4096 NoPadding 505100 1042000 551300 6200415098 528300 523400 555100 
37 AES CBC 128 16 ISO 98340 312600 125700 1001563116 114000 109800 129100 
38 AES CBC 192 16 ISO 98060 286900 123400 893774518 112900 108100 125300 
39 AES CBC 256 16 ISO 102500 386100 130600 1788575398 116600 111300 129200 
40 AES CBC 128 2048 ISO 265700 798100 303600 3643393110 288000 281500 302000 
41 AES CBC 192 2048 ISO 279400 592500 315100 2321450831 300700 292400 312800 
42 AES CBC 256 2048 ISO 291900 795100 333700 3924530220 315000 308100 334700 
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43 AES CBC 128 4096 ISO 453100 1034000 506700 10384780070 478300 469300 498500 
44 AES CBC 192 4096 ISO 472100 908200 521700 3882736897 501200 490800 528800 
45 AES CBC 256 4096 ISO 501500 1022000 553300 5993719679 529300 521300 559200 
46 AES CFB 128 16 ISO 96940 340300 126500 1257197933 111700 108400 131100 
47 AES CFB 192 16 ISO 98060 292200 122100 837094002 110800 107200 120700 
48 AES CFB 256 16 ISO 102200 300900 126500 969288169 113800 110200 128600 
49 AES CFB 128 2048 ISO 275700 807100 311900 3663724059 293500 288800 311100 
50 AES CFB 192 2048 ISO 293100 880600 334800 7758128197 311800 302300 326600 
51 AES CFB 256 2048 ISO 303700 555400 340500 1821316089 326200 317600 344500 
52 AES CFB 128 4096 ISO 470500 750700 500800 1234337076 490300 484300 502400 
53 AES CFB 192 4096 ISO 488900 727500 526900 1144124139 515300 509700 531700 
54 AES CFB 256 4096 ISO 524100 1015000 563600 3162328342 547800 540900 571400 
55 AES ECB 128 16 ISO 83810 240300 113000 582205897 107400 99380 116600 
56 AES ECB 192 16 ISO 89120 393900 112700 1365767242 101400 95540 115400 
57 AES ECB 256 16 ISO 90790 641100 127800 8657179499 103800 97360 118400 
58 AES ECB 128 2048 ISO 246400 763500 281100 5520392231 260600 252700 280300 
59 AES ECB 192 2048 ISO 251400 551500 288500 1981127142 273600 267100 294900 
60 AES ECB 256 2048 ISO 267400 882000 302500 3989151306 293200 278800 305600 
61 AES ECB 128 4096 ISO 405100 625800 440500 1075005587 431800 420900 448100 
62 AES ECB 192 4096 ISO 431600 688900 467700 1344200062 457700 448600 478600 
63 AES ECB 256 4096 ISO 450600 1031000 501800 7028946350 479900 475200 497500 
64 AES OFB 128 16 ISO 88000 273500 124300 768133066 113800 110000 128400 
65 AES OFB 192 16 ISO 90240 314600 124000 1451790420 111600 106700 123100 
66 AES OFB 256 16 ISO 88000 351400 123800 1183348559 112700 109000 124000 
67 AES OFB 128 2048 ISO 271500 886400 310700 7097050950 291500 284800 300900 
68 AES OFB 192 2048 ISO 272900 565700 316400 1431144250 303900 298400 325700 
69 AES OFB 256 2048 ISO 296700 812100 336700 3340143308 322000 313700 341500 
70 AES OFB 128 4096 ISO 463500 1309000 510200 9687721170 487900 478300 507700 
71 AES OFB 192 4096 ISO 484400 939800 524900 2556542050 512500 504400 534600 
72 AES OFB 256 4096 ISO 518500 1091000 557600 4166165143 537800 532700 566600 
73 AES CBC 128 16 PKCS5 103900 323500 130700 883455454 121500 116400 132300 
74 AES CBC 192 16 PKCS5 104800 330500 131400 1413597202 117500 113100 136400 
75 AES CBC 256 16 PKCS5 103400 323800 130400 1008091260 120400 113900 132800 
76 AES CBC 128 2048 PKCS5 279100 473000 305400 928431300 292400 285400 316700 
77 AES CBC 192 2048 PKCS5 282700 550600 320900 1913200576 307400 298400 324500 
78 AES CBC 256 2048 PKCS5 299500 604500 336400 1823424411 324200 314800 342100 
79 AES CBC 128 4096 PKCS5 458200 990900 498200 3807091118 482500 472700 501600 
80 AES CBC 192 4096 PKCS5 484400 1103000 537600 9245805618 510800 501700 538300 
81 AES CBC 256 4096 PKCS5 511500 1093000 555200 7153584056 532300 526500 546900 
82 AES CFB 128 16 PKCS5 101700 354500 129000 1301802405 115200 111500 135600 
83 AES CFB 192 16 PKCS5 102000 364000 124800 1153356377 114400 110600 122700 
84 AES CFB 256 16 PKCS5 98060 228500 124300 491784738 116100 112800 124800 
85 AES CFB 128 2048 PKCS5 281900 448400 307900 787414767 298100 292500 312300 
86 AES CFB 192 2048 PKCS5 291400 416500 325200 767628307 313700 305800 337200 
87 AES CFB 256 2048 PKCS5 311800 510400 339200 1177836529 328000 320700 344900 
88 AES CFB 128 4096 PKCS5 471300 1469000 518700 11857464064 492500 486100 510800 
89 AES CFB 192 4096 PKCS5 501200 661000 534700 1214420069 521900 514800 540400 
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90 AES CFB 256 4096 PKCS5 513200 720500 561200 1270367666 548300 540800 572000 
91 AES ECB 128 16 PKCS5 84930 270100 115800 900092033 107000 101100 113800 
92 AES ECB 192 16 PKCS5 91070 334100 112000 975486228 102400 96940 115200 
93 AES ECB 256 16 PKCS5 94150 247000 114900 650224981 103600 100400 116600 
94 AES ECB 128 2048 PKCS5 246100 398100 274400 846297013 263000 257400 278500 
95 AES ECB 192 2048 PKCS5 254500 756200 294800 3252355723 280100 270400 299300 
96 AES ECB 256 2048 PKCS5 268800 408700 303300 927717942 293100 283300 310900 
97 AES ECB 128 4096 PKCS5 407900 602000 443000 861705633 433600 426500 451200 
98 AES ECB 192 4096 PKCS5 433300 692500 476500 1862030794 461000 454100 490700 
99 AES ECB 256 4096 PKCS5 461800 1024000 505200 4100658742 487800 481300 507400 
100 AES OFB 128 16 PKCS5 106200 338900 132200 1178402752 120000 114300 133700 
101 AES OFB 192 16 PKCS5 105300 387200 129700 1350792726 115700 112200 131500 
102 AES OFB 256 16 PKCS5 86880 375700 128400 1612997933 114700 109700 127300 
103 AES OFB 128 2048 PKCS5 282200 536100 305800 1285031282 295000 288900 306500 
104 AES OFB 192 2048 PKCS5 288300 847300 327300 4681769076 308700 303900 318100 
105 AES OFB 256 2048 PKCS5 303900 770200 343800 3187549449 328000 319800 346100 
106 AES OFB 128 4096 PKCS5 467100 662100 497500 794874017 488200 481800 506800 
107 AES OFB 192 4096 PKCS5 486900 1048000 533100 4242360822 517000 507200 533600 
108 AES OFB 256 4096 PKCS5 514300 730800 558200 1163283178 544600 538700 567500 
109 DES CBC 56 16 NoPadding 102000 320400 123200 1210623929 110600 107500 120800 
110 DES CBC 56 2048 NoPadding 410400 586900 437500 677831149 431600 422300 440900 
111 DES CBC 56 4096 NoPadding 726900 987600 761300 1638048388 749300 741800 763400 
112 DES CFB 56 16 NoPadding 104500 440800 135000 2292881243 122100 113400 136500 
113 DES CFB 56 2048 NoPadding 412900 982500 446500 4448949098 433400 423400 441400 
114 DES CFB 56 4096 NoPadding 731900 1305000 777300 4333585643 759700 752100 783000 
115 DES ECB 56 16 NoPadding 85210 266800 116800 779554803 110100 98900 123200 
116 DES ECB 56 2048 NoPadding 375500 580800 406700 858764639 399200 391000 412700 
117 DES ECB 56 4096 NoPadding 674900 1243000 714400 3649713719 701900 692300 718800 
118 DES OFB 56 16 NoPadding 105000 230200 130900 623082294 124900 114200 134900 
119 DES OFB 56 2048 NoPadding 410700 635600 444300 1211457006 435300 426700 447400 
120 DES OFB 56 4096 NoPadding 731400 1054000 769700 1914708991 757200 750000 774100 
121 DES CBC 56 16 ISO 103400 318200 134400 1294000653 123800 119200 132100 
122 DES CBC 56 2048 ISO 407600 698400 447900 2259599600 436400 425900 447000 
123 DES CBC 56 4096 ISO 730800 995400 770200 1959618575 755500 748000 772300 
124 DES CFB 56 16 ISO 102000 637000 134600 3261267815 125400 114800 132000 
125 DES CFB 56 2048 ISO 411200 736100 448100 1947392014 439000 429400 449100 
126 DES CFB 56 4096 ISO 736700 989500 776000 1491628940 763200 757800 781400 
127 DES ECB 56 16 ISO 93030 282400 120700 951227765 112300 107300 122700 
128 DES ECB 56 2048 ISO 385500 624400 418400 1337958732 409400 401700 417900 
129 DES ECB 56 4096 ISO 681100 889500 719100 1295830967 708500 701400 725200 
130 DES OFB 56 16 ISO 107600 412300 139400 1700826097 127400 121200 142100 
131 DES OFB 56 2048 ISO 409300 916600 452100 3881735078 438200 429900 446500 
132 DES OFB 56 4096 ISO 731400 1279000 780800 6596441815 760200 755500 770100 
133 DES CBC 56 16 PKCS5 102200 1003000 143400 8654544069 128400 118900 137200 
134 DES CBC 56 2048 PKCS5 409000 690600 445500 1543568138 435700 424900 444900 
135 DES CBC 56 4096 PKCS5 729100 1299000 772500 4039375770 758600 751000 771300 
136 DES CFB 56 16 PKCS5 106200 262900 139700 740519982 131900 119000 153400 
  
188 
 
137 DES CFB 56 2048 PKCS5 416800 965200 454500 3373226653 443600 431100 458500 
138 DES CFB 56 4096 PKCS5 741200 919100 790700 943482725 782500 771700 799600 
139 DES ECB 56 16 PKCS5 94150 284700 118700 604377919 112900 103600 126300 
140 DES ECB 56 2048 PKCS5 381600 585000 413300 940407857 407500 397700 416700 
141 DES ECB 56 4096 PKCS5 684700 1226000 726900 4040043999 713800 705300 727600 
142 DES OFB 56 16 PKCS5 105300 647600 145700 5767101290 129100 121400 138400 
143 DES OFB 56 2048 PKCS5 413500 690900 452600 1294428856 445900 438400 452900 
144 DES OFB 56 4096 PKCS5 738100 1245000 779500 3529871358 765200 757100 776900 
145 TDES CBC 112 16 NoPadding 116500 334100 146800 1193255286 137400 131900 148100 
146 TDES CBC 168 16 NoPadding 116500 358400 144900 1395986577 136200 126100 144200 
147 TDES CBC 112 2048 NoPadding 816300 1371000 865500 7092467541 845500 839400 860700 
148 TDES CBC 168 2048 NoPadding 816900 1017000 857900 764845512 850800 843100 867000 
149 TDES CBC 112 4096 NoPadding 1544000 2050000 1585000 2845183146 1575000 1567000 1583000 
150 TDES CBC 168 4096 NoPadding 1540000 2102000 1593000 4266895936 1576000 1569000 1596000 
151 TDES CFB 112 16 NoPadding 119300 474600 149600 1888455553 138800 135400 150200 
152 TDES CFB 168 16 NoPadding 117900 494800 148500 2143060334 138300 134800 148100 
153 TDES CFB 112 2048 NoPadding 823600 1375000 859900 3945071900 846800 835500 859700 
154 TDES CFB 168 2048 NoPadding 819400 1304000 864200 4935656700 847600 839100 858800 
155 TDES CFB 112 4096 NoPadding 1550000 2070000 1596000 5489458433 1577000 1569000 1592000 
156 TDES CFB 168 4096 NoPadding 1547000 2645000 1602000 14451419971 1578000 1571000 1594000 
157 TDES ECB 112 16 NoPadding 105300 640300 138700 4134394975 124600 115900 135100 
158 TDES ECB 168 16 NoPadding 106400 339200 133600 1541574492 123200 114300 133000 
159 TDES ECB 112 2048 NoPadding 791400 1004000 821100 992186043 813700 806200 822500 
160 TDES ECB 168 2048 NoPadding 790000 1012000 825500 901507008 818700 811300 828900 
161 TDES ECB 112 4096 NoPadding 1493000 2085000 1560000 14607089855 1523000 1514000 1541000 
162 TDES ECB 168 4096 NoPadding 1494000 1968000 1542000 4668360018 1523000 1517000 1545000 
163 TDES OFB 112 16 NoPadding 120100 414600 146000 1831733980 137200 125500 146600 
164 TDES OFB 168 16 NoPadding 118700 384700 143700 1397990237 137000 124000 144300 
165 TDES OFB 112 2048 NoPadding 820500 1276000 859400 2826258385 850900 838200 858800 
166 TDES OFB 168 2048 NoPadding 819700 1193000 857100 2141707878 846600 836500 861700 
167 TDES OFB 112 4096 NoPadding 1541000 2142000 1586000 4452608972 1572000 1563000 1587000 
168 TDES OFB 168 4096 NoPadding 1542000 1738000 1584000 1261897288 1574000 1563000 1593000 
169 TDES CBC 112 16 ISO 108400 654300 152500 4273254413 138400 127600 148700 
170 TDES CBC 168 16 ISO 113400 408700 145100 1672058543 138600 127000 143900 
171 TDES CBC 112 2048 ISO 823000 1051000 851300 978746301 845500 834300 853200 
172 TDES CBC 168 2048 ISO 823600 1321000 860600 3066260368 850100 841100 860700 
173 TDES CBC 112 4096 ISO 1551000 2139000 1606000 10673766529 1581000 1571000 1590000 
174 TDES CBC 168 4096 ISO 1545000 2126000 1607000 8569237207 1584000 1575000 1606000 
175 TDES CFB 112 16 ISO 121500 331300 148200 870105237 141500 134400 150200 
176 TDES CFB 168 16 ISO 119800 395900 147900 1241467318 141400 130500 148700 
177 TDES CFB 112 2048 ISO 823600 1419000 861200 3764272460 851600 839900 862100 
178 TDES CFB 168 2048 ISO 824400 1116000 864300 1585942790 854900 845300 872900 
179 TDES CFB 112 4096 ISO 1554000 2122000 1606000 7984338275 1586000 1578000 1601000 
180 TDES CFB 168 4096 ISO 1551000 1776000 1595000 1024020679 1586000 1579000 1603000 
181 TDES ECB 112 16 ISO 87440 246400 133600 519594214 127000 122200 138100 
182 TDES ECB 168 16 ISO 108400 632200 139700 3345460831 128500 118400 137000 
183 TDES ECB 112 2048 ISO 793700 1338000 831900 3467054835 820800 813400 827200 
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184 TDES ECB 168 2048 ISO 799800 1289000 842500 6687378711 822700 813700 836600 
185 TDES ECB 112 4096 ISO 1510000 2045000 1564000 9114846903 1539000 1532000 1553000 
186 TDES ECB 168 4096 ISO 1511000 2048000 1552000 3647878310 1537000 1531000 1560000 
187 TDES OFB 112 16 ISO 122600 340500 151500 1235826938 143900 134000 153500 
188 TDES OFB 168 16 ISO 121500 395900 151900 1810300250 141500 135800 149000 
189 TDES OFB 112 2048 ISO 825500 1414000 870500 6865130270 852200 845000 864000 
190 TDES OFB 168 2048 ISO 824100 1014000 860600 833959713 853200 848200 862700 
191 TDES OFB 112 4096 ISO 1554000 2166000 1608000 7799881850 1584000 1576000 1608000 
192 TDES OFB 168 4096 ISO 1551000 2131000 1619000 11260991265 1590000 1580000 1612000 
193 TDES CBC 112 16 PKCS5 119300 669600 156200 3981869015 142600 130300 156200 
194 TDES CBC 168 16 PKCS5 109500 342200 148100 745524065 144400 131800 150400 
195 TDES CBC 112 2048 PKCS5 824100 1302000 861900 2677850162 851600 841800 864100 
196 TDES CBC 168 2048 PKCS5 826400 1337000 873600 5253777272 857500 847500 871100 
197 TDES CBC 112 4096 PKCS5 1551000 2068000 1601000 5399518835 1584000 1575000 1607000 
198 TDES CBC 168 4096 PKCS5 1552000 2119000 1601000 5252927380 1587000 1578000 1596000 
199 TDES CFB 112 16 PKCS5 126600 412600 157400 1992169893 146700 139300 159600 
200 TDES CFB 168 16 PKCS5 123500 383600 151400 906613347 145700 141500 154300 
201 TDES CFB 112 2048 PKCS5 835600 940600 863100 426571692 858300 852000 866500 
202 TDES CFB 168 2048 PKCS5 825500 1000000 861400 828215031 854900 848400 861900 
203 TDES CFB 112 4096 PKCS5 1557000 2028000 1601000 3384459006 1589000 1580000 1603000 
204 TDES CFB 168 4096 PKCS5 1566000 2128000 1613000 5449410291 1593000 1584000 1613000 
205 TDES ECB 112 16 PKCS5 109200 652000 143200 3213101716 131600 124500 145100 
206 TDES ECB 168 16 PKCS5 114800 367900 140600 1135722588 134500 120900 141800 
207 TDES ECB 112 2048 PKCS5 798100 1372000 846700 11166740471 818300 807900 833100 
208 TDES ECB 168 2048 PKCS5 796700 1366000 835500 4099117189 822900 812900 835900 
209 TDES ECB 112 4096 PKCS5 1510000 2092000 1560000 6535513514 1545000 1531000 1556000 
210 TDES ECB 168 4096 PKCS5 1499000 2096000 1564000 10768602627 1538000 1528000 1559000 
211 TDES OFB 112 16 PKCS5 125400 497000 155200 2176465192 146200 134600 154100 
212 TDES OFB 168 16 PKCS5 123800 520500 150700 2106223154 143900 131000 150900 
213 TDES OFB 112 2048 PKCS5 831100 1368000 875500 7588171220 856000 845000 867200 
214 TDES OFB 168 2048 PKCS5 831400 1024000 864800 891832170 857200 847900 868900 
215 TDES OFB 112 4096 PKCS5 1556000 1895000 1596000 1993245612 1586000 1575000 1604000 
216 TDES OFB 168 4096 PKCS5 1563000 2127000 1615000 7850168401 1590000 1584000 1616000 
217 BF CBC 56 16 NoPadding 238600 507300 266400 986091932 261100 252900 267700 
218 BF CBC 112 16 NoPadding 231000 382700 252100 513095242 244900 239700 256500 
219 BF CBC 256 16 NoPadding 231900 457300 256500 1161713564 245800 240000 258500 
220 BF CBC 56 2048 NoPadding 410700 599800 441700 489593450 435500 432200 444300 
221 BF CBC 112 2048 NoPadding 412900 678300 444800 985851758 434700 429400 449300 
222 BF CBC 256 2048 NoPadding 412100 985000 448000 3782431390 434700 429100 446800 
223 BF CBC 56 4096 NoPadding 616000 846800 647100 1090149389 636700 630000 654800 
224 BF CBC 112 4096 NoPadding 611500 1136000 651400 4008834534 637200 629900 649800 
225 BF CBC 256 4096 NoPadding 611200 829200 649300 959365322 642000 630500 659100 
226 BF CFB 56 16 NoPadding 220400 379400 257700 625774317 248500 242100 264600 
227 BF CFB 112 16 NoPadding 230800 458200 256500 940341786 247400 240700 260000 
228 BF CFB 256 16 NoPadding 234400 441700 254700 615936354 247500 242900 255700 
229 BF CFB 56 2048 NoPadding 416500 738400 447000 1363131847 438700 432900 446400 
230 BF CFB 112 2048 NoPadding 413500 652000 446600 1174436302 436600 431000 451600 
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231 BF CFB 256 2048 NoPadding 418500 592800 447700 640556709 437800 432700 456000 
232 BF CFB 56 4096 NoPadding 621000 740300 644600 497271289 637000 630800 648300 
233 BF CFB 112 4096 NoPadding 623300 794800 649500 775237270 639600 634200 655000 
234 BF CFB 256 4096 NoPadding 615200 901000 652300 1641768631 638900 634200 663000 
235 BF ECB 56 16 NoPadding 219600 411200 240900 873359252 233100 228200 242600 
236 BF ECB 112 16 NoPadding 216800 392800 241100 535361507 233500 229200 242600 
237 BF ECB 256 16 NoPadding 218700 373500 243100 526078193 237000 229900 246500 
238 BF ECB 56 2048 NoPadding 386100 942900 415700 3192482564 404000 399100 417100 
239 BF ECB 112 2048 NoPadding 386600 600600 412000 999932528 403100 395900 418200 
240 BF ECB 256 2048 NoPadding 383600 611200 414700 1029708107 404900 400000 415300 
241 BF ECB 56 4096 NoPadding 565400 1087000 600600 3617448919 587200 580800 596200 
242 BF ECB 112 4096 NoPadding 561800 883900 600100 1268263952 588600 581600 609400 
243 BF ECB 256 4096 NoPadding 568800 827800 600500 995631144 590700 584700 608800 
244 BF OFB 56 16 NoPadding 236100 520700 260000 1580761583 246700 242500 261000 
245 BF OFB 112 16 NoPadding 233300 774400 267200 4986728220 247200 241900 268300 
246 BF OFB 256 16 NoPadding 236100 476600 258300 821993511 249200 243300 262300 
247 BF OFB 56 2048 NoPadding 416500 747000 449700 1865404158 439400 432500 452300 
248 BF OFB 112 2048 NoPadding 423500 661800 448200 1129668511 437600 431800 453000 
249 BF OFB 256 2048 NoPadding 422700 996800 461900 6825457299 439900 432200 460500 
250 BF OFB 56 4096 NoPadding 617100 1142000 653400 3349261585 638800 631600 655800 
251 BF OFB 112 4096 NoPadding 619600 933600 656400 2292087778 641100 635100 662000 
252 BF OFB 256 4096 NoPadding 619600 786400 651000 697471457 642400 635300 661000 
253 BF CBC 56 16 ISO 233800 535300 264100 2416950200 248600 243000 261600 
254 BF CBC 112 16 ISO 226300 783300 268100 5053343531 249200 241900 265400 
255 BF CBC 256 16 ISO 234900 438600 255900 656449128 247800 243300 257200 
256 BF CBC 56 2048 ISO 417400 654000 447100 1119444994 438300 432700 449000 
257 BF CBC 112 2048 ISO 417700 630500 451100 1159229956 440700 434100 452300 
258 BF CBC 256 2048 ISO 418500 678000 454400 1169484863 444900 436600 455200 
259 BF CBC 56 4096 ISO 618000 807900 649600 818338653 640200 634400 655700 
260 BF CBC 112 4096 ISO 615200 826100 649800 932482596 639900 634300 651800 
261 BF CBC 256 4096 ISO 614300 1212000 660100 4266912451 642100 636400 662200 
262 BF CFB 56 16 ISO 234900 448700 256200 679297408 247900 244200 258500 
263 BF CFB 112 16 ISO 234400 778600 261500 3781604033 247100 242800 258600 
264 BF CFB 256 16 ISO 232400 778000 269500 5547632589 250600 244400 271300 
265 BF CFB 56 2048 ISO 423000 690900 450200 1151978542 439700 435200 455500 
266 BF CFB 112 2048 ISO 420200 919900 453500 3265442751 437900 433800 454200 
267 BF CFB 256 2048 ISO 419000 660100 453900 1348577989 441500 434300 459700 
268 BF CFB 56 4096 ISO 618000 1120000 654500 2911912573 643700 637000 656700 
269 BF CFB 112 4096 ISO 620500 819100 647200 859272359 638800 631600 647800 
270 BF CFB 256 4096 ISO 617100 875500 652700 1317666509 642800 636700 656300 
271 BF ECB 56 16 ISO 221500 421300 242900 623839455 235800 231200 245400 
272 BF ECB 112 16 ISO 222400 417400 245100 1016325625 236500 230500 244000 
273 BF ECB 256 16 ISO 223200 445300 244700 961509669 235600 231200 245100 
274 BF ECB 56 2048 ISO 390000 912100 427100 3467302819 412500 403000 433600 
275 BF ECB 112 2048 ISO 385800 576600 419200 1025942055 408400 400300 430900 
276 BF ECB 256 2048 ISO 387200 912100 424700 2993796103 414000 403800 427400 
277 BF ECB 56 4096 ISO 566800 1115000 601600 3163112877 590000 581400 607100 
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278 BF ECB 112 4096 ISO 562100 1087000 607200 4085893894 590600 583000 608300 
279 BF ECB 256 4096 ISO 570200 1143000 609000 6185437938 591700 583700 604000 
280 BF OFB 56 16 ISO 237700 438900 256300 837614339 248500 243800 259000 
281 BF OFB 112 16 ISO 230800 754000 263200 3512033134 248200 242700 258100 
282 BF OFB 256 16 ISO 236300 777200 265200 3455247117 251300 243900 266900 
283 BF OFB 56 2048 ISO 423800 924700 455500 2900132568 443800 436900 453800 
284 BF OFB 112 2048 ISO 425800 642300 450500 887389150 440700 433900 455200 
285 BF OFB 256 2048 ISO 427400 950100 455800 3228320566 441400 435000 455700 
286 BF OFB 56 4096 ISO 623300 1156000 665900 5627815226 645200 640000 668700 
287 BF OFB 112 4096 ISO 623500 876900 655000 1072445004 644100 638600 662000 
288 BF OFB 256 4096 ISO 621000 1108000 660500 2933078981 644400 637400 666300 
289 BF CBC 56 16 PKCS5 240500 378300 260500 554425191 251400 246700 263900 
290 BF CBC 112 16 PKCS5 225400 466800 257700 928339099 248900 244200 258800 
291 BF CBC 256 16 PKCS5 237700 361500 261400 529209410 251300 248400 264400 
292 BF CBC 56 2048 PKCS5 426600 945900 456600 3252018905 445000 436900 457500 
293 BF CBC 112 2048 PKCS5 425800 613200 457400 1066830504 445300 438900 464400 
294 BF CBC 256 2048 PKCS5 428000 627700 458200 982350181 448900 440400 465600 
295 BF CBC 56 4096 PKCS5 624400 1138000 661200 3954645589 645500 639700 656500 
296 BF CBC 112 4096 PKCS5 621900 1279000 665900 4638282578 651500 640600 676300 
297 BF CBC 256 4096 PKCS5 616300 869700 657900 1227525006 647600 639700 669000 
298 BF CFB 56 16 PKCS5 242800 481600 267300 986187355 255500 249100 273600 
299 BF CFB 112 16 PKCS5 240300 366500 260800 497747916 253000 248300 263800 
300 BF CFB 256 16 PKCS5 241400 390300 262900 703956487 253500 248100 265300 
301 BF CFB 56 2048 PKCS5 427400 952600 467300 4923940544 448500 442700 464000 
302 BF CFB 112 2048 PKCS5 427400 955100 472500 8838089732 447000 438800 461700 
303 BF CFB 256 2048 PKCS5 432200 647300 461700 1122884231 450600 444500 461000 
304 BF CFB 56 4096 PKCS5 628800 806500 657200 869767264 645900 639700 663600 
305 BF CFB 112 4096 PKCS5 623500 1122000 658600 3073475792 644100 639100 655700 
306 BF CFB 256 4096 PKCS5 625500 1196000 667300 4411535231 649800 643600 667400 
307 BF ECB 56 16 PKCS5 225400 569300 257400 2084645289 242500 234900 264300 
308 BF ECB 112 16 PKCS5 228200 450600 256900 1541229527 243900 237900 259000 
309 BF ECB 256 16 PKCS5 227700 403100 252400 817734310 242900 236500 258900 
310 BF ECB 56 2048 PKCS5 393100 616600 422500 891638099 413300 408100 425800 
311 BF ECB 112 2048 PKCS5 392200 620200 424700 1314678098 414200 407600 424600 
312 BF ECB 256 2048 PKCS5 397300 899600 427200 3127468067 413500 407600 428000 
313 BF ECB 56 4096 PKCS5 575200 1143000 610600 3742790413 596700 589700 613100 
314 BF ECB 112 4096 PKCS5 570500 1089000 609800 3417671515 595200 585200 616100 
315 BF ECB 256 4096 PKCS5 572400 1113000 605800 3543879694 592800 587200 604700 
316 BF OFB 56 16 PKCS5 241400 413500 263000 808396005 252100 248900 265800 
317 BF OFB 112 16 PKCS5 238600 766600 269000 3592627396 252500 246400 274000 
318 BF OFB 256 16 PKCS5 241400 774100 269800 3526988549 254500 248900 265500 
319 BF OFB 56 2048 PKCS5 428300 528000 450400 398583576 444100 436900 456300 
320 BF OFB 112 2048 PKCS5 428000 659900 455700 1125477899 444100 436900 460900 
321 BF OFB 256 2048 PKCS5 426300 959300 466600 3843464204 448800 443000 462600 
322 BF OFB 56 4096 PKCS5 619900 1181000 659000 4039863210 643000 637200 655400 
323 BF OFB 112 4096 PKCS5 620500 1181000 662700 5528548145 644500 637400 656000 
324 BF OFB 256 4096 PKCS5 620700 1160000 664300 3433393500 647600 638900 673700 
  
192 
 
325 RC2 CBC 40 16 NoPadding 94150 339100 117000 1168874774 106600 102500 117900 
326 RC2 CBC 64 16 NoPadding 90790 324100 111600 1294061340 100300 95470 110300 
327 RC2 CBC 128 16 NoPadding 91910 287500 111800 1020083362 100300 95750 109200 
328 RC2 CBC 40 2048 NoPadding 318800 843700 355800 5232061584 337300 330400 348200 
329 RC2 CBC 64 2048 NoPadding 312600 569900 348500 1279547266 339800 330400 356300 
330 RC2 CBC 128 2048 NoPadding 318500 824400 352300 3123175030 338600 333800 352800 
331 RC2 CBC 40 4096 NoPadding 559300 747900 590700 812160016 584000 576000 596900 
332 RC2 CBC 64 4096 NoPadding 554300 1198000 610200 9755115576 586200 577100 610000 
333 RC2 CBC 128 4096 NoPadding 558700 1068000 599800 3167203510 586900 578100 603000 
334 RC2 CFB 40 16 NoPadding 92190 334100 115400 969438772 105000 101900 114100 
335 RC2 CFB 64 16 NoPadding 91910 376900 112100 1208523314 103600 98830 111500 
336 RC2 CFB 128 16 NoPadding 94980 254500 113900 525313887 106600 100700 118500 
337 RC2 CFB 40 2048 NoPadding 341900 752300 375900 2195814967 362500 356400 375000 
338 RC2 CFB 64 2048 NoPadding 340000 632800 379400 1769476073 366400 360500 381600 
339 RC2 CFB 128 2048 NoPadding 342500 674400 379600 1846555856 367500 360900 384500 
340 RC2 CFB 40 4096 NoPadding 610400 1077000 647800 2560248452 635700 628900 651300 
341 RC2 CFB 64 4096 NoPadding 607600 1147000 653500 5718563768 634200 627900 649200 
342 RC2 CFB 128 4096 NoPadding 613800 1157000 652100 5736645067 636100 626800 650700 
343 RC2 ECB 40 16 NoPadding 77660 163700 97980 344585485 91630 86320 103500 
344 RC2 ECB 64 16 NoPadding 77380 268500 101300 711483962 92050 84930 111600 
345 RC2 ECB 128 16 NoPadding 74030 267600 98340 667041623 91770 86600 97640 
346 RC2 ECB 40 2048 NoPadding 287700 390000 312700 407379632 306000 299400 317400 
347 RC2 ECB 64 2048 NoPadding 286100 390800 310300 371157882 303700 297700 316100 
348 RC2 ECB 128 2048 NoPadding 283800 368800 312400 347118087 305800 299200 320800 
349 RC2 ECB 40 4096 NoPadding 502300 975000 537100 2364307211 526700 521600 539300 
350 RC2 ECB 64 4096 NoPadding 505100 1093000 554100 8595888337 529500 521200 552600 
351 RC2 ECB 128 4096 NoPadding 508400 784700 538600 1094067441 531400 522300 546300 
352 RC2 OFB 40 16 NoPadding 96100 369000 118300 1153636862 106900 103900 114700 
353 RC2 OFB 64 16 NoPadding 94980 307900 113500 857569823 102400 98620 115400 
354 RC2 OFB 128 16 NoPadding 94150 296100 114400 1052307356 103600 98900 112700 
355 RC2 OFB 40 2048 NoPadding 340000 847900 371600 3106763617 358400 352500 371800 
356 RC2 OFB 64 2048 NoPadding 341900 897600 384600 7843201765 363900 355100 376200 
357 RC2 OFB 128 2048 NoPadding 345600 530500 372400 760205011 363500 356700 379200 
358 RC2 OFB 40 4096 NoPadding 601800 778000 635000 917946274 626800 618000 640700 
359 RC2 OFB 64 4096 NoPadding 601500 721900 633200 503465986 625900 619800 643800 
360 RC2 OFB 128 4096 NoPadding 597000 1135000 647100 5990410759 627200 619500 645500 
361 RC2 CBC 40 16 ISO 93870 181600 114800 430402253 107400 103400 117400 
362 RC2 CBC 64 16 ISO 93590 261800 112500 777206830 103400 99170 109600 
363 RC2 CBC 128 16 ISO 94430 286100 115200 974119463 105000 99450 116000 
364 RC2 CBC 40 2048 ISO 321000 910500 355600 4000402453 343100 335700 353800 
365 RC2 CBC 64 2048 ISO 317900 582500 354600 1253134060 343200 337500 360100 
366 RC2 CBC 128 2048 ISO 321800 858200 358400 3721755912 343800 338200 356600 
367 RC2 CBC 40 4096 ISO 563200 1077000 603200 3428133500 587500 581000 604300 
368 RC2 CBC 64 4096 ISO 561500 773300 597100 931874181 587400 581900 605600 
369 RC2 CBC 128 4096 ISO 568500 1109000 615100 7323082208 589700 584400 608100 
370 RC2 CFB 40 16 ISO 83250 274300 115800 581188134 108300 104800 116800 
371 RC2 CFB 64 16 ISO 93310 346400 116400 1080299427 105300 101700 116400 
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372 RC2 CFB 128 16 ISO 96940 219000 117000 524104728 107600 103400 120100 
373 RC2 CFB 40 2048 ISO 347300 453100 374400 412364671 368900 363500 379700 
374 RC2 CFB 64 2048 ISO 349800 595600 379800 1397310813 371000 363000 380400 
375 RC2 CFB 128 2048 ISO 346400 920200 385200 4161521790 369500 362500 381900 
376 RC2 CFB 40 4096 ISO 614300 834200 646900 920572709 639900 631600 652500 
377 RC2 CFB 64 4096 ISO 614300 912700 650800 1196277334 642000 634100 656200 
378 RC2 CFB 128 4096 ISO 614300 861600 652900 1227455807 641600 635500 657600 
379 RC2 ECB 40 16 ISO 77940 184900 98840 392738791 91490 87580 102200 
380 RC2 ECB 64 16 ISO 78780 260900 102700 630099821 95260 88770 105600 
381 RC2 ECB 128 16 ISO 77380 346700 106600 1350064265 96240 91280 111700 
382 RC2 ECB 40 2048 ISO 291900 400300 314000 342258606 309500 301900 321100 
383 RC2 ECB 64 2048 ISO 285500 528600 317200 1003527602 309100 301100 322700 
384 RC2 ECB 128 2048 ISO 288900 459800 313300 549914004 307300 301400 317000 
385 RC2 ECB 40 4096 ISO 510400 656200 537900 540220195 531400 525600 544800 
386 RC2 ECB 64 4096 ISO 511500 1057000 546800 3645003954 534800 526500 546800 
387 RC2 ECB 128 4096 ISO 514600 730500 548500 790698383 541300 533000 552900 
388 RC2 OFB 40 16 ISO 99180 347800 122800 1318834999 110800 106400 125200 
389 RC2 OFB 64 16 ISO 95820 301700 117500 959562364 106200 101400 123800 
390 RC2 OFB 128 16 ISO 96660 214000 112700 430119944 105000 101100 116600 
391 RC2 OFB 40 2048 ISO 343600 485800 373900 655326478 366500 357900 379100 
392 RC2 OFB 64 2048 ISO 347500 526900 376400 1018075566 365800 360500 379900 
393 RC2 OFB 128 2048 ISO 343900 536700 376700 894360615 367200 361200 380100 
394 RC2 OFB 40 4096 ISO 609900 794200 639500 666959086 632600 625100 649900 
395 RC2 OFB 64 4096 ISO 607300 1214000 658000 9019546736 633000 625400 646700 
396 RC2 OFB 128 4096 ISO 611300 819100 648800 1195513630 637800 629400 654300 
397 RC2 CBC 40 16 PKCS5 97220 276600 117600 644657089 108700 104200 121100 
398 RC2 CBC 64 16 PKCS5 97500 283600 118100 918277039 107300 103200 117300 
399 RC2 CBC 128 16 PKCS5 95260 207000 116400 594750964 106000 102200 121200 
400 RC2 CBC 40 2048 PKCS5 326000 883400 357100 3196223871 346000 340500 359100 
401 RC2 CBC 64 2048 PKCS5 323200 481300 352300 519292144 346800 339600 358600 
402 RC2 CBC 128 2048 PKCS5 322700 448400 354600 519431893 347400 341200 363000 
403 RC2 CBC 40 4096 PKCS5 570200 1091000 607800 3726600433 593200 587500 608900 
404 RC2 CBC 64 4096 PKCS5 564600 793700 599600 992029100 589900 582100 609600 
405 RC2 CBC 128 4096 PKCS5 563800 1132000 613800 4446990131 595500 588000 621700 
406 RC2 CFB 40 16 PKCS5 98340 290500 121100 786834989 112600 105300 122500 
407 RC2 CFB 64 16 PKCS5 96100 373200 120900 1312170390 108300 105000 120800 
408 RC2 CFB 128 16 PKCS5 98620 256500 118700 676559755 109900 106100 119100 
409 RC2 CFB 40 2048 PKCS5 350300 1297000 386600 9123433238 368900 363300 385000 
410 RC2 CFB 64 2048 PKCS5 351200 539700 382500 916680983 370600 365900 391900 
411 RC2 CFB 128 2048 PKCS5 351400 877500 392200 5180859701 373200 367000 394100 
412 RC2 CFB 40 4096 PKCS5 615400 749500 646200 605383471 638100 630200 651200 
413 RC2 CFB 64 4096 PKCS5 618800 825500 651600 1035705635 640700 632800 658700 
414 RC2 CFB 128 4096 PKCS5 619600 906800 655400 1330685581 644200 637800 663500 
415 RC2 ECB 40 16 PKCS5 84930 264000 106600 572071965 98760 93450 109600 
416 RC2 ECB 64 16 PKCS5 74310 193300 99300 466318965 90790 86880 101800 
417 RC2 ECB 128 16 PKCS5 79900 301400 104000 708363485 95960 90100 109300 
418 RC2 ECB 40 2048 PKCS5 297200 398900 319900 448239531 312500 307800 325100 
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419 RC2 ECB 64 2048 PKCS5 291700 630800 317200 1299551732 308300 303800 319100 
420 RC2 ECB 128 2048 PKCS5 294500 462600 324100 983658508 311900 307200 327000 
421 RC2 ECB 40 4096 PKCS5 510700 638100 541200 458834494 535000 528800 547000 
422 RC2 ECB 64 4096 PKCS5 515200 1069000 549500 3543643793 535800 530800 549000 
423 RC2 ECB 128 4096 PKCS5 514600 624900 545300 573209241 537500 530400 555900 
424 RC2 OFB 40 16 PKCS5 96380 248400 120400 639761043 111900 107600 120100 
425 RC2 OFB 64 16 PKCS5 98900 308400 120300 818502704 112000 107000 118800 
426 RC2 OFB 128 16 PKCS5 97220 322700 117000 899100751 107300 103900 115600 
427 RC2 OFB 40 2048 PKCS5 345000 572100 376300 855627739 367600 362300 381100 
428 RC2 OFB 64 2048 PKCS5 350300 442800 377000 445339216 369600 362800 384100 
429 RC2 OFB 128 2048 PKCS5 349500 510700 378800 724898016 369300 364300 385500 
430 RC2 OFB 40 4096 PKCS5 612600 826600 647100 1183789747 635100 629200 652500 
431 RC2 OFB 64 4096 PKCS5 610100 1195000 648700 3763445769 634300 626000 657100 
432 RC2 OFB 128 4096 PKCS5 615400 1198000 659600 9003309195 634000 628300 653400 
433 AES CBC 128 1024 NoPadding 183300 448100 217000 977424044 206700 201100 218700 
434 AES CBC 192 1024 NoPadding 190500 404500 227200 1405319179 214000 206600 236300 
435 AES CBC 256 1024 NoPadding 186600 484400 218900 1274249182 209000 200700 226000 
436 AES CFB 128 1024 NoPadding 177400 475200 203400 1204904863 194900 187000 208300 
437 AES CFB 192 1024 NoPadding 182700 517900 210400 1430006239 201100 192800 210300 
438 AES CFB 256 1024 NoPadding 191400 333800 218500 611200515 210100 202200 220800 
439 AES ECB 128 1024 NoPadding 155000 258700 177500 415862448 172500 163400 184200 
440 AES ECB 192 1024 NoPadding 164300 310700 187000 557113058 180200 173200 191100 
441 AES ECB 256 1024 NoPadding 173200 700400 203600 2910799020 193200 184900 207100 
442 AES OFB 128 1024 NoPadding 175200 719900 207600 3270009752 197900 184300 212500 
443 AES OFB 192 1024 NoPadding 179600 738900 214300 3367887924 202800 191600 219000 
444 AES OFB 256 1024 NoPadding 188600 325500 215900 611663060 208100 200700 218700 
445 AES CBC 128 1024 ISO 177700 359800 206200 840899795 198500 184700 216600 
446 AES CBC 192 1024 ISO 181900 317900 212300 804761642 202000 195800 215600 
447 AES CBC 256 1024 ISO 191900 310700 221600 697535802 212900 204700 228400 
448 AES CFB 128 1024 ISO 180700 325700 210800 894514812 201300 192400 216700 
449 AES CFB 192 1024 ISO 191400 787200 221100 3865460754 206000 201600 219800 
450 AES CFB 256 1024 ISO 198900 341100 224500 687120045 216800 210000 226400 
451 AES ECB 128 1024 ISO 152500 741400 190600 3708002944 177300 169300 193200 
452 AES ECB 192 1024 ISO 165700 291700 191300 527279123 185400 174900 195900 
453 AES ECB 256 1024 ISO 175700 330800 200300 731106671 193600 185400 205100 
454 AES OFB 128 1024 ISO 178200 655400 211300 2798447922 197500 191100 211400 
455 AES OFB 192 1024 ISO 183800 331300 213400 809365356 203200 196300 217800 
456 AES OFB 256 1024 ISO 192200 371600 222500 923709366 214300 204200 228700 
457 AES CBC 128 1024 PKCS5 181300 335800 211700 773757562 203700 193900 222700 
458 AES CBC 192 1024 PKCS5 187200 392000 222000 1111790203 209500 198700 237900 
459 AES CBC 256 1024 PKCS5 194400 317900 225300 694652239 217300 207700 236100 
460 AES CFB 128 1024 PKCS5 182400 308400 212800 702520302 205600 193300 224700 
461 AES CFB 192 1024 PKCS5 187500 298600 216900 576344378 208400 202300 224900 
462 AES CFB 256 1024 PKCS5 198600 322100 226800 665863696 219000 208700 235400 
463 AES ECB 128 1024 PKCS5 160600 300600 190000 780012571 181600 172900 192900 
464 AES ECB 192 1024 PKCS5 169300 276600 194000 534419136 185900 177900 198700 
465 AES ECB 256 1024 PKCS5 175400 686700 209200 3240055576 196700 186300 209000 
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466 AES OFB 128 1024 PKCS5 177400 685600 213200 3699022991 198100 190200 210600 
467 AES OFB 192 1024 PKCS5 190200 722700 225100 3736165950 209200 200200 224100 
468 AES OFB 256 1024 PKCS5 197200 384700 226500 834136234 218200 210900 231000 
469 DES CBC 56 1024 NoPadding 244700 757100 272900 3197149176 258400 252200 269500 
470 DES CFB 56 1024 NoPadding 242500 476900 279000 1121292240 269300 263700 277700 
471 DES ECB 56 1024 NoPadding 223500 449500 255300 1073002453 247100 241400 253900 
472 DES OFB 56 1024 NoPadding 252800 495300 281100 1163643670 268200 261700 288400 
473 DES CBC 56 1024 ISO 239400 470700 280900 1000695220 269200 265100 284500 
474 DES CFB 56 1024 ISO 257300 845400 287500 4024451186 271700 265700 287000 
475 DES ECB 56 1024 ISO 229600 804600 264600 3850512946 249600 243500 267300 
476 DES OFB 56 1024 ISO 252800 596200 282600 1539043386 270100 264800 284600 
477 DES CBC 56 1024 PKCS5 248600 460700 278000 880728867 267900 262300 278500 
478 DES CFB 56 1024 PKCS5 252800 449800 286600 955167021 274200 268200 296000 
479 DES ECB 56 1024 PKCS5 237500 432500 260900 855886954 251800 246100 260600 
480 DES OFB 56 1024 PKCS5 258400 494800 285400 1306622773 272900 268400 281000 
481 TDES CBC 112 1024 NoPadding 459300 701800 484800 1417410917 469200 465600 488100 
482 TDES CBC 168 1024 NoPadding 452900 947300 489200 3931357186 469900 464800 479600 
483 TDES CFB 112 1024 NoPadding 458200 980900 489600 3881717265 472000 465400 484200 
484 TDES CFB 168 1024 NoPadding 456500 976400 490400 3754665235 472500 465700 487400 
485 TDES ECB 112 1024 NoPadding 436600 966300 466000 3768944891 449800 444100 459000 
486 TDES ECB 168 1024 NoPadding 438900 1117000 468200 5338666330 451200 447200 462200 
487 TDES OFB 112 1024 NoPadding 455400 1152000 494800 7570046064 471800 466000 483700 
488 TDES OFB 168 1024 NoPadding 455900 650100 486900 1282234562 472300 467100 491800 
489 TDES CBC 112 1024 ISO 459800 983400 493500 3468899984 478300 470200 496800 
490 TDES CBC 168 1024 ISO 463500 992000 501300 5979983329 479300 473700 494500 
491 TDES CFB 112 1024 ISO 464300 707100 489300 1218323585 476200 471200 490600 
492 TDES CFB 168 1024 ISO 465700 987600 493800 3853369675 476600 471300 488500 
493 TDES ECB 112 1024 ISO 443900 999300 472200 3701461080 455600 450600 469500 
494 TDES ECB 168 1024 ISO 441100 667700 472000 1336618978 459300 453400 468300 
495 TDES OFB 112 1024 ISO 464000 1084000 497500 4993666422 478800 472700 490700 
496 TDES OFB 168 1024 ISO 462100 988700 505100 6685688551 480400 474300 495000 
497 TDES CBC 112 1024 PKCS5 463200 681100 492900 1255948264 480500 473500 494800 
498 TDES CBC 168 1024 PKCS5 464600 686700 494200 1437868233 480600 474900 493100 
499 TDES CFB 112 1024 PKCS5 454200 701500 493200 1192657212 481800 476800 493600 
500 TDES CFB 168 1024 PKCS5 467700 715500 493400 1434738169 480600 476800 492200 
501 TDES ECB 112 1024 PKCS5 445300 985600 473500 3471330421 460400 455400 467200 
502 TDES ECB 168 1024 PKCS5 445300 684400 468600 1349100226 457600 452400 465500 
503 TDES OFB 112 1024 PKCS5 464300 857100 492300 2139528337 480600 471800 490000 
504 TDES OFB 168 1024 PKCS5 462900 769400 497700 1729253212 484800 478800 496600 
505 BF CBC 56 1024 NoPadding 325500 829400 366200 3733333890 352000 346300 361400 
506 BF CBC 112 1024 NoPadding 314000 949300 352200 4909370859 336900 330500 352900 
507 BF CBC 256 1024 NoPadding 317600 893700 350900 4352731777 336800 329300 351300 
508 BF CFB 56 1024 NoPadding 314600 573300 343800 1030641866 336200 326800 347900 
509 BF CFB 112 1024 NoPadding 317100 450100 344600 684601127 336100 328500 348400 
510 BF CFB 256 1024 NoPadding 321000 804900 357100 4664348763 342500 332100 355200 
511 BF ECB 56 1024 NoPadding 297500 848400 324300 3160966639 314300 306400 321900 
512 BF ECB 112 1024 NoPadding 297500 508400 321500 673956306 314700 307700 326900 
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513 BF ECB 256 1024 NoPadding 298900 816900 327200 2919963929 316400 307200 327600 
514 BF OFB 56 1024 NoPadding 315700 857400 346000 3210615476 335000 325900 344300 
515 BF OFB 112 1024 NoPadding 316000 868800 346700 3578512463 333700 327100 345200 
516 BF OFB 256 1024 NoPadding 317600 851200 348800 3536488917 334800 325500 344600 
517 BF CBC 56 1024 ISO 317900 904000 347700 4089592298 336800 325500 344400 
518 BF CBC 112 1024 ISO 319600 845100 348800 3619210453 335900 330300 346100 
519 BF CBC 256 1024 ISO 319000 573800 345100 906352493 337600 331000 346100 
520 BF CFB 56 1024 ISO 317600 878300 355300 6325065526 338900 329200 350400 
521 BF CFB 112 1024 ISO 317400 662100 350900 1577361594 340300 331500 354000 
522 BF CFB 256 1024 ISO 321800 849300 352000 3124953547 340400 331300 351800 
523 BF ECB 56 1024 ISO 300300 542000 327000 979640077 317400 308800 334400 
524 BF ECB 112 1024 ISO 300900 430500 322600 391920480 317100 308000 326600 
525 BF ECB 256 1024 ISO 300000 579100 329700 1066536740 321300 315000 334900 
526 BF OFB 56 1024 ISO 309300 429100 346400 484247181 338200 332000 357500 
527 BF OFB 112 1024 ISO 319000 882500 352200 3767023471 338000 333200 348900 
528 BF OFB 256 1024 ISO 325500 528300 349400 821569449 341200 334000 350700 
529 BF CBC 56 1024 PKCS5 324100 561000 352500 1637677505 337900 332400 349700 
530 BF CBC 112 1024 PKCS5 326900 528600 351000 898530981 341800 334600 352100 
531 BF CBC 256 1024 PKCS5 322100 880600 353900 3909985851 340800 332400 348400 
532 BF CFB 56 1024 PKCS5 320400 855100 352500 3255853956 340000 330400 350900 
533 BF CFB 112 1024 PKCS5 323800 536400 352100 869216279 344700 335200 358200 
534 BF CFB 256 1024 PKCS5 320700 424100 346800 512142615 341700 333300 347600 
535 BF ECB 56 1024 PKCS5 304200 481300 327300 606883308 321500 312300 329000 
536 BF ECB 112 1024 PKCS5 306700 415400 325900 360849749 321800 312000 331300 
537 BF ECB 256 1024 PKCS5 305300 533300 329100 774235945 321100 313900 333800 
538 BF OFB 56 1024 PKCS5 321500 883900 358200 3407384933 345000 336600 359000 
539 BF OFB 112 1024 PKCS5 319600 534400 350400 775906984 342200 333900 359600 
540 BF OFB 256 1024 PKCS5 319000 978100 366900 9373951686 344600 336100 360200 
541 RC2 CBC 40 1024 NoPadding 200900 378800 227100 650641653 218300 210600 235100 
542 RC2 CBC 64 1024 NoPadding 197800 313400 225100 626352470 217900 207600 230100 
543 RC2 CBC 128 1024 NoPadding 197500 378500 224700 964752286 214300 206900 232500 
544 RC2 CFB 40 1024 NoPadding 211500 768800 242600 3488323431 231200 221000 243700 
545 RC2 CFB 64 1024 NoPadding 214300 457900 242500 1212064288 232300 223200 248200 
546 RC2 CFB 128 1024 NoPadding 211500 359500 237500 541855687 230500 223400 241700 
547 RC2 ECB 40 1024 NoPadding 176600 1148000 208400 9625559789 193600 185900 204300 
548 RC2 ECB 64 1024 NoPadding 179100 720800 216200 3603334446 199500 189500 226200 
549 RC2 ECB 128 1024 NoPadding 180700 778000 224300 3858684097 217100 197000 235400 
550 RC2 OFB 40 1024 NoPadding 215100 357300 249900 956383617 238400 229200 261200 
551 RC2 OFB 64 1024 NoPadding 209000 726400 241000 2988782762 229100 220300 241400 
552 RC2 OFB 128 1024 NoPadding 209800 424600 234700 878623488 223800 218700 236300 
553 RC2 CBC 40 1024 ISO 197500 1207000 235400 10176256164 218500 210000 236300 
554 RC2 CBC 64 1024 ISO 200900 363500 228400 668249864 220000 210100 239700 
555 RC2 CBC 128 1024 ISO 201100 444500 227400 988629820 216900 211100 231100 
556 RC2 CFB 40 1024 ISO 213200 487800 239600 1013734224 231700 224000 243700 
557 RC2 CFB 64 1024 ISO 210400 500300 242700 1430009701 231200 223300 246300 
558 RC2 CFB 128 1024 ISO 213400 464900 239900 905808602 231700 223800 245700 
559 RC2 ECB 40 1024 ISO 177400 327100 202400 524006571 195300 189900 206200 
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560 RC2 ECB 64 1024 ISO 177400 725800 211400 6034166605 193500 188400 202500 
561 RC2 ECB 128 1024 ISO 176600 320700 202700 601070177 195000 189800 207400 
562 RC2 OFB 40 1024 ISO 212300 381900 239000 858049152 230100 223500 240000 
563 RC2 OFB 64 1024 ISO 204500 710700 243800 3239155155 229800 220300 244500 
564 RC2 OFB 128 1024 ISO 212300 402000 238900 882589144 229400 222200 245000 
565 RC2 CBC 40 1024 PKCS5 202000 361200 227400 766261381 218300 211100 231500 
566 RC2 CBC 64 1024 PKCS5 203100 861300 229800 4421298071 218200 210600 227800 
567 RC2 CBC 128 1024 PKCS5 203400 785600 231300 3606120608 218600 212600 231200 
568 RC2 CFB 40 1024 PKCS5 210400 699500 244500 2726832528 234700 225400 248100 
569 RC2 CFB 64 1024 PKCS5 214800 374600 241100 508247478 235100 226800 245400 
570 RC2 CFB 128 1024 PKCS5 214600 1154000 250400 8796685864 233700 225700 255100 
571 RC2 ECB 40 1024 PKCS5 179100 295300 201200 323252128 195800 190100 205800 
572 RC2 ECB 64 1024 PKCS5 180200 270700 204000 285467850 198600 191600 211000 
573 RC2 ECB 128 1024 PKCS5 179600 269900 201700 282921488 198900 190700 204600 
574 RC2 OFB 40 1024 PKCS5 213200 316800 240300 433824682 232400 226800 243300 
575 RC2 OFB 64 1024 PKCS5 209000 708700 242500 2710760214 230100 222700 248500 
576 RC2 OFB 128 1024 PKCS5 210900 353700 238200 589062180 229600 224800 241000 
 
  
 
 
